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Abstract
High demand of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in recent time requires LNG carriers in more
frequent operations in order to meet customers' needs. To ensure that the LNG carriers are
always reliable in service, it has become necessary to adopt various advanced modelling
techniques such as Genetic Algorithm (GA), fuzzy logic and Evidential Reasoning (ER) for
risk/safety assessment and maintenance modelling of LNG carrier operations. These
advanced computational techniques can help to overcome challenges posed by uncertainties
associated with the LNG carrier operations. Their usefulness is demonstrated using case
studies in this research.
Firstly, two major hazards of LNG carrier operations such as "failure of LNG containment
system" and "LNG spill from transfer arm" are identified and estimated as high risk ones
using a risk matrix technique and expert judgement. The causes (failure modeslbasic
events) of these high risk hazards are analysed using a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The
failure logics of their failure modes are established and Boolean algebra is applied to
facilitate the evaluation of the failure probabilities and frequencies.
Secondly, a GA model is developed to improve the safety levels of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm, to minimise their maintenance costs and to realise optimal
resource management. The GA is used to optimise a risk model that is developed with
exponential distribution and parameters such as failure frequencies, unit costs of
maintenance and new maintenance costs of the LNG containment system and transfer arm.
Thirdly, the uncertainties of some parameters in the GA model such as unit costs of
maintenance are subdued using the strength of Fuzzy Rule Base (FRB) in combination with
GA. 125 fuzzy rules of LNG carrier system maintenance cost are developed, which makes
it possible to facilitate the evaluation of maintenance cost in any specific LNG risk-based
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operation. The outcomes of unit costs of maintenance are used in the GA based risk model
to update the optimal management of maintenance cost.
Finally, the uncertainties of failure modes of the LNG containment system and transfer arm
are investigated and treated based on the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) principle using a
Fuzzy ER (FER) approach. The fuzzy logic is used to estimate the safety/risk levels of
those failure modes while the ER is used to synthesise them to facilitate the estimation of
safety/risk levels of the top events. Risk Control Options (RCOs) are developed to manage
high level risks. The costs for each of the RCOs are estimated and synthesised using ER,
which facilitated the investigation of the best RCOs in risk-based decision making.
There is no doubt that the methodologies proposed possess significant potential for use in
improving safety and maintenance of LNG carrier operations based on the verifications of
their corresponding test cases. Accordingly, the developed models can be integrated to
formulate a platform to facilitate risk assessment and maintenance management of LNG
carrier systems in situations where traditional techniques cannot be applied with
confidence.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Summary
In this chapter, the background analysis of the research is conducted, followed by the
discussion of research aim and objectives. The challenges of conducting the research, the
research methodology and scope of the thesis are also described. The structure of the thesis
is outlined with the view of addressing the methodologies of risk-based maintenance and
subjective risk assessment of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier operations.
1.1. Background Analysis
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) earners are well designed ships that have maintained
excellent safety records for years, though recently, the number of voyages per year has
increased. This drastic increase in the number of voyages per year of LNG carriers, has lead
to questions about the safety and reliability of the vessels while in operations because of
hazards that will be introduced in meeting the world's high demand of LNG. The
International Maritime Organization (lMO), Society of International Gas Tanker and
Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), and International Association of Classification Societies
(lACS) such as American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Bureau Veritas (BV), Det Norske
Veritas (DNV), Korean Register of Shipping, and Nippon Kaiji Kyokai have put their
efforts and time to ensure that risks associated with LNG facilities are mitigated in their
technical design standards and operating procedures to an acceptable level. Therefore, it is
necessary to assess the effectiveness of the safety features used, which is of particular
significance when limited resources and assets are available.
The IMO has proven that risk assessment is effective in the maritime industry via the
introduction of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology after studying notable
accidents, including the tragedy of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987, the Piper
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Alpha accident, 1988 and the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989. These catastrophic marine
and offshore accidents drove the United Kingdom Maritime and Coastguard Agency (UK
MCA) to propose FSA to the IMO in 1993. This can support the relevance of this study that
risk assessment and maintenance modelling need to be proactively carried out on the LNG
carrier operations because of the rapid increase in the number of LNG carriers used in the
LNG industry. The aim of maintenance is to ensure that LNG carrier systems are reliable
while in operation and minimize their downtime and maintenance cost. Different types of
maintenance strategies can be applied to LNG carrier systems as stand-alone or
simultaneous in a cost effective manner.
The components of a LNG value chain include natural gas production, liquefaction of
natural gas, transportation of LNG, re-gasification, and distribution to end users (Foss,
2003, Sophia and Anne, 2006). In this research, there is particular emphasis on the
transportation of LNG using LNG carriers for the risk assessment framework. Therefore, a
generic LNG carrier is used to facilitate an understanding of the subject under study and
can help identify relevant hazards. LNG is natural gas that becomes liquefied at a
temperature of approximately -256°F (-160°C) after pretreatment for easy storage and
transportation by LNG carriers. It occupies 1I600th the volume of its gaseous state. When
vaporized, its flammability range is between approximately 5% and 15% by volume, i.e. a
mixture with air within this range of concentrations is flammable (Vanem et al., 2008).
Thus, the framework developed in this research encompasses a generic LNG carrier and its
systems and subsystems that could fail to cause a LNG spill. The greatest concerns of the
LNG carrier are loss of containment, LNG spill on deck, fire and explosion, gas release,
disposal of boil off, and over/under pressure. The framework is based on the generic LNG
carrier and its systems and subsystems, since the difference between the carriers is the
containment system, which is either membrane, spherical or prismatic tank type. Membrane
tank design type is mostly used in the industry because of its relatively higher utilization of
the hull volume for the cargo capacity. Although the ship dimensions are smaller than
similar spherical (moss) and prismatic type LNG carriers of the same cargo capacity, the
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boil-off gas amount carried by the membrane tank type vessels is higher compared to that
of the spherical tank type because of the way they have been designed.
The developed framework of a generic LNG carrier can ensure the proactive safety of LNG
vessels and their systems/subsystems as well as provides a basis of analysing the measures
of their pollution prevention to the maritime environment by the identification of their
hazards. The risks associated with the hazards will be estimated and prioritized using a risk
matrix approach and expert judgement.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) will be adopted for Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and
Genetic Algorithm (GA) will be used for maintenance modelling of the high risk LNG
carrier systems. Uncertainty treatment of unit costs of maintenance of the high risk LNG
carrier systems will be conducted using a combination of fuzzy logic and GA, while
subjective risk assessment of the high risk LNG carrier systems based on FSA methodology
will be conducted using a combination of fuzzy logic and Evidential Reasoning (ER).
1.2. Research Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research is to conduct a proactive risk assessment and maintenance
modelling of LNG carrier operations under uncertainties. The methodology will be
proactively based. This will be useful to the LNG industry to prevent and mitigate any
prospective accidents that will cause loss of lives, great damage to LNG carrier systems and
environmental pollution. To achieve this aim, the following objectives are outlined:
• Conduct a comprehensive literature search on relevant hazards of LNG carrier
operations and risk prioritization using a risk matrix approach.
• Carry out PRA of a LNG containment system and a LNG transfer arm, which are areas
of high risk of LNG carriers, using a FTA method.
• Carry out maintenance modelling of LNG carrier systems using a GA approach,
thereby identifying their maintenance costs as a safety improvement measure.
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• Develop a novel methodology for uncertainty treatment of unit costs of maintenance of
a LNG containment system and a LNG transfer arm using Fuzzy Rule Base (FRB) and
GA for optimization of the risk model.
• Develop a novel methodology for subjective risk assessment and control of a LNG
containment system and a LNG transfer arm by employing a combination of fuzzy
logic and ER, based on a FSA methodology.
The above objectives will be achieved in this research from Chapters 2 to 6. Novel
methodologies are detailed in various chapters with case studies. Literature review of this
research is detailed in Chapter 2, followed by Hazard Identification (HAZID) and risk
priorization in Chapter 3. A combination of FTA and GA is detailed in Chapter 4, while a
combination of GA and FRB is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 proposes a combination
of fuzzy logic and ER.
1.3. Challenges of Conducting the Research
In maintaining the outstanding safety records of LNG carriers, there are some challenges
encountered while conducting risk assessment and maintenance modelling of the LNG
carrier operations in this research. These challenges have been treated in both certain and
uncertain environments. Novel methodologies are developed to handle the uncertain
situations of LNG carrier operations with respect to risk assessment and maintenance
modelling. In view of that, the challenges are outlined and handled as follows:
• HAZID of a generic LNG carrier. The hazards of generic LNG carrier operations pose
to be a challenge, as this research is not based on investigation of any accident that has
happened. It is a purely proactive HAZID process. This challenge is handled by
thorough literature search and consultation with experienced marine professionals. The
risks of the hazards are estimated using a risk matrix approach and expert judgement.
• Construction of FTA of a LNG containment system and a LNG transfer arm. The
developments of causes of top events such as "failure of the LNG containment system"
and "LNG spills from the transfer arm" are challenging tasks. In development of any
4
FTA diagram, different designers do identify various failure modes (basic events),
though, the causes of the top event and their failure logic are always similar. However,
effort and time is put in construction of the FTA diagrams of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm failures with the assistance of marine professionals.
Significant failure modes are identified.
• Formulation of an objective function (risk model) for maintenance optimization using
GA. To form a mathematical relationship among all the needed parameters of a LNG
containment system and a LNG transfer arm for optimal risk control solution is a
difficult task. This problem is solved by using the risk. formula for the LNG
containment system and transfer arm, time-cost relationship, and the relationship
between the budgeted maintenance cost of high risk LNG carrier systems and
maintenance cost of each of the high risk systems.
• Development of a novel methodology for uncertainty treatment of unit costs of
maintenance of a LNG containment system and a LNG transfer arm. This challenge is
tackled by employing the FRB method. The 125 rules of the FRB are developed with
the antecedents (technical consultancy cost, maintenance duration and spare part cost)
as well as with the consequent (maintenance cost). Relevant rules are fired and fuzzy
values of unit costs of maintenance of the LNG containment system and transfer arm
are identified. The fuzzy values are defuzzified to crisp values using Weighted Mean of
Maximum (WMoM).
• Development of a novel methodology for uncertainty treatment of failure modes of a
LNG containment system and a LNG transfer arm. This challenge is solved by using
the FER approach, based on a FSA methodology. The fuzzy set manipulation. formula
is used to estimate the degree of beliefs (DoBs) of different categories of safety levels
of failure modes of the LNG containment system and transfer arm, while the ER is
used to synthesise their results to ascertain the safety levels of the systems.
1.4. Research Methodology and Scope of Thesis
The research methodology carried out in this thesis is risk assessment of LNG carrier
operations and its maintenance modelling for safety improvement in the LNG industry. The
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risk assessment is carried out in both certain and uncertain environments. In the uncertain
environments, the FSA principle is adopted in the risk assessment process of the LNG
carrier operations. Eight chapters are established to realize this research methodology.
In Chapter 1, the background of this research is explained together with the research aim
and objectives, challenges of conducting the research and the structure of this thesis. This
chapter is well organized for a clear idea of the subject under investigation.
In Chapter 2, a thorough and comprehensive literature review of safety and maintenance
issues relating to LNG carriers is conducted. This involves an investigation of the
properties of LNG and various LNG accidents/incidents that can assist in improvement of
safety of the LNG carriers. Regulations governing safety of LNG shipping that have
contributed to safe operations of the LNG carriers for years are also reviewed. Maintenance
is studied, including advantages and disadvantages of different types of maintenance
strategies. In view of these reviews, and the current and future status of LNG carrier
operations due to high energy demand, the needs for this research arise. Risk assessment
and a FSA methodology are introduced as the way forward. The usefulness of GA, fuzzy
logic and ER as risk-based modeling techniques is identified and presented, followed by the
justification for this research.
In Chapter 3, HAZIO of LNG carrier operations is conducted, which is the first step to
providing a solution to potential accidents/incidents of LNG carriers. The hazards are
identified after a thorough literature search and brainstorming of experts. The risk matrix
approach is adopted for priorization of risks of the hazards. In the risk matrix technique, the
Occurrence likelihoods of hazards are described with linguistic terms such as frequent,
probable, occasional and remote while the consequences of hazards are described using
linguistic terms such as catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible. The mechanism of
the risk matrix technique is used to, assign scores to hazards for effective mapping on the
risk matrix table, which facilitates the estimation of high risk hazards by expert judgements.
The high risk hazards of the LNG carrier operations are identified as "failure of the LNG
containment system" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm" and are represented using FTA
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diagrams with undeveloped events for comprehensive risk assessment in the following
chapters.
Chapter 4 explains the application of FTA and GA to risk-based maintenance of high risk
LNG carrier systems. The FTA of the LNG containment system and transfer arm that are in
a undeveloped event form in Chapter 3, is developed in basic event (failure mode) form and
has top events such as "failure of the LNG containment system" and "LNG spill from the
transfer arm" for PRA. The PRA is conducted with the assumption of failure modes being
independent to estimate the failure probabilities of the LNG containment system and
transfer arm. The failure frequencies of the LNG containment system and transfer arm are
also calculated. A mathematical (risk) model is developed using parameters such as hazard
severity weight, failure probabilities, failure frequencies, unit cost of maintenance, new cost
of maintenance, time of maintenance and budgeted cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier
systems. To identify the new costs of maintenance of the LNG containment system and
transfer arm for a safety improvement measure, GA is used to optimize the risk model,
satisfying the constraints of the objective function that is made up of unit costs of
maintenance, new cost of maintenance and budgeted maintenance cost. Validations of
results are conducted to ascertain the new cost of maintenance of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm.
Chapter 5 details how the FRB method is used to treat uncertainties of unit costs of
maintenance of the LNG containment system and transfer arm in the optimization of the
risk model using GA. The resultant unit costs of maintenance are used to substitute the
former ones of the LNG containment system and transfer arm in the risk model in Chapter
4. The risk model is minimized using GA to identify the new costs of maintenance of the
LNG containment system and transfer arm. All the maintenance costs used and produced in
optimization of the risk model are noted and compared with all the previous maintenance
costs in Chapter 4. The maintenance cost differences are noted and the advantages of FRB
method are revealed. The FRB is used to combine different experts' opinions of unit costs
of maintenance of the LNG containment system and transfer arm.
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In uncertain situations of failure modes of the LNG containment system and transfer arm
due to lack of data of failure frequencies, Chapter 6 provides a step by step solution for
such problems based on the FSA methodology. Firstly, safety/risk levels of the identified
failure modes of the developed FTA of the LNG containment system and transfer arm in
Chapter 4 are estimated using the mechanism of the fuzzy set manipulation formula in the
HAZID and risk assessment phases. The estimated safety levels of failure modes of the
LNG containment system and transfer arm are synthesised using the mechanism of ER to
ascertain their respective safety levels.
In Risk Control Option (RCO) and Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) phases, three RCOs are
forecasted for the LNG containment system and transfer arm respectively. The cost of using
any of the RCOs in the risk reduction is estimated by four experts and their judgements are
systhesised using ER to obtain the actual estimated cost of a particular RCO. The safety
level of the LNG containment system is synthesised with the estimated cost for each RCO
and mapped onto utility space for the decision making phase. A similar process is applied
to estimate the safety level of the LNG transfer arm.
In decision making, the preference degree for each RCO is calculated using DoB of the
utility space, and the highest preference degree can be noted. The RCO with the highest
preference degree is the one needed to improve the safety of the LNG containment system.
In this case, the RCO is to carrying out maintenance activities. In a similar way, the most
preferable RCO for the LNG transfer arm is also to carrying out maintenance activities.
Other RCOs of the LNG containment system are "regular inspection of the system per
voyage" and ''training of crew members on new technology and change of operating
procedures in loading of LNG to the containment system". The RCOs of the LNG transfer
arm that are not selected as the best ones are "use of well experienced personnel in
loading/unloading of LNG" and "redesign of the system".
In Chapter 7, discussions of the results produced in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are detailed. The
strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies used in these chapters are described. The
industries that can use this research are identified.
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In Chapter 8, discussion of the conclusion of this research is detailed. The pathway of
achieving the main aim of this research is discussed, while limitation of the research is also
outlined. New areas in the LNG industry where the methodology of this research will be
useful are recommended for future studies.
1.5. Structure of the PhD Thesis
The research is structured from Chapters 1 to 8. The name of each chapter is listed in Table
1.1. The information flow diagram of this research is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The flow of
information is started in Chapter 1, the introduction to this research. This gives rise to
Chapter 2, which is literature review of all relevant subjects under investigation. The
information produced from Chapter 2 is used to develop other chapters.
Table 1.1: Summary of the Chapters in this Research
Chapter No. Title
1 Introduction
2 Literature Review
3 Hazard Identification and Risk Prioritization of Liquefied Natural Gas
Carrier Operations using a Risk Matrix Approach
4 Application of Genetic Algorithm to Risk-based Maintenance
Operations of Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems
5 A Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm Approach·to Analyse Maintenance Cost of
High Risk Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems under Uncertainty
6 A New Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning Method for Risk Analysis and
Control of Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems
7 Discussion
8 Conclusion
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Chapter 3 identifies hazards and prioritizes risks of LNG carrier operations, which provides
a foundation for solution to other chapters. Chapter 4 exploits the information provided
from Chapter 3 for effective risk-based maintenance operations of the LNG carrier systems.
Its aims are re-examined in Chapters 5 and 6 due to/in event of existence of uncertainties of
unit costs of maintenance and failure modes of the LNG carrier systems as a result of
ambiguity and lack of data respectively. Chapter 7 discusses the results produced in other
chapters, and the advantages and disadvantages of the methods used in these chapters.
Finally, the conclusion of this research is drawn in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review
r ------------------------------------ -
Chapter 3 - Hazard Identification and Risk Prioritization of Liquefied
Natural Gas Carrier Operations using a Risk Matrix Approach
~
Chapter 4 - Application of Genetic Algorithm to Risk-based
Maintenance Operations of Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems
~ ~
Chapter 5 - A Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm Chapter 6 - A New Fuzzy Evidential
Approach to Analyse Maintenance Cost of
~
Reasoning Method for Risk Analysis
High Risk Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier and Control of Liquefied Natural Gas
Systems under Uncertainty Carrier Systems
,,,,,,,,,
",
------------------------------------------ --------------------------------~
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Research
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
Summary
This chapter provides a thorough literature review of safety/risk assessment and the
maintenance modelling of LNG carrier operations. This includes safety, properties and
hazards of LNG, overview of LNG carrier including the incidents/accidents and the
regulations governing safety of the shipping, an overview of FSA of ships and overview
of maintenance. Different modelling techniques such as GA, Fuzzy Logic and ER are
also reviewed. Their usefulness in the LNG industry in areas of risk assessment and
maintenance modelling is identified. Justification of carrying out this research is
established.
2.1. Introduction
The literature review plays a vital role in this research. LNG carriers are expensive and
complex engineering structures for which there is need for proactive risk assessment of
their operations because catastrophic accidents such as cargo loss cannot be tolerated.
The literature review is carried out to investigate the properties of LNG and its carriers,
and also various LNG accidents/incidents. Such an investigation can assist in the
improvement of safety of LNG shipping operations with particular emphasis on
safety/risk assessment using probabilistic and subjective (possibilistic) approaches and
on maintenance modelling using optimization techniques. Various risk assessment tools
are discussed and the efficient approaches are adopted in this research. FSA is also
discussed. The maritime industry adopted FSA in 1990s as a proactive tool to tackle
various marine accidents. FSA has changed the traditional reactive regulatory
framework towards a risk-based and goal-setting regime (Godaliyadde, 2008). The
concept of maintenance in the maritime and LNG industry is outlined. Reliability
Centred Maintenance (RCM) and types of maintenance strategies are discussed. The
differences among the maintenance strategies are noted and their relevance is outlined.
11
There is a need to carry out regular risk assessment of LNG carrier operations and
maintenance modelling using a proactive approach due to a rapid increase in number of
voyages per year. Such increases in number of voyages per year are as a result of high
demand of LNG. A PRA is conducted using a risk assessment tool such as FTA, and
maintenance modelling conducted for safety improvement using the GA. Novel
approaches are proposed to deal with uncertain situations. The FRB is employed to treat
uncertainties of unit costs of maintenance of the LNG containment system and transfer
arm, while FER is used to treat uncertainties of failure modes of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm based on the FSA methodology.
2.2. Safety of LNG
The safety record of the LNG industry is outstanding compared to other
petroleum/process industries. The excellent safety record is proven by the few incidents
and accidents that have happened since 1912, when the first LNG plant was built in
West Virginia. The success of the LNG industry in terms of safety is because of the
following factors (Foss, 2003):
• The industry has technically and operationally evolved to ensure safe and secure
operations. Technical and operational advances include everything from the
engineering domain that underlies LNG facilities to operational procedures and
technical competency of personnel.
• The physical and chemical properties of LNG and its associated hazards and risk
are well understood and incorporated into their technology and operations.
• The high standards and regulations that are applied to the LNG industry.
Safety is defined as freedom from unacceptable risk or personal harm (Wang and
Trbojevic, 2007). This is applied to LNG facilities, including LNG carriers because of
the potential hazards that might affect their operations. A hazard is a physical situation
or condition with a potential for injuries/deaths, .property damage, damage to the
environment or some combinations of these (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Risk
mitigation and hazard prevention measures are applied to a LNG value chain in Figure
2.1. Risk mitigation measures are used to reduce the consequences of hazards, while
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hazard preventive measures prevent the occurrence of hazards and their undesirable
consequences. Risk is defined as a combination of the probability of occurrence of an
undesired event and the degree of its possible consequences, or a term which combines
the chance that a specified undesired event will occur and the severity of the
consequences of the event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
Figure 2.1: LNG Value Chain (Foss, 2003)
Though various safety measures secure the operations of the LNG value chain in Figure
2.1, they are still prone to accidents. An accident on a particular component of a LNG
value chain can affect another component. For example, an accident/incident on the
LNG carrier operations during loading/unloading of LNG can affect the LNG storage
tank via the pipelines. The LNG carrier operational hazards can be identified using a
brainstorming technique, after analyzing the safety features of the components that
make up the LNG value chain. The LNG value chain has five main functions. These are
(Natural gas Online, 2010):
• Natural gas production.
• Liquefaction of natural gas.
• Transportation of LNG.
• Re-gasification.
• Distribution.
2.2.1. Natural Gas Production
After discovering of viable quantities of natural gas on a particular area, a natural gas
well is drilled and "completed" to allow for the flow of petroleum or natural gas out of
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the formation and up to the surface (Naturalgas Online, 2010). This process includes
strengthening the well hole with casing, and evaluation of the pressure and temperature
of the formation, before installation of the proper equipment for an efficient flow of
natural gas out of the well (Natural gas Online, 2010). During natural gas production in
the gas field, workers need to wear safety boots, hand gloves, goggles, helmets and an
overall for mitigation of consequences of the hazards. The natural gas produced is
channelled to the next LNG value chain component (i.e. liquefaction facility).
2.2.2. Liquefaction of Natural Gas
Liquefaction of natural gas is the process of converting natural gas to its liquid state. It
reduces the natural gas from its original volume for easy transportation using LNG
carriers. Safety features of the liquefaction facility are identified as:
• Secondary containment of the LNG storage tanks have the ability to keep LNG
isolated in event of an accident.
• Automatic shutdown of ~NG facilities and activation of fire alarm in undesirable
conditions.
• Practice of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) policies and regulations that are
applied to liquefaction facilities and their processes.
2.2.3. Transportation of LNG
Transportation of LNG is the shipment from a containment tank to another containment
tank using LNG carriers. The containment systems of LNG carriers have more than four
layers that secure LNG, coupled with their double hull systems that reduce the risk of
gas spills. With the increase of LNG demands and distributions, the safety concern of
LNG shipping is increasingly growing, attracting more and more research.
2.2.4. Re-gasification
Re-gasification is the process of converting the LNG back to its gaseous phase by use of
vaporizers. The produced natural gas from the re-gasification process is transported to
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end users via pipelines. HSE policies and industrial safety rules and regulations are
practiced to avoid environmental pollution and expose of the workers to risk (HSE,
2011).
2.2.5. Distribution
The LNG that is converted to its gaseous state for easy distribution is channelled
through intrastate or interstate gas pipelines to the end users. These pipelines are
constantly inspected to ensure safe distribution of natural gas. Pipeline inspection
reveals the safety level of the pipelines so that appropriate action or correction will be
taken if anything has gone wrong. The pipeline inspection is carried out using
inspection techniques such as internal (magnetic flux leakage, ultrasonic,
geometry/calliper and eddy current tool), external (Remote Operated Towed Vehicle
(ROTV) and Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV)) and diver inspection.
2.3. Properties of LNG
LNG is natural gas that is produced from the wellhead and becomes liquefied at a
temperature of approximately -256°F (-160°C) after pretreatment for easy storage and
transportation using LNG carriers. It occupies l/600th the volume of its gaseous state.
The raw natural gas that is converted to LNG comes from three types of wells. These
are (Naturalgas Online, 2010):
• Oil wells.
• Gas wells.
• Condensate wells.
Natural gas from these wells is mainly composed of methane, propane, ethane,
pentanes, water vapour, hydrogen sulphide, carbondioxide, helium, nitrogen and other
compounds. Typical compositions of natural gas with its percentage before it is refined
are illustrated in Table 2.1. The natural gas i~pretreated to have a pipeline quality using
four basic processes such as (Naturalgas Online, 2010):
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• Oil and condensate removal.
• Water removal.
• Separation of natural gas liquids.
• Sulphur and carbondioxide removal.
Table 2.1: Composition of Natural Gas (Natural gas Online, 2010)
These processes make the LNG a clear, cold, odourless, non-corrosive, non-toxic,
cryogenic liquid at normal atmospheric pressure. LNG has other properties that make it
a unique gas. These include:
• The density of LNG is about 450Kg/m3 compared to the density of water, which is
about 1000Kg/m3 (Foss, 2003). Thus, LNG floats on top of water if spilled, and
vaporizes rapidly because it is lighter than water.
• The vapour of LNG is flammable because it is composed mainly of methane.
Methane occupies about 70 to 90% of LNG.
• The LNG vapour at ambient temperature is lighter than air and its specific gravity
relative to air is 0.55, once thermal equilibrium is reached (ABS Consulting, 2004).
• At a pressure of 1 atmosphere and temperature of -259°F (-162°C), its normal
boiling point, LNG can evaporate and form vapour that has a specific gravity of 1.7
(ABS Consulting, 2004).
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• LNG vapour tends to stay near the surface of the ground or water for less than a
minute, until it mixes with air and warms to a temperature of approximately -162°F
(-108°C), at which it will become less dense than air and tend to rise and disperse
more rapidly (ABS Consulting, 2004).
• The vapour of LNG does ignite whenever there are LNG spills and a source of
ignition such as an open flame, spark or a source of heat of 540°C and above (Foss,
2003).
2.4. Hazards of LNG
The properties of LNG determine the type of hazards associated with it in onshore and
offshore environments. Safety systems are used to mitigate and prevent the
consequences of hazards on its value chain systems. Failures of LNG carrier operations
are the main factor that results in consequences such as LNG hazards, which cause
pollution of the environment. Such LNG hazards are:
• Explosion.
• Vapour clouds.
• Rollover.
• Freezing liquid.
• Rapid phase transition.
• Pool fire.
2.4.1. Explosion
Explosion is an LNG hazard that occurs when LNG changes its chemical state by
ignition or uncontrollable release from its pressurized state (Foss, 2003). The release of
LNG without control is probably a result of structural failure. Structural failure mainly
occurs as a result of external attack on the tank (Le. induced failure) or the stress in the
inner part of the tank. Structural failure will not lead to immediate explosion because
the LNG liquid is stored at atmospheric pressure.
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2.4.2. Vapour Cloud
Vapour clouds become hazardous if there is a source of ignition when the LNG is
within 5-15% flammability limit. The LNG warms up and returns to a gaseous state
once it leaves the container where it is stored at very low temperature of about -256°F (-
160°C). It mixes with the surrounding air and begins to disperse after the creation of a
fog (Foss, 2003). Fire caused by a LNG vapour cloud, burns gradually until it reaches
the source (LNG spills) and continues to burn as a pool fire (IMO, 2007).
2.4.3. Rollover
Loading of LNG with multiple densities into a tank, causes formation of various layers.
This is a result of the LNG not mixing up initially (IMO, 2007). The density of the
lower layer of LNG is changed by heat applied by the normal heat leak until it becomes
lighter than the upper LNG layer (Foss, 2003). During this process, liquid rollover
would occur with a sudden vaporization of LNG that may be too large to be released
through the normal tank pressure release valves (Foss, 2003). The pressure release valve
settings depend on the designed pressure of the tank. The pressure release valve value
could be 2413165.1 N/m2, if the designed pressure of the tank is 2068427.2 N/m2. The
stabilization of the LNG causes overpressure in the tank (IMO, 2007). The resultant
effect of the overpressure may be cracks on the inner tank (primary containment).
2.4.4. Freezing Liquid
This is one of the hazardous effects of LNG spillage. Any human contact with LNG will
freeze that part of the body. Freezing liquid is prevented by use of containment systems
to surround the LNG storage tank. In addition, all personnel working on the LNG
facility must wear gloves, facemasks and other protective clothing when entering
potentially hazardous areas, including the areas where freezing liquid occurred (Foss,
2003).
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2.4.5. Rapid Phase Transition
Rapid phase transition occurs when LNG is released on water. The LNG floats on top of
water and normally vaporizes immediately if the LNG is of large volume, thereby
causing rapid phase transition. Water temperature and the presence of substances other
than methane also affect the likelihood of a rapid phase transition (Foss, 2003). Rapid
phase transitions range from small pops to blasts that can damage lightweight structures
(Foss, 2003). Rapid phase transition constitutes a minor hazard to nearby people and
structures, in event of LNG release (IMO, 2007).
2.4.6. Pool Fire
Pool fire is a hazard associated with LNG that cannot be extinguished until all the LNG
is consumed. LNG spillage in presence of an ignition source causes evaporating gas
within its flammability limit to burn above the LNG pool. The resulting pool fire
spreads as the LNG pool expands from its source and continues to evaporate. A pool
fire on water is more hazardous than a pool fire on land due to thermal effects. The
thermal radiation from a pool fire can injure unprotected people and damage property at
considerable distance away from the fire (IMO, 2007). The pool fire contributes in
causing global warming by emission. of carbondioxide and methane into the
atmosphere.
2.5. Overview of LNG Carriers
The LNG industry started using LNG carriers to transport LNG as far back as 1959,
when the Normarti, an ex-world war IItanker was converted to carry LNG and renamed
Methane Pioneer. Since then, the LNG shipping industry has been showing a
remarkable safety record because of stringent safety practices in the LNG industry
(Chang et al., 2009). The LNG carriers have been designed, constructed and equipped to
carry cryogenic LNG stored at a temperature of -162°C and at atmospheric pressure
(Moon et al., 2009). The most important concern in the transportation of LNG is to
maintain the structural integrity of the cargo containment system (Moon et al., 2009).
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In view of that, LNG carriers are constructed with double hulls, which provide a
significant measure of protection against LNG release in event of external damage. In
addition, the International Gas Code (IGC) requires LNG carrier tanks to be protected
from damage due to collision or grounding by locating the tank at a specified minimum
distance inboard from ship's shell plating (ABS Consulting, 2004). Inner tank and outer
hull are more than 2m apart, so that if there is a large hole in the hull, it will result in a
smaller one in the inner tank (Bubbico et al., 2009). Most LNG carriers have six storage
compartments.
The three main types of LNG carriers have the same features but with different tank
designs. The LNG carrier tank design is either a self-supporting or supporting tank
design. The self-supporting tank does not depend on ship's hull for. support and has
three categories such as (ABS Consulting, 2004):
• Type A. It is designed primarily using recognized standards for classical ship
structural analysis procedures.
• Type B. It is designed using model tests, refined analytical tools, and analysis
methods to determine stress levels, fatigue life, and crack propagation
characteristics.
• Type C. It is designed for specific vapour pressure criteria and the tanks meet
pressure vessel criteria (not typically applicable to the LNG carriers).
Membrane tank design is classified as a supporting tank design while the spherical
(moss) and structural prismatic tank designs are classified as self-supporting tank
designs. The membrane tank design is supported by the hold it occupies (Pitblado et al.,
2004, Sandia National Laboratory, 2005). It is made up of a layer of metal (primary
barrier), layer of insulation, liquid-proof layer, and finally another layer of insulation.
The multiple layers are attached to the walls of the external framed hold. The primary
and secondary barriers are sheets of invar, which is an alloy of 36 percent nickel steel.
The layers of insulation are plywood boxes holding perlite. Membranes are built up
from the surface of a hold using discrete units of insulation called panels that are
anchored to the hold. Special insulation is inserted around the anchors called studs. The
joints between panels are sealed using special methods.
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The spherical (moss) tank design has a spherical shape (Pitblado et al., 2004, Sandia
National Laboratory, 2005). The sphere tank design is constructed using aluminium
with a minimum thickness of 29 mm and is installed in the hold of a double hull ship. A
steel cylinder is used to support the tank, which makes the tank independent of the
ship's hull. The covered insulation surrounding the spherical tank design channels any
leakage to a drip tray.
The structural prismatic tank is similar to the spherical (moss) tank because it is a self-
supported tank (Pitblado et al., 2004; Sandia National Laboratory, 2005). It is
constructed with stainless aluminum or 9-percent nickel steel or 304 stainless steel. The
tanks are installed in the hold of a double hull ship and are insulated with covered
polyurethane foam that can channel any leakage to drip trays in a similar way to
spherical (moss) tank design. The prismatic tank is not popular in the LNG industry, as
it accounts for only 2% of the world's LNG fleet (Foss, 2003).
The membrane and spherical tank designs are the most popular tank designs and
account for 98% of the world's LNG carrier fleets (Foss, 2003). The insulation of these
tanks cannot keep the LNG cold enough. To overcome this challenge, LNG is stored in
the tank using auto- refrigeration. In this process, the LNG is subjected to constant
temperature and pressure to keep it cold by allowing the Boil-Off Gas (BOG) to leave
the tank. The BOG can be used as fuel or re-liquefied and returned to the tank.
Traditionally, LNG carriers have been propelled by steam turbine, which has been
proved to be a simple and reliable solution for consuming natural BOG (Moon et al.,
2009). Alternative propulsion systems have been considered in recent times, due to the
continuous increase in the size of LNG carriers. Therefore, other design options for the
propulsion systems such as dual fuel steam mechanical, dual fuel diesel electric, dual
diesel turbine electric, dual fuel diesel mechanical propulsion with reliquefaction, and
the cargo handling systems for the LNG carriers have been and continue to be
developed (Moon et al., 2009).
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2.5.1. LNG Carriers Accidents
Since the use of the LNG earners in transportation of LNG, few incidents have
happened and only one accident claimed 6 lives of personnel in 1996. Some notable
accidents and their causes have been listed in Table 2.2. The accidents of LNG carriers
in Table 2.2 are the ones that caused LNG spills. Other notable accidents of LNG
carriers are listed in Appendix B1.
Table 2.2: Notable Incidents/Accidents of LNG Carriers (0stvik, et al., 2005)
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1977 LNG Aquarius The tank was overfilled during loading operations and
there was a spillage of LNG. No casualty was recorded.
1979 Mostefa Ben There were valve leakage and deck fractures during
Boulaid unloading of LNG, which caused LNG spillage. There
was no injury or fatality of personnel.
1979 Pollenger There were a valve leakage and tank cover plate fractures
(LNG during unloading of LNG. The spilled LNG did not cause
Challenger) any injury/fatality of personnel.
1989 Tellier During loading of the LNG, there were broken moorings,
hull and deck fractures. LNG spilled and explosion
occurred thereafter. Several injuries were experienced.
2001 Khannur There was LNG leak through a vent during unloading.
There were cracks in tank dome and over-pressurization
of cargo in No.4 tank. A LNG spill was experienced.
2002 MostefaBen A spillage resulted in a cracked deck. Thought to be
Boulaid human error as the alarm that should alert personnel had
been isolated. No one was hurt.
2.5.2. Risk Assessment of the LNG Carriers
The safety and reliability of LNG carriers have been outstanding so far in the marine
industry, which is achieved because of the safety features that are in place to avoid
unwarranted release of LNG from their containment systems and other related marine
facilities. Risk assessment is a comprehensive estimation of the probability and the
degree of the possible consequences in a hazardous situation in order to select
appropriate safety measures (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Before carrying out a risk
assessment, all parties involved should have a common understanding of the goals of
the exercise, the methods to be used, the resources required, and how the results will be
applied (ABS, 2000).
The main safety concern of LNG carriers is the release of large amounts of LNG or its
vapour. Risks associated with hazards that will cause injury to people, damage to LNG
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carrier systems and the environment need to be estimated and reduced. Risk assessment
of LNG carriers can be carried out using qualitative or quantitative risk analysis
depending on the requirements of LNG safety analysts and the available historical LNG
incidents data. The process can be proactive and includes new risks estimated because
of improvement in technology of the LNG carriers. A quantitative risk analysis
approach has been applied to a generic LNG carrier using the FSA principle (IMO,
2007; Vanem et al., 2008). Event Tree Analysis (ETA) method was used to identify the
consequences of collision, grounding, contact, fire/explosion and loading/unloading
risks of LNG carrier operations in the FSA process. Collision risk was found to be the
highest and the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle was applied.
Other researchers have carried out qualitative and quantitative risk analysis of LNG
carrier systems and LNG terminals, including the works of Bubbico et al. (2009), Hyo
et al. (2005), Moon et al. (2009), 0stvik et al. (2005), Pitblado et al. (2004) and Vanem
et al. (2006).
In bublico et al. (2009)'s work, a preliminary risk analysis of LNG carriers approaching
the Panigaglia maritime terminal was conducted. The intentional damages of the
containment systems of the LNG carriers by terrorist attacks caused pool fires. The
consequence analysis showed that dangerous thermal effects were expected within a
radius of 700-1500m in the location under examination. The impact on residential
population was negligible while that of anchorage was marginal. Similar risk and
consequence analysis of accidental failures such as terrorist attacks on LNG carriers
approaching a generic LNG terminal in USA was investigated by Pitblado et al. (2004).
According to Hyo et al. (2005)'s work, a quantitative risk assessment of the Korea
onshore LNG storage tank was carried out using a Fault Tree analysis (FTA) method.
They considered events involved during the loading and unloading of LNG carriers as
one of the six accident categories that could cause a LNG spill from the Korea onshore
LNG storage tank. Various FTA diagrams for the identified six accident categories were
developed and their failure probabilities were evaluated. Another study of risk
assessment of a LNG carrier was conducted by 0stvik et al. (2005). A qualitative risk
assessment technique was used to estimate risks of identified hazards of a 138000m3
membrane type LNG carrier under construction by Navantia. They considered various
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operational phases of LNG vessels while identifying the hazards and estimated the risks
of the hazards using expert judgements.
Moon et al. (2009) conducted risk assessment of different gas turbine propulsion system
designs for LNG carriers with the aim of identifying hazards associated with each
design and the most significant contributors to such hazards. The causes of gas release
were investigated, focusing on novel features of the gas turbine propulsion systems.
Further investigations were conducted to identify ways to reduce the risks of causes of
gas release. From the previous studies, it has been seen that the risks associated with
LNG carrier operations are managed/reduced to a great extent using the safety features
such as double hull construction, high strength steel in critical areas, double wall walled
piping system, redundant steering systems, highly trained specialized crews, gas
detection systems, inert inter-barrier spaces, water spray, dry chemical, CO2 fire
fighting systems and emergency cargo evacuation systems that are incorporated in the
LNG carriers. Irrespective of the safety features already in place on the LNG carriers
and other LNG facilities, hazards that might affect the proper functioning of the LNG
carrier systems and subsystems may not be eliminated, especially with the development
and implementation of new technologies. The experts in the LNG industry can conduct
comprehensive risk assessment of LNG carriers and other related marine facilities using
safety/risk analysis techniques such as:
• Event Tree Analysis.
• Risk Matrix.
• Fault Tree Analysis.
• Failure Mode, Effect and Critical Analysis.
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis.
• Hazard and Operability study.
• What If Technique.
• Cause Consequence Analysis.
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2.5.2.1. Event Tree Analysis
ETA is a safety/risk analysis technique used in the LNG industry to deduce the
consequences of an accident, unintended event or abnormal function of a system. This
involves the study of the complex relationships among the subsystems of the system
given the occurrence of an initiating event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). ETA is
developed diagrammatically using inductive bottom-up logic (Halebsky, 1989; Wang
and Trbojevic, 2007). ETA assigns probabilities to each branch of an event using
historical data or expert judgement. For example, to determine how possible each
consequence occurs when a LNG spill (initiating event) happens, involves defining the
possible routes along which the consequence could occur and assign probabilities to
their routes. ETA can be used to identify possible outcomes of a LNG spill occurrence.
For instance, if a LNG spill occurred and there is no ignition source, the consequence
will be negligible in terms of fire risk. If there is an ignition source, then check if the
gas detection system failed. If not, the consequence will be minor damage, otherwise
check the status of the fire alarm system. If the fire alarm system did not fail, the
consequence will be major damage, otherwise injuries/deaths will be caused. ETA can
be employed to investigate unknown effects from known causes (Godaliyadde, 2008;
Villemeur, 1992). ETA enables quantitative analysis to be carried out to estimate the
occurrence probability of each possible consequence.
2.5.2.2. Risk Matrix
Risk matrix is a qualitative assessment method which can be used to estimate risk in the
LNG industry. It is used as a pre-comprehensive risk assessment of a system because
the mechanism can be used to screen high risk hazards that need to be further evaluated
using other risk/safety analysis techniques. The analysts focus on those high risk
hazards for facilitation of the risk assessment process. It is mostly used as a first choice
for HAZID and risk prioritization for large engineering systems as detailed failure rate
values are not needed.
This technique uses a tabular format to estimate risks associated with the hazards
(Halebsky, 1989; Eleye-Datubo, 2006; IMO, 2007; Military Standard, 1993; Tummala
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and Leung, 1995). The table of a risk matrix technique has probability of failure on the
horizontal axis and consequence of that failure on the vertical axis. The points of
intersection of the horizontal and vertical axis are the risks of the hazards. The
probability of failure is categorized and scored, as well as consequence of that failure.
The summations of their scores at the points of intersection on the risk matrix table are
described as estimated risks of hazards (failures). The success of this method depends
heavily on the multi-disciplinary team experience of the system under investigation.
The benefit of this technique has been taken to carry out the study in Chapter 3.
2.5.2.3. Fault Tree Analysis
FTA is a safety/risk analysis technique commonly used to assess the probability of
failure of a system. Since the early 1970s, the FTA technique has been utilised as a tool
in risk assessment methodologies (Godaliyadde, 2008; Kumamoto and Henley, 1992).
This technique is a process of deductive reasoning which can be applied to a system of
any size for risk assessment purposes (Ang and Tang, 1984; Godaliyadde, 2008; Wang
and Trbojevic, 2007).
The FTA technique represents the failure logic of a system in an inverted tree structure
and provides very good documentation of how the failure logic of the system is
developed (Andrews and Ridley, 2002). The pathways through the Fault Tree (FT)
diagram represent all the events which give rise to the top event, are known as cut sets
or implicant sets. The minimal cut set is defined as the irreducible pathways leading to
the occurrence of a top event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It can be used in qualitative
and quantitative assessment. The quantitative assessment is carried out successfully on
any system that the failure probabilities of the basic events are known. If the basic
events probabilities are not known, a subjective method can be adopted.
The FTA technique is used for the PRA of LNG carrier systems followed by the
maintenance modelling using GA in Chapter 4. It is also used in subjective risk
assessment of the LNG carrier systems adopting the FSA methodology in Chapter 6.
27
2.5.2.4. Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a safety/risk analysis
technique used in HAZID and risk estimation. It was created and developed in the
United States in the early 1960s and used by NASA during the development of the
Apollo Project (Carmignani, 2009). It can be carried out from any indenture level
required to examine the failure modes of a component (subsystem) and its possible
consequences. FMECA systematically details, on a component by component basis, all
possible failure modes and identifies their resulting effects on the system (Godaliyadde,
2008; Kumamoto and Henley, 1992). FMECA is an inductive process which involves
the compilation of reliability data that is available for individual components
(Godaliyadde, 2008; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It can provide regulators with insight
into the system features and how they contribute to overall system safety (Buzzatto,
1999). This safety/risk analysis technique is made up of Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) and Criticality Analysis (CAS). The performance of an FMEA is the
first step in generating FMECA (Pillay and Wang, 2003). FMEA is the identification of
potential failure modes of the constituent components and the effect on system
performance by identifying the potential severity of the effect (Pillay and Wang, 2003).
The CAS produces the criticality ranking of the components under investigation. The
CAS helps analysts to know which component to give maximum attention. FMECA can
be used in qualitative and quantitative analyses. FMECA produces information that can
be used in the development of FTs and boolean representation tables (Godaliyadde,
2008; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007; Wang et al., 1998).
2.5.2.5. Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a safety analysis technique that is performed to
identify all the possible hazards that could be created by the system being designed.
This is the first step used to identify the hazards of a LNG carrier starting from when the
ship is about to be designed. Results of PHA enable system designers to avoid many
potential safety problems (Dowlatshahl, 2001). A collective brainstorming technique is
employed during which the design or operation of the system is discussed on the basis
of experience of the participants (Godaliyadde, 2008). PHA is a qualitative approach
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which involves a mixture of inductive and deductive logic (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
Checklists are commonly used to assist in identifying the hazards and the results are
presented in a tabular format (Godaliyadde, 2008). When sufficient information is not
available for particularly rigorous analyses, PHA serves as a valuable aid (Dowlatshahi,
2001). The procedures of a PHA are (Czerny et al., 2005):
• Perform brainstorming or review existing potential hazard lists to identify hazards
associated with the system.
• Provide a description of the hazards and mishap scenarios associated with them.
• Identify causes of the hazards.
• Determine the risk of the hazards and the mishap scenarios.
• Determine if system hazard avoidance requirements need to be added to the system
specification to eliminate or mitigate the risks.
2.5.2.6. Hazard and Operability Study
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is an inductive technique for identifying
hazards and problems associated with the operation of a process plant in the LNG
industry. The HAZOP technique was developed in the 1970s by loss prevention
engineers working for Imperial Chemical Industries at Tees-Side UK (Godaliyadde,
2008; Smith, 2005; Villemeur, 1992). This is a collective brainstorming technique in
which the system is examined systematically, component by component, to determine
how deviations from the design intent can occur, the consequences of such deviations
and the preventive/mitigative measures that are required (Godaliyadde, 2008). It is also
an extended FMECA. The aim of the HAZOP is to carry out a qualitative analysis in the
intermediate stages of the design process to predictable hazards, thus it is an exploratory
technique (Godaliyadde, 2008; Mauri, 2000). It is used in detailed examination of
components within a LNG system to determine what would happen if the components
were to operate outside their normal design mode conducted by a group of specialists
headed by a hazard analyst. Each LNG component will have one or more parameters
associated with its operation such as "pressure", "flow", ''temperature'', "composition",
"relief", "level", "phase" and "instrumentation",
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The HAZOP study looks at each parameter in tum and uses guide words to list the
possible off-normal behaviour. The guide words are "no", "low", "high", "as well as",
"reverse", "other than" and "part of'. An example of the combination of a parameter
like "no" and a guide word like "flow" is used in loading or unloading of LNG from an
onshore containment tank to a LNG containment tank through a pipeline. If LNG is not
or has stopped flowing through the pipeline, the team involved in HAZOP studies will
give the deviation "no flow". The team then focuses on listing all the credible causes of
a "no flow" deviation beginning with the cause that can result in the worst possible
consequences. Once the causes are recorded, the team lists the consequences, safeguards
and any recommendations deemed appropriate. The process is repeated for the next
deviation until completion of the node before the team moves to the next node and
repeats the process depending on the type of process being considered. Information
produced from HAZOP studies can be used in cause consequence analysis, FMECA and
Boolean representation analysis (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
2.5.2.7. What-IF Analysis
What-If analysis helps to identify potential LNG hazards. It uses brainstorming
techniques to ask question, "What If' in the lifecycle of a system. The intention of
"What If' is to ask questions which will cause a team to consider potential failure
scenarios and ultimate consequences that such failures might create (CCPS, 1992;
Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The possible hazards are identified,
existing safeguards are noted, and qualitative severity and likelihood ratings are
assigned to help in risk assessment. This technique assures that all hazards that mayor
may not occur in the future are known because well experienced personnel are involved
in the HAZID process. Assembling an experienced and knowledgeable team is probably
the single most important element in conducting a successful "What If' analysis. Their
experience in the design, operation, and servicing of the involved systems is essential.
Their knowledge of design standards, regulatory codes, past and potential operational
errors as well as maintenance difficulties brings a practical reality to the review. To
minimize the chances that potential problems are not overlooked, all the potential
hazards are identified before recommendations on those hazards are made. It uses a
mixture of inductive and deductive logic (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
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2.5.2.8. Cause-Consequence Analysis
Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) is the combination of ETA and FTA. The ETA
shows consequence and the FTA shows causes, hence deductive and inductive analysis
is combined. The CCA was developed at RISO national laboratories, Denmark, in the
1970's to specifically aid in the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear power plants in
Scandinavian countries (Andrews and Ridley, 2002; Andrews and Ridley, 2001;
Villemeur, 1992). Many authors have used the CCA as the main analysis tool for a
safety assessment (Andrews and Ridley, 2002; Pauperas, 1991; Valaityte et al., 2009;
Vyzaite et al., 2006). The purpose of the CCA is to identify chains of events that can
result in undesirable consequences. The CCA diagram documents the failure logic of a
system (Andrews and Ridley, 2001). It is used to identify hazards (FTA) and
consequences of the hazards (ETA) for easy eradication of risk. The "consequence
tracing" part of the CCA involves taking the initial event and following the resulting
chains of events through the system (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The "cause
identification" part of the CCA involves drawing the FT and identifying the minimal cut
sets leading to the identified critical event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The diagram of
the CCA normally starts with choice of critical event. This technique is advantageous in
safety analysis as it can work forward using ETs and backward using FTs.
2.6. Overview of Maintenance
Maintenance is defined as the combination of all technical and administrative actions,
including supervision. actions, intended to retain an entity in, or restore it to a state in
which it can perform a required function (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Wang and Trbojevic,
2007). The ultimate goal of maintenance is to provide reliability to equipment,
machines or processes that meets the business needs of a company (Jones, 2009).
Reliability is defined as the ability of a machine or components or equipment to perform
a required function under specified conditions and for a given period of time without
failing (BS EN 292; Jone, 2009; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Maintenance of the LNG
carrier systems is of upmost importance in the LNG industry to avoid loss of LNG and
ensure safety of the crew members onboard the vessel. Once a risk-based check is
conducted, system maintenance is recommended as a preventive or mitigative measure
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for any identified hazard that the consequence could be catastrophic, marginal or
critical. However, the system maintenance is prioritized based on the consequences of
their failures and the manufacturers' instructions. Various maintenance techniques have
been developed and industries have proved their usefulness on engineering systems.
Reliability Centred Maintenance (ReM) is a procedure for determining maintenance
strategies based on reliability techniques and encompasses FMEeA (Pillay and Wang,
2003). The ReM focuses the maintenance resources only on those items that affect the
system reliability, thereby making the maintenance programme cost effective in the long
run (Mokashi et al., 2002; Pillay and Wang, 2003). Maintenance involves planned and
unplanned activities being carried out to ensure an acceptable state of operation of a
system. Selection of a maintenance strategy will depend on one or a combination of the
following criteria (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Savic et al., 1995; Wang and Trbojevic,
2007):
• Maximisation of reliability.
• Minimisation of downtime.
• Minimisation of total maintenance cost.
In the maritime industry, any selected maintenance strategy must take into account cost,
safety, environmental and operational consequences. The prime objective of a
maintenance programme is to:
• Minimise costs.
• Meet safety and environmental goals.
• Meet operational goals.
A maintenance model is successfully developed in the maritime industry. after
considering the problems associated with the maintenance of a ship and its systems and
subsystems such as (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007; Pillay and Wang,2003):
• The high cost ofa ship's system out of service.
• Severe safety and insurance conditions, necessitating rigorous survey requirements.
• Ships' personnel are operators as well as maintainers.
• The frequency with which personnel join and leave ships, creating a need for
continuity of ships maintenance plans.
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• The high degree of isolation from repair and spares facilities.
• The high cost of transport unit (Le. the ship).
• Varying costs, availability and quality of labour and spares throughout the world.
Maintenance of the LNG carriers and their systems and subsystems can be carried out
using any of the maintenance techniques as stand-alone or in combination with other
maintenance techniques to produce a sound maintenance regime in a cost effective
manner. Some maintenance activities are carried out onboard the vessel depending on
the experience of crew members. If the failures of the LNG carrier systems that affect
the operations of the vessel cannot be maintained by the crew members, a tugboat will
be used to tow the vessel to a nearby port for maintenance. The importance of
maintenance is demonstrated by the fact that it is the only shipboard activity to have one
whole element assigned to it (Le International Safety Management (ISM) Code element
10) (IMO, 1997). The types of maintenance commonly used are:
• Preventive Maintenance.
• Reactive Maintenance.
• Predictive Maintenance.
• Proactive Maintenance.
2.6.1. Preventive Maintenance
Preventive Maintenance (PM) is a maintenance strategy carried out on equipment
before its failure. PM is usually conducted on repairable systems to improve the overall
reliability of these systems (Sun et aI., 2009). PM can be defined as actions performed
on a time based schedule that detect, preclude or mitigate degradation of a component
or system with the aim of sustaining or extending its useful life through controlling
degradation to an acceptable level (Sullivan et aI., 2002). The PM technique
maximizes/increases the reliability of LNG carriers and their systems and subsystems
by detection and prevention of incipient failures, before they become major failures. PM
involves the repair, replacement and maintenance of equipment in order to avoid
unexpected failure during use (Khanlari et al., 2008, Pillay and Wang, 2003). The
objective of a PM programme is to minimize the total cost of inspection, repair and
equipment downtime (Khanlari et al., 2008). PM decrease the number of failures but
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does not guarantee that catastrophic failure will not occur. Carrying out a PM
programme as the equipment designer envisioned, extends the life of the equipment
closer to the original design (Sullivan et al., 2002). PM with inspection intervals is a
commonly used maintenance strategy (Crocker, 1999; Ben-Daya and Hariga, 1998;
Lofsten, 1999; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). This maintenance
technique has advantages such as (Sullivan et al., 2002):
• Cost effective in many capital intensive processes.
• Flexibility allows for the adjustment of maintenance periodicity.
• Increases component life cycle.
• Energy savings.
• Reduces system or component or process failure.
• Cost savings over reactive maintenance programme.
The disadvantages of a PM programme are outlined as:
• It is always labour intensive.
• Occurrence of catastrophic failures cannot be ruled out on the systems or
components.
• Sometimes, there is introduction of problems on the systems or components
because of unneeded maintenance.
2.6.2. Reactive Maintenance
Reactive Maintenance (RM) is a maintenance strategy that involves reacting to failures
of equipment as they occur by carrying out maintenance as necessary to rectify the
equipment. No actions are taken to maintain the equipment as the designer originally
intended to ensure the design life of the equipment is reached (Sullivan et al., 2002). It
could be called break down, fix-when-fail, run to failure or corrective maintenance. In
RM programme, procedures that can be used to influence the equipment survivability
are ignored. It only consists of actions applied on equipment when they break down
(Samrout et al., 2009). When failures of equipment are not critical, RM becomes
necessary (Arunraj et al., 2010). Equipment that can be reactively maintained must be
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non-critical and will not pose any serious hazards or affect the operation of the system
as a whole (Pillay and Wang, 2003). A RM programme is applied in many industries
because of the following:
• Cost effective for small and non-critical equipment.
• Limited number of personnel is needed to carry out maintenance activities
throughout the design life of the equipment.
The major downsides of RM programme are (Sullivan et al., 2002):
• Increased cost due to unplanned downtime of equipment.
• Increased labour cost, especially if overtime is needed.
• Cost is involved with repair or replacement of equipment.
• Possible secondary equipment or process damage from equipment failure.
• Inefficient use of personnel resources.
• A large material inventory of repair parts is required since equipment is run to
failure.
2.6.3. Predictive Maintenance
Predictive maintenance can be defined as measurements that detect the onset of a
degradation mechanism, thereby allowing casual stressors to be eliminated or controlled
prior to any significant deterioration in the component physical state (Sullivan et al.,
2002). It can provide an increase in safety, quality and availability of a system (Camero,
2006). It is also called Condition Monitoring (CM). A predictive maintenance
programme can be used to detect whether or not to maintain a system according to its
state (Chu et al., 1998). The continuous analysis of equipment condition monitoring
data allows planning and scheduling of maintenance or repairs in advance of
catastrophic and functional failure (Pillay and Wang, 2003). Basically, predictive
maintenance differs from preventive maintenance by basing maintenance need on the
actual condition of the equipment rather than on some preset schedule (Sullivan et al.,
2002). Predictive maintenance saves cost over preventive maintenance because tasks are
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performed only when warranted. This maintenance strategy has advantages such as
(Sullivan, et al., 2002):
• Allows for pre-emptive corrective actions.
• Increases component operational life/availability.
• Decrease in equipment or process downtime.
• Decrease in costs for parts and labour.
• Better product quality.
• Improves worker and environmental safety.
• Energy savings.
• Cost savings over preventive maintenance programme.
The disadvantages of applying predictive maintenance are (Sullivan et al., 2002):
• Increase investment in diagnostic equipment and in personnel training.
• Savings potential not readily seen by management.
2.6.4. Proactive Maintenance
Proactive maintenance is a maintenance strategy that determines the root causes of
repeated failures. The root cause failure analysis is the determination of the mechanisms
and causes of equipment faults. It is a natural part of proactive maintenance process
(EPRI, 200 I). The fundamental causes of equipment failures can be identified and the
failure mechanisms can be corrected. Proactive maintenance improves maintenance
through better design, installation, maintenance procedures, workmanship and
scheduling (Pillay and Wang, 2003). This maintenance strategy is a daily process that
complements the maintenance work process and the predictive maintenance process
(EPRI, 2003). The techniques used in proactive maintenance to extend machinery life
are proper installation and precision rebuild; failed-part analysis; rebuild verification;
age exploration and recurrence control (Pillay and Wang, 2003). Proactive maintenance
can be used to reduce the failure probability of equipment (Swanson, 2001). The
proactive maintenance has attributes such as (Pillay and Wang, 2003):
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• Maintaining a feedback loop from maintenance to design engineers, in an attempt
to ensure the design mistakes made in the past are not repeated in future designs.
• Viewing maintenance and supporting functions from a life-cycle perspective. This
perspective will often show that reducing maintenance activity to save money in the
short term often cost in long term.
• Constantly re-evaluating established maintenance procedures in an effort to
improve them and ensure that they are being applied in the proper mix.
The advantages of proactive maintenance are:
• The design life of equipment is extended.
• The root causes of problems are addressed.
• Reduces maintenance costs beyond predictive levels.
The major disadvantage of proactive maintenance is:
• High cost.
2.7. Overview of Formal Safety Assessment of Ships
Several accidents in the maritime industry prompted the IMO to question the safety of
operations of ships. For safety of the public and environment, the IMO decided to adopt
the FSA methodology after studying notable accidents that have affected the lives of
people onboard vessels and caused great damage to the environment. One of the
accidents was the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise that happened on 6th March,
1987, which claimed 193 lives. The investigation of the capsize of the Herald of Free
Enterprise led by Lord Carver brought changes to marine safety related regulations,
demonstrated by the adoption of the enhanced damage stability and watertight closure
provisions in the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS'90) (Wang, 2002; Wang and Trbojevic,
2007). The introduction of the ISM Code for the safe operations and pollution
prevention, and the development of the FSA framework in shipping industry are also
adopted as marine safety related regulations (Wang, 2002; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
Introduction of a more structured risk analysis process through the FSA procedure;
compelled regulators to examine potential hazards and introduce appropriate measures
or standards before a catastrophic accident occurs.
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The submission of Lord Carvers report on the investigation of the capsize of the Herald
of Free Enterprise, which was published in 1992, caused the United Kingdom Maritime
Coastal Agency (UK MCA) to immediately improve the safety of ships by proposing to
the IMO in 1993 that FSA should be applied to ships to ensure a strategic oversight of
safety and pollution prevention. The IMO accepted the proposal and sanctioned the
application of FSA in relation to ship design and operation. The UK MCA has proved
FSA's practicability by carrying out trial applications to safety of high speed catamaran
ferries (IMO, 1997a; IMO, 1998a) and bulk carriers (IMO, 1998f; IMO, 2000; IMO,
2002a; IMO, 2002b). FSA has been successfully applied to various ships and marine
facilities using probabilistic and subjective (possibilistic) assessment approaches. The
ship and marine facilities include:
• Fishing vessels (Pillay, 2001; Loughran et al., 2003).
• Ports (Trbojevic, 2002; Ung et al., 2006; Ung, 2007).
• Marine transportation (Soares and Teixeira, 2001).
• Offshore support vessels (Sii, 2001).
• Containerships (Wang and Foinikis, 2001).
• LNG ships (IMO, 2007; Vanem et al., 2007).
• Ship Hull Vibration (SHV) (Godaliyadde, 2008)
• Cruising ships (Lois et al., 2004).
• Liner shipping (Yang et al., 2005; Yang, 2006).
• Trial study on passenger roro vessels with dangerous goods (IMO, 1998g).
• Trial study on high speed crafts (IMO, 1997b; IMO, 1998b; IMO, 1998c).
• Trial study on oil tankers (IMO, 1998d; IMO, 1998e).
The applications of FSA to ship design and operation offer great incentives that could
(Eleye-Datubo, 2005):
• Improve the performance of the current fleet, being able to measure the
performance change and ensure that new ships are good designs.
• Ensure that experience from the field is used in the current fleet and that any
lessons learned are incorporated into new ships.
• Provide a mechanism for predicting and controlling the most likely scenarios that
could result in incidents.
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FSA is a process of identifying hazards, assessmg the associated risks, studying
alternative ways of managing those risks, carrying out Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA)
of alternative management options and finally making decisions on which option to
select (MSA, 1993). The five basic steps of the FSA methodology are applied to ships
and marine systems step by step. The steps are HAZID (Step 1), Risk Assessment (Step
2), Risk Control Option (RCO) (Step 3), CBA (Step 4) and Decision Making (Step 5).
The steps interact with each other to ensure that the best RCO is chosen based on the
CBA during decision making. The incentives offered by FSA have been demonstrated
in Chapter 6 of this thesis by applying its methodology to LNG carrier operations using
a subjective approach. The subjective approach is successful by employing a FER
algorithm, which treats the uncertainties associated with the failure modes of LNG
carrier systems.
2.8. Overview of Regulations Governing Safety of LNG Shipping
The IMO was created in 1958, with the aim of functioning as a body that contributes to
the standardization of the legislations and regulations related to safety of shipping. The
IMO was formerly called the Inter-governmental Maritime Organization (IMCO). The
international safety based marine regulations have been driven by serious marine
accidents (Godaliyadde, 2008). The regulations for gas carriers concerning the
construction, equipment and operations of gas carriers are contained in the IMO "Gas
Codes". The three Gas Codes that have evolved for the LNG shipping industry are
(Walker et al., 2003):
• The code for existing ships carrying liquefied gas in bulk (existing ship code -
IMO).
• The code of construction and equipment of ships carrying liquefied gas in bulk
(The GC code - IMO).
• The international code of construction and equipment of ships carrying liquefied
gas in bulk (The IGC code - IMO), .
The IMO has implemented international conventions for the safety of shipping such as
(ABS, 2000):
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• International Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), 1995.
It is aimed at providing unified standards for training and certification of seafarers.
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution at Sea, 1973 and protocol
of 1978 (MARPOL 73178). It is aimed at preventing and minimizing pollution at
sea from oil, noxious liquid substances, noxious substances in packaged forms,
sewage, garbage, and air pollution.
• International Load Line Convention (ILLC), 1966. It is aimed at standardizing the
procedures for assignment of load lines to ships and the conditions of assignment,
such as intact and damage stability, the protection of openings in the watertight
boundaries and protection of crew at sea, etc.
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREG), 1972. It is aimed at providing "rules of the road" at sea, such as
maintaining proper lookout, safe speed, lights and signals to be displayed, etc.
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974. It is aimed at
providing adequacy in ship structural design (albeit by specifying compliance with
classification rules); safety of mechanical and electrical systems onboard; damage
stability; fire safety; radio communication and search and rescue; safety of
navigation and prevention of collision; the provision of life saving appliances, the
safe carriage of dangerous cargoes; and safety management.
The International Association of Classification Societies (lACS) was formed in 1969
and is made of 10 members and 2 associate members. The members of lACS such as
Lloyd's Register, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Bureau Veritas (BV), Det
Norske Veritas (DNV), Korean Register of Shipping, and Nippon Kaiji Kyokai classify
LNG ships using the regulations of the IMO conventions and their own rules. Their
rules and the IMO conventions have contributed in improving the safety of LNG
carriers. Other bodies such as the Society of International Gas Tankers and Terminal
Operators (SIGTTO) provide guidelines for the safe operation of gas tankers and
terminals, after putting their effort and time to ensure that risks associated with LNG
facilities are mitigated in their technical design standards and operating procedures to a
maximum level.
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2.9. Genetic Algorithm
GA was developed by John Holland in the 1970s as an optimization technique that uses
the principle of a natural genetic. A GA maintains a population of candidate solutions,
where each candidate solution is usually coded as a binary string called a chromosome
(individuals) (Yen and Langari, 1999). GA establishes a fitness function for facilitation
of the formation of an initial population. The fitness of the chromosomes that make up
the initial population is assessed for selection of the best ones for the next generation.
The chromosomes that are not selected for the next generation using the selection
operator are replaced by the reproduced offspring. The offspring are reproduced by the
parents (the selected chromosomes from the initial population) using the crossover
operator. Premature convergence is overcome by the use of a mutation operator and a
new population is formed, maintaining the population size of the initial population. This
process continues until an optimal solution is found or a fixed number of generations is
reached. There are different methods of GA used in solving engineering problems.
These methods of GA include:
• Binary Genetic Algorithm.
• Continuous Genetic Algorithm.
• Steady State Genetic Algorithm.
• Multiobjective Genetic Algorithm.
2.9.1. Binary Genetic Algorithm
It is a GA that works with finite parameter space (Harikumar et al., 2004). The value of
the chromosome (structure or potential solution) is represented using binary numbers (0
or 1). The bit (0 or 1) represents the gene that makes up the chromosome. The usual
representation scheme for the GA is that each potential solution is coded as a string of
parameter values, usually in binary code (Andrew and Bartlett, 2003). The main aspect
of this method is the representation of the parameter as strings of binary digits of 0 or 1
(Harikumar et al., 2004). In this method, GA operators are:
• Selection.
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• Crossover.
• Mutation.
• Elitism.
2.9.1.1. Selection
The operator is a process of choosing parents for reproduction based on their fitness
(Haupt and Haupt, 2004). It attempts to apply pressure upon the population in a manner
similar to that of natural selection found in biological systems (Colley, 1999). The
selection operators use the fitness values in the current population to create a breeding
pool for the next generation (Alim et al., 2007). A selection operator occurs at each
iteration of the algorithm to allow the population of chromosomes to evolve over the
generations to fit chromosomes (members) as defined by the fitness (objective)
function. The selection operators are a roulette wheel selection (Colley, 1999; Mitchell,
1996; Haupt and Haupt, 2004; Man et. al., 1999), stochastic universal sampling
selection (Colley, 1999; Man et. al., 1999, Mitchell, 1996), and tournament selection
(Man et. al., 1999, Mitchell, 1996; Haupt and Haupt, 2004).
2.9.1.2. Crossover
It allows solutions to exchange information in a way similar to that used by a natural
organism undergoing sexual reproduction (Colley, 1999). It is an operator that forms a
new chromosome from two parent chromosomes by combining part of the information
from each according to Haupt and Haupt, (2004). The operator switches gene between
two genotype to generate offspring. The crossover operators include a single point
crossover (Colley, 1999; Mitchell, 1996; Haupt and Haupt, 2004), two point crossover
(Colley, 1999; Mitchell, 1996; Haupt and Haupt, 2004; Sakawa, 2002), and multipoint
crossover (Colley, 1999; Man et al., 1999; Sakawa, 2002).
2.9.1.3. Mutation
Mutation is a reproduction operator that randomly alters the values of genes in a parent
chromosome (Haupt and Haupt, 2004). A mutation operator provides diversity in the
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population by making changes randomly in a selected genotype and the percentage of
genes (bits) in a population that is mutated in each generation of GA is lower than that
of the crossover operator. In other words, mutation is applied with a lower probability
than the crossover probability (Alim et al., 2007).
2.9.1.4. Elitism
This is an operator that ensures that the GA retains the best chromosomes at each
generation because sometimes a selection operator does not guarantee that the fittest
chromosomes as defined by the fitness function are selected for the next generation.
Without this operator, the likelihood of losing the best chromosomes is high during
selection, crossover and mutation. In many applications, the search speed can be more
effective by not losing the best members known as elite members.
The application of binary GA to engineering problems is of great benefit. These include:
• Optimization of continuous variables by encoding them to binary numbers.
• Simple application of crossover and mutation.
• Optimization of mixed-integer problems.
However, difficulties are also encountered during the GA process. Some of the
difficulties are:
• Hybridization with other algorithms is difficult.
• It wastes time because of conversion of variables with real numbers to binary
numbers prior to application of GA.
• Variables with a long number of bits occupy space in the computer.
• It is not that efficient compared to continuous GA. if the binary bits are many.
2.9.2. Continuous Genetic Algorithm
A continuous GA is an algorithm that uses real numbers to encode the variables. It
follows the same steps of GA that is used in the binary GA. Although they share the
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same steps, significant differences have been revealed. The difference in the continuous
parameter GA occurs in the computation of the fitness function and the crossover and
mutation operators (Harikumar et aI., 2004). Some of all these features have allowed
continuous GA to be equipped with more advantages, including:
• It enables faster calculation compared to the binary GA because the chromosomes
do not need to be decoded before evaluation of the objective function.
• It gives exact or approximate optimal solution compare to binary GA because it uses
internal precision of the computer and round off to define the precision of the
chromosomes (values) during the computational processes.
• It has less storage data space than binary GA because it is not represented by a
number of bits. The variables are represented by a single floating number.
• Continuous GA can be easily hybridized with other algorithms.
• It can solve a multiobjectives optimization problem.
Although showing some attractiveness, the continuous GA still exposes a weakness
such as applications of crossover and mutation operators being not natural and real.
2.9.3. Steady State Genetic Algorithm
A steady state GA is either a single or multiobjective GA with its ability of solving one
or more objective function(s). It can be binary based or continuous based, depending on
the encoding of the constraints of objective function(s) as a result of the problem
formulation. In steady-state selection, only few chromosomes (individuals) are replaced
in each generation. Usually a small number of the least fit chromosomes (individuals)
are replaced by offsprings resulting from crossover and mutation of the fittest
individuals (Mitchel, 1996). Elitism is introduced to ensure that some of the fittest
individuals are not lost during the generation processes. The fraction of individuals
replaced is called the generation gap (Colley, 1999). Steady-state GAs are often used in
evolving rule-based systems in which incremental learning (and remembering what has
already been learned) is important and in which members of the population collectively
(rather than individually) solve the problem at hand (Mitchel, 1996). Firstly, the initial
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population is formed from the problem formulation. This initial population is allowed to
evolve in successive generations through the following steps (Podofillini et al., 2006):
• Selection of a pair of individuals as parents.
• Crossover of the parents, with generation of two children.
• Replacement in the population, so as to maintain the population number constant.
• Genetic mutation.
The new population formed is ranked and updated after the evaluation of the objective
functions. This ranking is used in the selection procedure which is performed in such a
way that in the long run the best individuals will have a greater probability to be
selected as parents, in resemblance to the natural principles of "survival of the fittest"
(Podofillini et al., 2006). The iteration will continue until convergence is achieved and
sufficient genetic diversity should be used, if it is needed to avoid premature
convergence or no convergence. Steady-state GA has the advantages of continuous and
binary GAs.
2.9.4. Multiobjective Genetic Algorithm
When more than one objective function is involved, single objective GA becomes
multi-objective GA. This solution solves problems simultaneously and helps to identify
the effectiveness of minimising the objective functions to the benefit of the constraint
and vice versa. The comparison of two solutions with respect to several objectives can
be achieved by introducing the concepts of Pareto Optimality and dominance, which
enable solutions to be compared and ranked without imposing any prior measure as to
the relative importance of individual objectives, neither in the form of subjective
weights nor arbitrary constraints (Marseguera et al., 2004). This GA has the following
specific characteristics (Torres-Echeverria and Thompson, 2007):
• Ranking based on Pareto dominance.
• Fitness sharing performed in the objective space.
• Mating restriction.
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• Suggest the first truly progressive preference-based method, incorporating the
decision maker through goals and priority levels.
• Parallel coordinates for visualization of the trade-off surface in two dimensions.
Pareto optimal means the dominance of a solution with respect to objective functions in
the search space. The population of chromosomes created will be ranked according to
their Pareto dominance. The multi-objective GA starts with finding all nondominated
chromosomes of population and gives them a rank of one (Haupt and Haupt, 2004) as
the best ones. These best ones are removed from the population for identification of the
next group of nondominated chromosomes, which will be ranked as two. The rank two
nondominated chromosomes are also removed, to find the next group of nondominated
chromosomes. This process continues until all the nondominated
chromosomes/solutions have been ranked. The selection and replacement procedures of
multi-objective GA are based on the ranking in which every chromosome belonging to
the same rank class has to be considered equivalent to any others to be selected as its
parents and surviving the replacement (Podofillini et al., 2006). It also uses niching on
the objective function to distribute the population over the Pareto-optimal region. A
Nondominated Sorting GA (NSGA) ranks chromosomes in the same manner as a
multiobjective GA (Haupt and Haupt, 2004). Therefore, NSGA is used to calculate a
uniqueness value, which is related to the distance between each solution and its closest
neighbours. The distance known by calculating the variables or costs is scaled between
o and 1 and subtracted from the cost. NSGA is effective because of the following
reasons (Haupt and Haupt, 2004):
• Reduces the computational complexity of the nondominated sorting.
• Introduces elitism.
• Replaces sharing with crowded-comparison to reduce computations and the need for
a user-defined sharing parameter.
Multiobjective GA can be recognized with the following features:
• It has the ability of solving multi-objective problems effectively.
• It has the ability of solving both continuous and binary GA.
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• It helps the designer to determine the effectiveness of one objective function to the
other.
• It has very high computational complexity.
• It is likely to converge at a single point, if niche strategy called sharing is not used.
There are other optimization techniques such as particle swarm optimization, ant colony
optimization and simulated annealing (Haupt and Haupt, 2004). According to Matlab
Version 7.7 (R2008b), binary integer programming, multiobjective goal attainment
optimization, single-variable nonlinear minimization, constrained nonlinear
minimization, minimax optimization, unconstrained nonlinear minimization, semi-
infinite minimization, nonlinear equation solving, single-variable non-linear equation,
linear programming, nonlinear curve fitting, constrained linear squares, nonlinear linear
squares, nonnegative linear least square, pattern search, quadratic programming, neural
network and threshold acceptance algorithm are recognized as optimization techniques.
Monte Carlo simulation is also an optimization technique (Rubinstein and Kroese,
2007). GA is used in minimization of the risk model in Chapters 4 and 5 because of its
ability to:
• Ensure that there is genetic diversity, thereby increasing the search space to
produce best optimal risk solution.
• Ensure that the search is probabilistic and not deterministic,
• Ensure that the search is conducted in a generated population of points and not at a
single point at each iteration, which improves efficiency and accuracy of GA.
2.10. Fuzzy Set Theory
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) is first presented by Lofti Zadeh in 1965. The theory is a
mathematical formalization which enables representation of degrees of membership of
members in sets (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). Fuzzy logic is the term used for ad-hoc
applications of rules based on a simplified FST (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). The fuzzy logic
is a versatile tool that is tolerant of imprecise, ambiguous and vague data/information,
and one for which its reasoning builds understanding into a process. It mainly uses the
concept of linguistic variables, and provides a framework for dealing with such
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variables in a systematic way. There are various techniques of fuzzy logic such as
discrete and continuous fuzzy sets, and FRB, which have been used in uncertainty
treatments in the maritime industry (Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Godaliyadde et al., 2009;
Pillay, 2001; Pillay and Wang, 2002; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Wang et al., 1995; Wang
et al., 1996; Wang, 1997; Wang, 2000; Sii et al., 2001; Ung et al., 2006; Yang et al.,
2005). The usefulness of fuzzy logic has also been proved in other industries (Durga
Rao et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2008., Hatiboglu et al., 2010., Markowski and Mannan,
2009; Moreno and Pascual, 2009; Prato, 2007; Soman and Misra, 1993; Soh and Yang,
1996; Sun and Collins, 2007; Yang and Soh, 2000).
FRB allows for the involved linguistic attributes to be specifically guided towards a
justified output result. Thus, fuzzy logic can be used in application of a linguistic
approach in a wide variety of problems. The significance of fuzzy variables is that they
facilitate gradual transition between states and thereby possess the natural capability to
express and deal with observation and measurement uncertainties (Pillay and Wang,
2003). This is beyond crisp variables. The definition of states by crisp sets is
mathematically sound, though in some cases, it may be unrealistic in a situation where
measurement errors cannot be avoided. This can be illustrated using a temperature
reading of 600·C of a LNG carrier engine, which is classified as "hot". An under-
estimation of re would place the temperature to "warm" category. The existence of
uncertainty of the temperature makes maintenance decision on the LNG carrier engine
very difficult. When dealing with crisp variables, the uncertainty is ignored; the
measurement is regarded as evidence for one of the states, the one that includes the
border point by virtue of an arbitrary mathematical definition. The idea is that unlike
crisp set, which is completely determined by an indicator function taking values in {O,
I}, a fuzzy set is characterised by a membership function with membership values
ranging between 0 and 1 (Pillay and Wang, 2003). A fuzzy set whose membership
function only takes on the value zero or one is called crisp.
2.10.1. Fuzzy Membership Function
A fuzzy set is represented by a membership function on the universe of discourse or
universal set (X) (Zadeh, 1987). If a universe X is made up of elements of x and various
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combinations of these elements make up set A on the universe. For crisp sets, each
element of x in the universe X is either an element of set A or is not. Crisp sets have a
unique membership function whereas fuzzy sets (denoted by A) have an infinite
number of memberships to represent the situation (Ross, 2004). Elements in a fuzzy set
can have a continuum of degrees of membership ranging from complete membership to
complete non-membership (Zadeh, 1987). A non-membership is represented by 0 and
full membership is represented by 1, which means full representation of the set under
consideration. A membership between 0 and 1 indicates the degree of membership p(x}.
The difference between a crisp set and a fuzzy set is the membership function. Values
assigned to a membership are not fixed and can be chosen by the investigator based on
the application. The notation of a fuzzy set is expressed as follows:
,uA{x)e [0,1] (2.1)
where ,uA{x) represents the degree of membership of element x in a fuzzy set Ii. ,uA{x)
is equal to the degree to which x e A and e means "member of'. The shape of the fuzzy
set depends on the way the data is represented. The membership is indicated on the
vertical axis and ranges between 0 and 1. The domain of a set is indicated along the
horizontal axis. The fuzzy set shape defines the relationship between the domain and the
membership values of a set. The hypothesis of using a membership function is to map
the parameter constraint to membership grade between the scaled intervals
(Godaliyadde, 2008).
There are different types of fuzzy membership functions used in solving engineering
problems. A particular membership function chosen for solving engineering problem
depends on the choice of the designer and the· problem formulation. The most
commonly used membership functions in engineering applications are triangular,
trapezoidal, sigmoid curve, generalized bell curve and gaussian curve membership
function.
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2.10.2. Features of Fuzzy Set Theory
The fuzzy logic is used in this research over other alternative modelling techniques
because of the following features (Eleye-Datubo, 2006):
• It is conceptually easy to understand with "natural" mathematics.
• It is tolerant to vague or imprecise data. Its use of FST is particularly adapted to
the representation and manipulation of imprecision and uncertainty of the
linguistic labels that define the criteria of the classes.
• It presents a flexible way of dealing with different forms of uncertainty. For
example, there is a lot of freedom in choosing the membership functions of fuzzy
sets.
• It is more intuitive than differential equations and enables analysts and decision-
makers to capture knowledge of how the system behaves in everyday linguistic
terms (Le. based on natural language).
• Though making use of heuristics, the framework still offers a convenient way to
express and make the most of the experience of experts' common sense
knowledge.
• It has the ability to model any complex or highly non-linear function to any
arbitrary degree of accuracy.
• It is based on rules (Le. rule base logic) that can be specified with a natural
language. Basically, the laws are naturally broken down into individual IF-THEN
statements that lend themselves to parallel processing.
The FRB technique is used in combination with GA for uncertainty treatment of unit
costs of maintenance of the LNG containment system and the transfer arm for optimal
maintenance in Chapter 5. A discrete fuzzy set method is used in combination with ER
to assess the safety/risk levels of failure modes of the LNG containment system and the
transfer arm and select the best RCOs based on the safety principles of FSA in Chapter
6.
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2.11. Evidential Reasoning
ER was developed in the 1990s to deal with Multiple Criteria Decision Making
(MCDM) problems under uncertainty (Godaliyadde, 2008). It solves problems of both
quantitative and qualitative nature with uncertainty. The ER algorithm is based on the
decision theory and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence, which is well suited
for handling incomplete assessment of uncertainty (Yang, 2001; Yang and Singh;
1994). D-S theory is a mathematical theory of evidence that can combine different
evidences together using their Degree of Beliefs (DoBs). The ER is different from other
conventional MCDM methods such as the Analytical Hierarchy Processing (AHP) and
additive utility function approach because it uses a belief structure to represent an
assessment as a distribution. The algorithm is used to aggregate criteria from the bottom
level of criteria to the top level criterion. In other words, once the assessments of the
conditions of components of a system have been carried out, the overall assessment of
the whole system can be obtained using the ER algorithm. The ER algorithm
synthesises the conditions of the components with respect to their evaluation grades
associated with the DoB.
Suppose a system has two subsystems and the subsystems have components. To assess
the safety/risk level of the system, the components safety/risk levels can be synthesised
using the ER approach. In such ER assessment framework, four synthesis axioms are
proposed as (Godaliyadde, 2008):
• If no subsystem is assessed to an evaluation grade at all, then the system should not
be assessed to the same grade either.
• If all components are precisely assessed to an individual grade, then the system
should also be precisely assessed to the same grade.
• If all components are completely assessed to a subset of grades, then the system
should be completely assessed to the same subset as well.
• If any component assessment is incomplete, then a system assessment obtained by
aggregating the incomplete and complete component assessments should also be
incomplete with the degree of incompleteness properly assigned.
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The properties ofER are (Sonmez et al., 2001, Yang and Xu, 2002):
• It is difficult to deal with both quantitative and qualitative criteria under uncertainty
but ER provides an alternative way of handling such information systematically and
consistently.
• The uncertainty and risk surrounding a problem can be represented through the
concept of DoB.
• Both complete and incomplete information can be aggregated and modelled by using
a belief structure.
• The ER algorithm is integrated into a software package called Intelligent Decision
System (IDS) (Xu and Yang, 2005). It is a graphically designed decision support
tool. The IDS allows decision makers to build their own models and input their own
data.
• The IDS software enables users to provide results of evaluation both in tabular and
graphical forms.
Practical application of ER in combination with fuzzy set has been illustrated in Chapter
6. In Chapter 6, ER is used to synthesise the safety/risk levels of failure modes of the
LNG carrier containment system and transfer arm respectively, which are modelled
using fuzzy set. The ER has also been proved to be a useful tool in many decision
making applications (Godaliyadde et al., 2009; Liu et al., 1994; Sonmez et al., 2001;
Tang et al., 2004; Wang et al., 1995; Wang et al., 1996; Wang, 1997; Wang, 2000;
Wang, 2002; Wang and Yang, 2001; Yang, 2001; Yang et al., 2005; Yang and Singh,
1994; Yang and Xu, 2002; Xu and Yang, 2005; Xu et al., 2006).
2.12. Justification of Research
The operations of LNG carriers are associated with hazards estimated as high, medium,
low and negligible risk hazards. The high risk hazards are threats to LNG carrier
operations as the occurrence of these hazards will result in a catastrophic or critical
consequence. The increase in demand and supply of LNG in recent time, poses to be a
threat to the marine environment and public because high risk hazards might be
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inevitable, if not properly handled. The number of voyages per year has increased
drastically, and is likely that the vessels will start changing routes more frequently due
to "cross-trades" and "gas swaps". To maintain the LNG industry's strong safety record,
potential high risk hazards need to be addressed, then there is need for this research. A
proactive approach is used to conduct a probabilistic and subjective risk assessment and
maintenance modelling of LNG carrier operations.
In view of that, HAZID of LNG carrier operations are conducted using a risk matrix
approach. The risks associated with the hazards are prioritized to concentrate on the
high risk ones. The failure modes (basic events) of high risk LNG carrier systems are
identified using FTA. A PRA is conducted to identify their probabilities of failure and
failure frequencies for effective maintenance modelling. Maintenance modelling is
carried out using GA to reasonably assign the maintenance cost to each system for
obtaining the optimal reliability improvement of the whole high risk LNG carrier
systems.
In addition, the problems of uncertainties associated with the unit costs of maintenance
of high risk LNG carrier systems are solved. A solution is adopted by employing the
service of a FRB method. Expert judgment is used to develop 125 rules of FRB of the
LNG carrier system maintenance cost with antecedents such as technical consultancy
cost, maintenance duration and spare part cost; and consequent such as maintenance
cost.
Furthermore, the challenges of existence of uncertainties of failure modes of the high
risk LNG carrier systems are overcame using subjective (possibilistic) risk assessment
approaches. The FER is incorporated with the FSA in the uncertainty treatment of the
failure modes to ascertain the unacceptable safety states of the high risk LNG carrier
systems, and recommend Risk Control Measures (RCMs) for improvement of the
systems safety and reliability.
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2.13. Conclusion
A thorough literature search has been conducted in this chapter. The detailed risk
assessment of LNG carrier and various safety analysis techniques can be used in
HAZID and risk estimation. Such safety analysis techniques include HAZOP, PHA,
FMECA, and What-If-Technique, FTA, ETA, CCA and risk matrix. The FTA and risk
matrix are adopted as qualitative/quantitative safety analysis techniques in this research.
Maintenance strategies such as preventive, reactive, predictive and proactive are also
explained. The FSA is reviewed and the various subjective and probabilistic
applications in the maritime industry are outlined. Algorithms such as fuzzy logic, GA
and ER are highlighted for solving risk assessment and maintenance modelling
problems in the LNG industry in this research.
The innovative research in this thesis has been illustrated using four core chapters. The
four core chapters are developed as the way forward with the aim of proposing a
proactive approach for risk assessment of LNG carrier operations and maintenance
modelling. These include "HAZID and Risk Prioritization of LNG Carrier Operations
Using a Risk Matrix Approach (Chapter 3)", "Application of GA to Risk-Based
Maintenance Operations of LNG Carrier Systems (Chapter 4)", "A Fuzzy GA (FGA)
Approach to Analyse Maintenance Cost of High Risk LNG Carrier Systems under
Uncertainty (Chapter 5)", and "A New FER Method for Risk Analysis and Control of
LNG Carrier Systems (Chapter 6)".
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Chapter 3 - Hazard Identification and Risk Prioritization of Liquefied
Natural Gas Carriers Operations Using a Risk Matrix Approach
Summary
In this chapter, HAZID of LNG carrier operations is carried out using a brainstorming
technique. A risk matrix approach is employed to estimate the risks of hazards associated
with the LNG carrier operations using expert judgment. In the risk matrix table, the
linguistic terms such as frequent, probable, occasional and remote are used to estimate the
occurrence likelihoods of LNG carrier hazards, while the consequences of the hazards are
estimated using the linguistic terms such as catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible.
3.1. Introduction
The recent interest in increasing fleet of LNG carriers and expansion or building of new
LNG facilities to accommodate the carriers, along with increased awareness on potential
terrorist threats has caused stakeholders to raise questions about the potential consequences
of incidents involving LNG carrier operations (ASS consulting, 2004). Therefore, HAZID
needs to be carried out on a generic LNG carrier. The greatest concern of LNG carriers is
hazards that could cause LNG spills. Some of these hazards are regarded as high risks to
LNG carrier operations. Expert judgment is used to estimate the high risks hazards due to
uncertainties of their failure rates. HAZID of a generic LNG carrier will proactively ensure
the safety of LNG vessels and their systems/subsystems if acted upon, as well as provide a
basis of analysing the measures of their pollution prevention to the maritime environment.
In this work, components of a LNG value chain are identified and described with particular
attention on the transportation of LNG using LNG carriers in a qualitative risk analysis
framework. Natural gas production, liquefaction of natural gas, transportation of LNG, re-
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gasification, and distribution to end users are described as the five main components of a
LNG value chain (Foss, 2003; Sophia and Anne, 2006). The properties of LNG determine
its hazards such as explosion, vapour clouds, rollover, freezing liquid, rapid phase
transition, and pool fire. These LNG hazards are caused by failures of LNG carrier
operations. In view of that, all relevant hazards that might affect the proper functions of
LNG carriers and their systems and subsystems are identified using a brainstorming
technique. Brainstorming is a technique for tapping the creative thinking of a team to
generate and clarify a list of ideas, problems and issues (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
The above process is proactive and not confined only to the hazards that materialised in the
past. Previous experience is properly taken into account and background information such
as applicable regulations and codes, list of hazards of LNG carriers, hazardous substances
and ignition sources are used. The failure rate values of the generic LNG carrier systems
may be difficult to achieve because of the high level of uncertainties associated with the
historical data. Therefore, use of expert judgment and a risk matrix technique can provide
an alternative solution of prioritising high risk hazards of LNG carriers.
3.2. Background Analysis
The relevance of qualitative risk analysis using a risk matrix technique has been proved in
many industries. Qualitative risk analysis is used in the fishing industry to prioritize issues
across the seven most valuable Western Australian commercial fisheries (Fletcher, 2005).
The brainstorming technique is used by stakeholders to identify issues across three
ecological areas such as retained species, non-retained species and the broader ecosystem
for each fishery. The risk associated with each issue is assessed using one of the five sets of
consequence criteria specifically developed to cover fishery-related impacts. The risk score
for each issue is identified using a risk matrix technique. Identification of the group of
worst issues in 115 issues across the three ecological areas, improved their entire fish
management processes.
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The risk matrix technique is used in the defence industry to estimate the risks of hazards
associated with military defence systems (Military Standard, 1993). Their experts carried
out the HAZIO using the brainstorming technique. The experts applied the risk matrix
technique to the hazards of the defence systems by using four categories of occurrence
likelihood of hazards and four consequence levels on the systems.
In the process industry, the risk matrix technique has also been used in the selection of
accident scenarios of an ethylene oxide storage system which needed to be modelled in the
calculation of the severity of hazards (Oelvosalle, 2006). The usefulness of the risk matrix
technique has been proven in management science (Haifang, et aI., 2009). In their work, a
risk matrix technique is used to identify the key risk factors of the use of private capital in a
government project. The work of Zhu et al. (2003) demonstrated the effectiveness of risk
matrix technique in technical project risk management.
In the maritime industry, the risk matrix technique has been extensively used in the risk
estimation of hazards of shipping activities (Eleye-Oatubo, 2006; Loughran et aI., 2002;
Pillay and Wang, 2003). The technique is applied to a list of hazards of a fishing vessel.
The HAZIO of the fishing vessel is carried out via the opinion of highly experienced
personnel, which is detailed in Loughran et al. (2002) and Pillay and Wang (2003), using
case studies.
A similar step by step process of HAZIO and risk estimation using a risk matrix technique
is applied to a bulk carrier (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). The application of the risk matrix
technique to a bulk carrier, proved to be a contribution to knowledge of qualitative risk
analysis of vessels. Since the IMO recommended the risk matrix technique in their rule
making process (IMO, 2002), it is applied in this research.
3.3. Risk Matrix Methodology
A risk matrix technique (Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Helebsky, 1989; Pillay and Wang, 2003;
Tummala and Leung, 1995) is a qualitative risk analysis method used to estimate the risks
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of hazards in the engineering industries. Expert judgement is used to estimate the risks of
hazards of marine and offshore facilities, including LNG carriers for effective hazard
ranking. The risk matrix technique serves as a tool for pre-comprehensive risk analysis of a
generic LNG carrier shown in Figure 3.1. This can be achieved by using Tables 3.1 and 3.2
to develop a risk matrix table, illustrated in Table 3.3. The description of the risk levels and
risk scores of the risk matrix table is shown in Table 3.4. The flow chart of the risk matrix
methodology of a generic LNG carrier is shown in Figure 3.2. In Figure 3.2, the
information flow starts from the description of a generic LNG carrier, followed by
identification of hazards of LNG carrier operations using a brainstorming technique and
development of a risk matrix table. The risk matrix table is made up of the consequence and
occurrence likelihood, which are used to calculate the risk scores of the hazards. Then, the
hazards are prioritized using their risk scores in order to categorise them. Hazards
associated with high risks are represented with Fault Tree (FT) diagrams, while the ones
associated other risk categories may not be investigated further.
Containment
System Others
Mooring
/Towing
\r-------------------------~----------~~----~
Navigation Emergencyr---,----. ~ response/control
Communications
/s_/
Anchoring
\
environment
Pollution
prevention Stability
-.
Power/propulsion
Figure 3.1: A Generic LNG Carrier
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Description of a generic LNG carrier
Identification of hazards ofa generic LNG carrier
operation using a brainstorming technique
Develop a risk matrix table
I~~~~~~~~~-~~~;~~~~~~~I;~I
l____:~~~~~~~~f~:_U~~__~~~:~__1
Prioritize the hazards with
their scores and identify their
risk levels from risk matrix
No
>-_--I~ Acceptable by
the LNG industry
Represent those hazards with Fault Tree (FT) diagrams in an
undeveloped event form for comprehensive risk assessment
Figure 3.2: A Flow Chart of Risk Matrix Methodology of a Generic LNG Carrier
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Table 3.1: Description of Consequence of a Hazard
Linguistic term for consequence of a Description
hazard
Negligible Less than minor system damage, less than
minor injury/illness of personnel or negligible
environmental damage.
Marginal Minor system damage, minor injury/illness of
personnel or minor environmental damage
Critical Major system damage, severe injury/illness of
personnel or major environmental damage
Catastrophic System loss, death of personnel or severe
environmental damage.
Table 3.2: Description of Occurrence Likelihood of a Hazard
Linguistic term for occurrence Description
likelihood of a hazard
Less possible The hazard is unlikely to occur compared to other
hazards.
Possible The hazard is likely to occur compared to other
hazards ..
More possible The hazard is reasonably likely to occur compared
to other hazards.
Most possible The hazard is highly likely to occur compared to
other hazards.
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Table 3.3: Risk Matrix Table
Consequences of hazards Occurrence likelihoods of hazards with scores that are
with scores that are expressed expressed in log., 10
in log., 10 1. Less 2. Possible 3.More possible 4.Most
possible possible
1. Negligible 2 3 4 5
2. Marginal 3 4 5 6
3. Critical 4 5 6 7
4. Catastrophic 5 6 7 8
Each of the scores of the occurrence likelihood and consequence of the hazards in Table
3.3, are expressed in a logarithmic scale. For example, a score of 2 is equivalent to
log., 102 • In Row 1 of Table 3.3, the occurrence likelihood of a hazard can be described
using linguistic terms such as less possible, possible, more possible and most possible with
their scores of 1,2,3 and 4 respectively. In Column 1 of the same table, the consequence of
the hazard can be described using linguistic terms such as negligible, marginal, critical and
catastrophic with their scores of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The areas of intersections of the
rows and the columns of Table 3.3 are the risks associated with the hazards. Therefore, 2 to
8 are the scores of the risks associated with the hazards. Risk is expressed as follows:
Risk (R) = Occurrence likelihood of a Hazard x Consequence of the Hazard (3.1)
Log (Risk) = Log (Occurrence likelihood of a Hazard) + Log (Consequence of the Hazard)
(3.2)
There are four risk levels in Table 3.4 defined by expert judgement using risk scores. These
are high, moderate, low and very low risks with their respective risk scores. 6, 7 and 8 are
high risk scores in the high risk area of Table 3.4. 5 is a moderate risk score in the moderate
risk area of Table 3.4. 3 and 4 are low risk scores in the low risk area of Table 3.4. 2 is a
very low risk score in the very low risk area of Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Description of Risk Levels and Risk Scores of the Risk Matrix Table
Risk levels Risk scores Description of risk Levels
High 6, 7, 8 Vessel operations have to be
prohibited until the risk is reduced
to an acceptable level.
Moderate 5 Vessel operations can continue
while risk reduction measures are
being applied at an acceptable
cost.
Low 3,4 Vessel operations continue while
efforts are being made to reduce
the risk, but the cost of prevention
should be carefully measured and
limited. Risk reduction methods
should be implemented within a
defined time period.
2Very Low
3.4. Safety of LNG Carriers
Actions are required on the vessel
while in operation, if there is no
additional cost burden.
The LNG shipping industry has an exemplary safety record in terms of cargo loss compared
to other areas of the shipping industry. Few accidents have occurred since the first
converted freighter delivered a Lake Charles, Louisiana cargo of LNG to the United
Kingdom in January 1959, none involved a major release of LNG (CLNG, 2008). The
safety record of the LNG shipping industry is attributed to safety design of LNG carriers
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and their effectiveness in handling accidents that happened in the industry using four levels
of awareness. These are (Chauvel, 1997):
• Discovering. Associated with curiosity on what went wrong, which results in
development of better ideas for improvement.
• Learning. Once new and better ways of doing things have been discovered, this
knowledge has to be accepted and passed to future generations and other colleagues in
the LNG shipping industry.
• Understanding. Once new ways of working have been established, research and
reflection facilitate the level of understanding of the principles based on scientific
methods.
• Developing. This is the final stage of the cycle based on the understanding. A new
system can be developed with confidence because the outcome can be safely controlled.
The containment tank of a LNG carrier stores LNG at a temperature of about -256°F (-
160°C) (California Energy Commission, 2003). All LNG carriers are constructed with double
hulls (Sandia National Laboratory, 2005). This construction method improves the integrity of
the hull system and provides protection for the cargo containment tanks in the event of an
accidental collision (Sandia National Laboratory, 2005). The LNG carrier has cargo
handling, ship handling and safeguard systems that have the ability to ensure safe delivery
of LNG from source to the destination (Foss, 2003). LNG carriers are built with three major
cargo containment tanks such as (Foss, 2003):
• Membrane tank design.
• Spherical (moss) tank design.
• Structural prismatic tank design.
3.4.1. Membrane Tank Design
Most LNG carriers are built with membrane tanks that have double containment. The
double containment is made up of primary and secondary containment. The primary
63
containment holds LNG while the secondary containment secures the LNG whenever there
is leakage. The inner shell consists of thin stainless steel called a membrane that is about
0.7-1.2millimeters (mm) thick (Pitblado, et aI., 2004). It is capable of containing the
hydrostatic load of LNG, though relies on the vessel for structural support (Pitblado, et al.,
2004). Plywood and thick perlite or polyurethane insulation separates the membranes and
the space between them is filled up with nitrogen. The membrane tank design has almost
zero stress and its structure is below the main deck of the LNG carriers. Such features
protect the carriers from external/terrorist attacks (Foss, 2003). A large cofferdam separates
each membrane tank so as to reduce the potential of an event in one tank affecting the other
(Pitblado, et aI., 2004).
3.4.2. Spherical (Moss) Tank Design
Some of the LNG carriers have spherical (moss) containment tanks. Spherical (moss) tank
design has double containment as membrane tank, but with different tank shape. The LNG
carrier containment tank has a spherical shape and maintains its own structural integrity,
without depending on the vessel for support. The LNG carrier containment tank is exposed
to external/terrorist attack because the covers of spherical tanks are above the carrier deck,
though the tanks are separated with barriers. Aluminium with thickness of 29 to 57mm is
used to construct the spherical tanks (Pitblado, et aI., 2004). The secondary barrier of a
spherical (moss) tank is a splash barrier with a drip pan at the bottom from which
accumulated liquid evaporates, because the tank does not depend on the vessel for support
(Foss, 2003). The holds collect spilled LNG and the vessels contain equipment capable of
recovering LNG (Sandia National Laboratory, 2005). The tanker uses nitrogen to purge
some below decks spaces to aid in preventing fires (Sandia National Laboratory, 2005).
3.4.3. Structural Prismatic Tank
The structural prismatic tank design is similar to a membrane tank. The tank has the same
application of secondary containment and primary containment safety systems. The tank is
also similar to the spherical (moss) tank because it is a self-supported tank that does not
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rely on the vessel for support (Sandia National Laboratory, 2005). Prismatic tanks are
designed to conform to the shape of the LNG carrier's hull, thereby occupying much of the
internal area of the carrier. It minimizes the areas in which LNG from a tank rupture or
spills can be diverted (Sandia National Laboratory, 2005).
3.5. Hazards of LNG Carriers
Despite all the safety features of LNG carrier systems and subsystems, there are still
potential hazards that might impair the proper functioning of LNG carrier operations. Most
of these hazards seem to be unavoidable during the operational mode of the LNG carrier
systems and subsystems. These hazards are identified and screened using a brainstorming
technique by experienced marine professionals. The four experts are considered to have
equal experience of the LNG carrier operations and include:
• Professor Jin Wang (Expert #1): A professor of marine technology at Liverpool John
Moores University, United Kingdom with more than 10 years experience in field of
marine engineering.
• Dr. Stephen Bonsall (Expert #2): A senior lecturer at Liverpool John Moores
University, United Kingdom with more than 10 years experience in field of marine
operations.
• Dr. Ramin Riahi (Expert #3): A researcher at Liverpool John Moores University,
United Kingdom with more than 10 years experience in field of marine engineering.
• Captain Kambiz Mokhtari (Expert #4): A researcher at Liverpool John Moores
University, United Kingdom with more than 10 years experience in field of marine
operations.
The identified hazards of the LNG carriers are the ones associated with their operations and
external events, such as:
• Structural damage due to incorrect loading.
• Overfilling of tanks.
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• Overpressure of tanks.
• Unignited leak in the cargo system.
• Fire in cargo handling.
• Fire in forward storage area.
• Explosion in engine room due to crank house failure.
• Explosion in cargo handling.
• Earthquake.
• Lightning.
• Sabotage.
• War action.
• Collision.
• Workplace accident.
• Crane operations.
• Working in tanks/enclosed spaces.
• Operating error.
• Leak from loading arm.
• Loss of instrumentation during loading operations.
• Unignited leak from tank.
• Ignited leak from tank.
• Gas freezing.
• Waves.
The identified hazards are ranked and screened based on their risk level using expert
judgement and the risk matrix technique explained in Section 3.3. The high risk hazards are
represented with a FT diagram for detailed risk analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. There are
other safety analysis techniques that can be used to identify LNG carrier hazards, which
depend on the choice of experts and available data. The acceptable safety analysis
techniques in the LNG industry have been discussed in Section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2.
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3.6. A Test Case of Application of the Risk Matrix Technique to Hazards of a Generic
LNG Carrier
The qualitative risk assessment of the hazards of generic LNG carrier operations using a
risk matrix technique will be carried out as follows:
• Develop a table containing hazard no., name of hazard, occurrence likelihood of
hazard, consequence of hazard, risk score and risk level.
• List the hazards of a generic LNG carrier that are identified in Section 3.5 in the
column for name of hazard.
• Estimate the occurrence likelihoods of hazards of a generic LNG carrier using expert
judgement with the information provided in the risk matrix table illustrated in Table
3.3.
• Estimate the consequences of hazards of a generic LNG carrier using expert jugdement
and a risk matrix table illustrated in Table 3.3.
• Calculate the risk score of the hazards of a generic LNG carrier using Equation (3.2),
and a risk matrix table illustrated in Table 3.3.
• Estimate the risk levels of the hazards of a generic LNG carrier using their risk scores
in Table 3.3.
• Prioritize the hazards of a generic LNG carrier based on their risk scores and risk
levels.
• Represent the high risk hazards with FT diagrams for comprehensive risk analysis.
The risks of hazards of a generic LNG carrier are estimated by expert judgement using the
risk matrix table, Table 3.3. The experts involved have equal experience of the subject
under investigation and are described as marine risk analyst.marine safety engineer, marine
chief engineer and ship captain. The results of the expert judgment are illustrated in Table
3.5. In Table 3.5, risk estimation of hazard no. 1 is calculated using the information in
Table 3.3 and Equation (3.2) as follows:
Log (Risk) = Log (Occurrence likelihood of Hazard) + Log (Consequence of the Hazard)
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Therefore, risk score of hazard no. 1 (Structural damage due to incorrect loading) = Score
of "possible" + Score of "critical" = 5
where the score of "possible" is 2 and score of "critical" is 3 in Table 3.3. Such a risk score
is classified as a moderate risk level as shown in Table 3.4. In a similar way, hazard no. 2 to
23 occurrence likelihoods, consequences, risk scores and risk levels are found, as illustrated
in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Hazards of a Generic LNG Carrier and their Risk Levels
Hazard Name of a hazard Occurrence Consequence Risk Risk level
no. likelihood of a ofahazard score
hazard
1 Structural damage Possible Critical 5 Moderate
due to incorrect
loading
2 Overfilling of More possible Marginal 5 Moderate
tanks
3 Overpressure of Less possible Catastrophic 5 Moderate
tanks
4 Unignited leak in Less possible Critical 4 Low
the cargo system
5 Fire in cargo Possible Critical 5 Moderate
handling module
6 Fire in forward Possible Critical 5 Moderate
storage area
7 Explosion in Less possible Marginal 3 Low
engine room due
to crank house
failure.
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8 Explosion in Less possible Critical 4 Low
cargo handling
9 Earthquake Less possible Catastrophic 5 Moderate
10 Lightning Less possible Marginal 3 Low
11 Sabotage Less possible Critical 4 Low
12 War action Less possible Catastrophic 5 Moderate
13 Collision Possible Critical 5 Moderate
14 Workplace Less possible Marginal 3 Low
accident
15 Crane operations Less possible Critical 4 Low
16 Working in Less possible Catastrophic 5 Moderate
tanks/enclosed
spaces
17 Operating error More possible Marginal 5 Moderate
18 Leak from Most possible Catastrophic 8 High
loading arm
19 Loss of Less possible Marginal 3 Low
instrumentation
during loading
operations
20 Unignited leak Possible Critical 5 Moderate
from tank
21 . Ignited leak from Most possible Catastrophic 8 High.
tank
22 Gas freezing More possible Marginal 5 Moderate
23 Waves Possible Critical 5 Moderate
Prioritization of hazards of a generic LNG carrier is very important in the LNG industry.
From Table 3.5, hazard no. 18 and 21 have the highest risk scores and classified as high
risk hazards by expert judgement using Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Attention is focused on the high
risk hazards such as "ignited leak from tank" and "leak from loading arm". FTA is the
69
proposed safety analysis technique for comprehensive risk analysis of "ignited leak from
tank" and "leak from loading arm". Therefore, the top events of the high risk hazards of a
generic LNG carrier are represented using FT diagrams with undeveloped events in Figures
3.3 and 3.4.
In Figure 3.3, a LNG containment system fails when structural defect, corrosion, fire and
explosion, structural potential pressure difference (PD) or failure of supporting structure
happens. In Figure 3.4, a LNG spill from transfer arm occurs when transfer arm failure,
material defect or failure of piping happens.
Containment
system failure
Failure of
supporting
structure
Corrosion
effects
Structural
defect
Fire and
explosion
Structural
potential PO
Figure 3.3: Fault Tree of a LNG Containment System Failure
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LNG spill fro m
transfer arm
Transfer arm
failure
Material defect Failure of piping
Figure 3.4: Fault Tree of a LNG Spill from Transfer Arm
3.7. Conclusion
HAZID of LNG carriers and prioritization of their associated risks have been successful
with the use of the brainstorming technique and risk matrix approach. The risk levels of
hazards of a LNG carrier are calculated using expert judgement and the mechanism of a
risk matrix table. The mechanism is the categorised occurrence likelihood and
consequences of hazards, coupled with risk formula, which facilitated the estimation of the
risk scores. The hazards of a generic LNG carrier are prioritized using their risk scores.
High risk is associated with' high scores as defined in the risk matrix table. Two out of
twenty-three of the hazards ofa generic LNG carrier are found in a high risk area of the risk
matrix table. Other hazards of a generic LNG carrier are in moderate, low and very low risk
areas of the risk matrix table. High risk hazards are the major concern in the LNG industry.
Therefore, high risk hazards of a generic LNG carrier such as "ignited leak from tank" and
"leak from loading arm" pose threats to proper functioning of the LNG carrier systems and
subsystems. Finally, FT diagrams with undeveloped events are used to represent the two
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high risk LNG carrier hazards for comprehensive risk analysis using advance techniques
later.
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Chapter 4 - Application of Genetic Algorithm to Risk-Based Maintenance
Operations of Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems
Summary
The concept of GA is used to model the cost of maintenance of a LNG containment system
and its transfer arm, after assessing the total risk of the systems using the PRA technique.
The failure frequency data of the basic events of the FT developed to model the LNG
containment system and transfer arm, is derived from a careful literature search. A total
risk formula is developed, which is dependent on hazard severity weight, failure
frequencies, time and cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems. The formula serves
as the objective function while new total cost allocated for maintenance of the LNG carrier
systems as a whole is the constraint with boundaries of presenting initial/unit cost of
maintenance of each of the containment system and transfer arm. Optimization is carried
out on the objective function and its constraint for identification of new cost of maintaining
the containment system and transfer arm independently with the powerful tool of GA using
Matlab version 7.7 software for improvement of the system's safety level.
4.1. Introduction
The consumption rate of LNG has increased drastically in recent years, which is supplied
using LNG carriers. This has led to public concern about the safety of the carriers and
environment. The need for a higher number of LNG carriers is evident; indeed, over the last
10 years, LNG carriers have increased annually, while more new carriers are predicted in
the years ahead. LNG carriers have been the most successful in the marine industry in terms
of safety and reliability, which is achieved by close attention to detail in the development of
new ideas, concepts and procedures used in the LNG industry. In April 2001 (Lloyd's,
2001), the general manager ofthe SIGTTO stated in an interview with Lloyd's List that the
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challenges of maintaining the LNG industry's strong safety record would increase in the
future. In particular, it is noted that LNG shipping patterns are changing. Traditionally,
LNG carriers were dedicated to serve specific terminals. In the future, carriers would be on
changing routes more frequently due to "cross-trades" and "gas swaps" (Lloyd's, 2001).
Risk assessment produces a comprehensive estimation of the possible consequences in a
hazardous situation in order to select appropriate safety measures. It is believed to be useful
for the LNG industry in identifying hazards and protecting against them, improving
operations, efficiently using resources, and developing or complying with rules and
regulations (ABS, 2000). This has subjected the maritime LNG carrier systems to
regular/advance checks to ensure that a high level of safety maintained in the LNG industry
is still standardised by increasing the systems' level of maintenance.
Cost effectiveness of the maintenance of LNG earner systems obviously remains a
challenge to the industry. Due to complexity of LNG carrier systems and the challenges
ahead, a powerful engineering tool of GA that can solve multi-objective and complex
problems is usefully adopted to tackle cost effectiveness of the maintenance of the LNG
carrier systems. GA application needs procedures to be set up starting from the fitness
function to the number of generations for an optimal solution. Detailed breakdown of the
genetic operators modelling cost effectiveness analysis of LNG carriers will be addressed
for understanding and easy application of simulation processes of the optimal safety
solution to control total risk of the systems. The method of GA needed to solve engineering
problems depends on the problem formulation and choice of its designer. In this chapter, a
single objective GA is used to tackle cost of maintenance of LNG carrier systems.
4.2. Background Analysis
Since the invention of GA in USA in the mid 70s, it has been effectively applied in civil
engineering, protein structure, nuclear engineering (Marse guerra et al., 2004), design
engineering (Andrew and Bartlett, 2003), water networks, jobshop scheduling, facial
recognition, control system, aeronautics engineering, robotics, liquid crystals, image
processing and very large scale integration electronic chip layouts (Colley, 1999).
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In civil engmeenng, the cost-effective risk based in situ bioremediation design is
determined using GA. This optimises the management/mathematic model which can
simultaneously predict risk and propose cost-effective options for reducing risk to
acceptable levels. The model combines a GA with a numerical fate and transport model, an
analytical fate and transport model, and an exposure and risk assessment model to identify
cost-effective combinations of monitoring an active pumping to reduce risks (Minster et aI.,
1999).
FTA has been combined with the algorithm to accelerate its process, which has been
applied in nuclear engineering to find the Optimal Surveillance Test Interval (ST!) of
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) safety system of a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
(Marseguerra et aI., 2004). In their work, multi-objective GA and FTA are used to achieve
the aim after developing a mathematical model.
The usefulness of the combination of GA and FTA is extended to selection of the best
design of a safety system such as a Fire Deluge System (FDS) that has 4.4 x 1010 design
variations (Andrew and Bartlett, 2003). It tackled the problem of the traditional engineering
design process that uses trial and error method in design of a system, whereupon a design is
created, analysed and compared with predetermined criteria of acceptability. The FTA with
Binary Decision Diagram (BOD) reduction was used to determine the availability
performance of the system, Le. the probability that it will not function on demand (Andrew
and Bartlett, 2003). Similar design was carried out on a High-Integrity Protection (HIP)
System with 10 design variables using a combination of GA and FTA (Pattison and
Andrew, 1999).
It is obvious that GA is very useful to the industries today especially when it is combined
with FTA. In this chapter, a combination of FTA and GA is applied to maritime risk
assessment of LNG carrier systems, so as to identify the cost of maintenance of each
system with assigned budgetary money for the whole system. .
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4.3. Genetic Algorithm
GA is an optimization and search technique based on the principle of genetics and natural
selection (Haupt and Haupt, 2004). In other words, the GA iterates toward a global solution
through a process that in many ways is analogous to the Darwinian process of natural
selection (Venkatesan and Kumar, 2002). John Holland developed GA in the 1970s at the
University of Michigan (Andrew and Bartlett, 2003) and the method was finally
popularized by one of his students, David Goldberg, who was able to solve a difficult
problem involving the control of gas-pipeline transmission in his dissertation (Haupt and
Haupt, 2004). The goal of John Holland's research has been to abstract and rigorously
explain the adaptive processes of natural systems, and to design artificial systems software
that retains the important mechanisms of natural systems (Goldberg, 1989). A GA allows a
population composed of many individuals to evolve under specified selection rules to a
state that maximizes the "fitness" (i.e., minimize the objective function) (Haupt and Haupt,
2004). A typical algorithm might consist of the following elements (Colley, 1999):
• A number or population of guesses of the solutions to a problem.
• A way of calculating how good or bad the individual solutions within the population
are.
• A method for mixing fragments of the better solutions to form new, on average even
better solutions.
• A mutation operator to avoid permanent loss of diversity within the solutions.
Prior to the application of a GA, it is necessary to demonstrate a representation scheme,
define the fitness function measure, define the parameters and variables for controlling the
algorithm and designate a performance measure and a criterion for terminating a run
(Andrew and Bartlett, 2003). The flow chart in Figure 4.1 .illustrates a simple GA
methodology for better and easy understanding of the process; an example is included in
Appendix C 1.1. The selection of GA methods needed to solve engineering problems
depends on the problem formulation and choice of the designer. Binary (Andrew and
Bartlett, 2003; Haupt and Haupt, 2004; Colley, 1999; Harikumar et aI., 2004), continuous,
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steady state (Colley, 1999; Mitchell, 1996; Podofillini et al., 2006) and multiobjective
(Torres-Echeverria and Thompson, 2007) GAs are the methods of GA, which have been
discussed in Chapter 2.
In this research, a continuous GA is used because it gives an exact or approximate optimal
solution as it uses internal precision of the computer and round off to define the precision of
the chromosomes (values) during the computational processes. A continuous GA uses real
numbers to encode the variables. The difference in the continuous parameter GA occurs in
the computation of the fitness function and the crossover and mutation operators
(Harikumar et al., 2004).
Figure 4.1: Flow Chart of Genetic Algorithm Methodology
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In this method, an initial population was formulated using chromosomes (real numbers) and
evaluation and selection of the chromosomes will be carried out using the defined fitness
function. Elitism is introduced as an operator that ensures that the GA retains the best
chromosomes (individuals) at each generation because sometimes a selection operator does
not guarantee that the fittest chromosomes are selected for the next generation. Prior to
mutation of the chromosomes (parents and offspring), the selected ones (parents) will
reproduce offspring by using a genetic operator called crossover. Selection operator could
be a roulette wheel selection (Haupt and Haupt, 2004; Colley, 1999; Mitchell, 1996; Man et
al., 1999), stochastic universal sampling selection (Colley, 1999; Mitchell, 1996; Man et
al., 1999), or tournament selection (Haupt and Haupt, 2004; Mitchell, 1996; Man et al.,
1999) while the crossover operators could be a single point crossover (Haupt and Haupt,
2004; Colley, 1999; Mitchell, 1996), two point crossover (Haupt and Haupt, 2004; Colley,
1999; Mitchell, 1996; Sakawa, 2002) and multipoint crossover (Colley, 1999; Man et al.,
1999; Sakawa, 2002). The mutation of the offspring reproduced by randomly altering the
values of genes in the chromosomes, ensures that there will be no premature convergence
during the process of GA to achieve an acceptable optimum solution. Mutation is applied
with a lower probability than the crossover probability (Alim, 2007). The offspring formed
will replace the weak chromosomes that were not selected during evaluation of the fittest
chromosomes as defined by the objective (fitness) function, which leads to the form of a
new population. This process of selection, elitism, crossover, and mutation continues until a
fixed number of generations have elapsed or some forms of convergence criterion have
been met (Colley, 1999).
4.4. Fault Tree Analysis
FTA is a productive hazard analysis technique widely used in the LNG industry. It was
invented in 1961 by H. A. Watson of Bell laboratories during the execution of a U.S. Air
force contract to study the Minuteman Launch Control System and was developed by Dave
Haasl of the Boeing company who applied FTA to the whole Minuteman Missile System
with his team in 1964, after recognising FTA as a major system safety analysis tool in
1963. The FTA concept is the translation of the failure behaviour of a physical system into
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a visual model that portrays system relationships, root cause fault paths, and a logic model,
providing the mechanism for qualitative and quantitative evaluation (Ericson II, 1999).
FTA is carried out using a deductive analysis from the top event, which is the undesired
event followed by causal relationships of the failures leading to that event identified by
experience from previous accident and incident/accident reports of the event in question.
FTA can be evaluated using two major techniques such as:
• FTA reduction by BOD.
• FTA reduction by Boolean algebra.
The steps for performing FTA using BOD are (Bartlett, 2000, Bartlett and Andrews, 2002):
• Identification of top event.
• Development of the top event through a top down process by determining the
intermediate failures and combinations of failures or events that are the minimum to
cause the next higher level event to occur as the logic being represented with the
example FT in Figure 4.2.
• Continuation of the top down process until further decomposition is not necessary.
• Determination of probabilities of failure assigned to the events at the lowest level.
• Pre-processing of the FT using two techniques such as faunet reduction and
modularisation, so that the smallest possible subtrees will be obtained for easy and
efficient construction of BOD.
• Faunet reduction reduces the fault tree to its minimal logic form using three stages
such as contraction, factorisation and extraction (Karen and Andrews, 2002).
• Modularisation identifies independent subtrees (modules) existing within the tree
that can be analysed separately.
• Selection of most appropriate ordering scheme for each independent module of the
FT based upon individual characteristics using neural network.
• Conversion of each module to BOD in separate computations using Shannon
decomposition theorem, which represents the Boolean equation for the top event.
• Finally the set of BODs can be quantitatively analysed simultaneously for the
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occurrence probability of the top event and the criticality of basic events.
The procedural steps of performing a FTA using Boolean algebra are (Wang and Trbojevic,
2007):
• Identification of top event.
• Development of the top event through a top down process by determining the
intermediate failures and combinations of failures or events that are the minimum to
cause the next higher level event to occur as the logic being represented in Figure
4.2.
• Continuation of the top down process until further decomposition is not necessary.
• Determination of occurrence probabilities of the lowest level events.
• Using Boolean logic to establish a Boolean equation for the tree and evaluate the
occurrence probability of the undesired top event.
• Determination of minimum cut sets.
• Compare to the system level requirement and if met, determine critical failure
modes.
It is important to understand that a FT is not a model dealing with all possible systems
failures and it covers the most credible faults as assessed by the analyst (Wang and
Trbojevic, 2007). FTA uses different types of gates for its construction, which makes it a
coherent FT (Amari, et al., 2003, Wang and Trbojevic, 2007) or non-coherent (Takehis,
2006). A coherent FT uses OR and AND gates to construct its tree as illustrated in Figure
4.2 and is mostly used in risk assessment in the LNG industry. OR and AND gates
symbolize the relationship of events needed for high level events to happen/occur. The
event at the higher level is the output of the gate while the events at the lower level are the
inputs to the gate (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). AND gate denotes that output occurs if all
input faults occur. OR gate shows that output occurs if anyone of the input faults occurs.
FTA can be evaluated using both the qualitative evaluation and quantitative evaluation.
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4.4.1. Qualitative Evaluation
Qualitative evaluation is the first phase of fault tree analysis before quantitative evaluation.
FTA is a qualitative model that can be evaluated quantitatively (Norman, 1987). The tree is
constructed starting with its top event and then with associated gates and events that lead to
the occurrence of top event successively. The pathways, known as "cut sets" or "implicant
sets", represent the entire events which give rise to the top event. A cut set is described as a
collection of basic events; if all these basic events occur, the top event is guaranteed to
occur (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). In this evaluation technique, the minimum cut set is
obtained using the Boolean algebra, which will be used in quantitative evaluation. Minimal
cut sets are defined as an irreducible pathways leading to the occurrence of the top event
(Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The relevance of these sets must be carefully weighted and
major emphasis placed on those of greatest significance (Pillay and Wang, 2003).
Gas Leak not
Controlled
Piping/Engine
Gas Leak not
Controlled
Failure to
Secure Vat-ie
Ventilation
Failure
Pressure Valva
Leak not
Controlled
Figure 4.2: FTA of "Gas Leak not Controlled"
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4.4.2. Quantitative Evaluation
Although a FT is primarily a qualitative method, it is also suited to quantify the occurrence
probability of the undesired event and to determine the relative importance of events in the
occurrence of the undesired event (Desmond and Gregory, 2004). Quantitative evaluation
multiplies the usefulness of the FTA in the LNG industry. Once the minimal cut sets are
defined, if quantitative results are desired, probability evaluations can be performed
(Norman, 1987). The quantitative evaluation is most easily performed in a sequential
manner, first by determining the component failure probabilities, then the minimal cut set
probabilities and finally the top event (system) probability (Norman, 1987). The method
used to achieve minimal cut sets is the Boolean algebra and set theory (see Appendix
C1.2 for more details).
4.5. Risk Modelling of LNG Carrier Operations
Risk modelling can be carried out in LNG carrier systems using various safety analysis
techniques. In this chapter, FTA explained in Section 4.4 will be used as the safety analysis
technique to model the risk of LNG carrier systems because of its compatible advantage for
cost effective modelling using the powerful tool of GA. Natural gas production,
liquefaction of natural gas, transportation of LNG, re-gasification, and distribution to end
users are the five main components of LNG value chains (Sophia and Anne, 2006; Foss,
2003). LNG carrier is used to transport the LNG and it is made of different systems and
subsystems. The wide spread of the hazards in the distributed chains indicates the possible
high risks of LNG carrier systems. Attention is focused on the systems through increasing
the level of maintenance. Risk assessment is believed to be useful for the LNG industry to
identify areas that need regular maintenance. Mathematically, risk can be expressed as
follows:
Risk = Consequences x Likelihood
= Hazard Severity x Failure Probability
(4.1)
(4.2)
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= Hazard Severity's Weight (Sw) x Failure Probability (P) (4.3)
In risk modelling/assessment of any LNG carrier system, failure probability intends to
follow an exponential distribution. The exponential distribution is adopted because it is
straightforward, computational effective, and can be used to demonstrate the useful life
period of a system. At such period, failure rate is constant. Due to the constant failure rate,
the exponential distribution is often regarded as the random failure distribution because it is
independent of previous successful operating time (Andrew and Moss, 2002). The failure
rate is the inverse of Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Therefore,
Risk (R) = s; x P
P = 1- e-A1 (4.4)
A = _-_In....;..(l_-_P~)
t
(4.5)
(4.6)
where 1-e-)./ = Exponential distribution formula
P = Failure probability
A = Failure rate/frequency
t = Time of interest
The risk level of the whole system is determined by the ones of its subsystems.
RT = RSYSTEM(I) + RSYSTEM(2) + + RSYSTEM(n) (4.7)
where RT = Total risk of the LNG carrier systems
RSYSTEM(I) = Risk of the LNG carrier subsystem i
i = 1,2....n or (i E n)
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Consequently, Equation (4.8) is obtained by substituting Equation (4.6) in Equation (4.7) as
follows:
(4.8)
where SW(i) = Hazard Severity's Weight of the LNG carrier subsystem i
Ai = Failure rate of the LNG carrier subsystem i
t, = Time of interest of the LNG carrier subsystem i
i = 1,2... .n or (i En)
The risk associated with the top event (hazard) of a FTA modelling a LNG carrier system is
evaluated in terms of its level. Risk assessment can be carried out at different phases of a
LNG carrier and other facilities used in the LNG industry by extending FTA to include
ETA for constructing a diagram called the "Risk Contribution Tree (ReT)" based on
accident data and expert judgement to display the cause-effect. Risk assessment provides
qualitative and/or quantitative information to decision makers (Wilcox, et al., 2000). This is
illustrated in Figure 4.3. Qualitative and quantitative risk analyses are explained as follows
(Eleye-Datubo,2006):
• Qualitative risk analysis. It is associated with the identification of the hazards that are
catastrophic, critical, marginal or negligible as categorised in Table 4.1. The occurrence
probability of the hazards is expressed as frequent, probable, occasional or remote, as
illustrated in Table 4.2. This analysis will lead to the knowledge of the
level/consequence of risk, in the early design stage when data is not available for
quantitative risk analysis.
• Quantitative risk analysis. It is associated with the use of characteristics of each
individual component like failure rate, repair rate, system logic, maintenance schedule,
mission time and human error to formulate a mathematical model that will help to
identify high risk areas that need to be controlled.
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Figure 4.3: A Diagram of Risk Assessment Technique (Pillay and Wang, 2003)
Hazards of LNG carrier systems identified based on probability of occurrence can be dealt
with using the basis of design actions in Table 4.3, which is a combination of hazard
consequence and hazard probability illustrated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. These can be
explained as follows:
• Design action is required to eliminate or control hazards classified as A-I, A-2, A-3, B-
1, B-2 and C-l.
• Hazard consequences must be controlled or hazard probability reduced for hazards
classified as B-3, C-2 and 0-1.
• Hazard control is desirable if cost effective for hazards classified as C-3 and 0-2.
• Hazard control is not cost effective for hazards classified as D-3.
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Table 4.1: Hazard Consequence
Category Weight Description Equipment Personnel
1 1000 Catastrophic System Loss Death
2 100 Critical Major System Severe
Damage Injury/Illness
3 10 Marginal Minor System Minor
Damage Injury/Illness
4 1 Negligible <Minor <Minor
System Injury/Illness
Damage
Table 4.2: Hazard Probability
Level Description Frequency
A Frequent Likely to happen
B Probable Several times during lifetime
C Occasional Likely to happen once
D Remote Unlikely but possible during life time
Table 4.3: Risk Assessment Matrix
Hazard Severity Weight A B C D (remote)
(Frequent) (Probable) (Occasional)
1. Catastrophic 1000 A-I B-1 C-I D-l
2. Critical 100 A-2 B-2 C-2 D-2
3. Marginal 10 A-3 B-3 C-3 D-3
4. Negligible 1 Negligible hazards
No action required
4.6. Cost Modelling of LNG Carrier Operations
Cost modelling is carried out on the LNG carrier systems using information provided by
risk modelling that identifies the system that needs more attention than others in the LNG
industry, so as to reduce the frequency of failures and/or mitigate their possible
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consequence through improving their maintenance. To maintain and improve the level of
safety in the LNG industry, the identified high risk systems of a LNG carrier need
particular attention in terms of the level of maintenance carried out on them. To
identify/forecast the even distribution of the cost of carrying out maintenance of the high
risk LNG carrier systems per year (s) as a result of its operations remains a challenge to the
industry because the risk of LNG carrier systems is taken into account in the cost
distribution phase. Therefore, a mathematical formula relating to the risk of the LNG
carrier systems and cost of their maintenance per year(s) will be developed.
From Equation (4.8), the total risk of the LNG carrier systems is expressed as follows:
CT = CSYSTEM(I) +CSYSTEM(2) + +CSYSTEM(n) (4.9)
where CT = Total cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems
CSYSTEM(i) = Cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system i
i = 1,2... .n or (i En)
To combine Equation (4.9) with Equation (4.8), I and C inverse relationship will be used
as follows:
For LNG carrier system 1,
1 (4.10)11=----
CSYSTEM (Iu)
1 (4.11)III =----
CSYSTEM(I)
Equations (4.10) and (4.11) can be used to estimate the times at which a system will be
maintained when there is less money for maintenance and more money for maintenance
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respectively. Therefore, Equations (4.10) and (4.11) can be combined to form Equation
(4.12) as follows:
.!L = CSYSTilM(l)
til CSYSTEM()u)
_ t CSYSTEM()U)Thus, ttl - ) -----'-"';"
CSYSTl:.M(I)
(4.12)
where t) = Initial maintenance time of the LNG carrier system 1
til = New maintenance time of the LNG carrier system 1
CSYSTEM()U) = Unit (initial or minimum) cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system 1
CSYmM(I) =New cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system 1
In a similar way, CSYSTEM(i) (i = 2, n) can be represented respectively as follows:
-_t. CSYSTl:.M(iu)
tii
, CSYSTEM(i)
(4.13)
Substitute Equation (4.12) and (4.13) in Equation (4.8) as expressed below:
The values of SW(ll' Ai' t., CSYSTEM(imax) and CSYSrEM(iu) (i = l, ..........n) are always known,
while the values of CSYSTEM(i) (i = 1, n) are unknown. However, the sum of them will
be known as the maintenance budget in the real world, while CSYSTEM (Imax) is described as
the maximum maintenance cost of system i , To obtain the value of CSYSrEM(I)
(i = l, n), an optimisation technique needs to be used to minimise the total risk of the
LNG carrier system (Rr ), given that the total cost (Cr) assigned for maintenance of the
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LNG carrier system is summation of CSYSTEM(i) (i = 1, n). GA is an optimisation
technique that will be used to solve Equation (4.14). Therefore, the objective function will
be expressed as follows:
A ("C.'1)".'o'T£\I('U») ~("CSrST£\/(2U») A ("CSI~TliM(,,"»)
R = S x (1- e I CsrSTEAI(I) ) +S x (1- e CsrSTEAI(2») + S (1_ _. CSrSTEAI(.) )T W(I) W(2) ••••• W(n) X e
Subject to: (4.15)
CT = CSYSTEM(I) +CSYSTEM(2) + •••••••• CSYSTEM(n)
CSYSTt.M(iu) sCSYSTEM(i) sCSYSTEM(lmax)
i = I,2 ... .n or (i E n)
4.7. Test Case of Genetic Algorithm to Cost Analysis of LNG Carrier Maintenance
Operations
LNG operations involve exploration, extraction, production, transportation, storage and
distribution via interstate or intrastate pipelines to the consumers. Safety is applied to the
different components of the gas supply chain to ensure that there are no environmental
pollution and Potential Loss of Life (PLL). Regular risk assessment is carried out on all the
LNG systems and subsystems to maintain a high level of safety by appropriately improving
their maintenance policy. GA is applied to a unit of cargo handling (LNG transfer arm) and
storage system/tank (LNG membrane tank) to ascertain the feasibility of the
aforementioned GA methodology for cost effectiveness of maintenance of LNG carriers.
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4.7.1. LNG Storage System
The proper selection of LNG storage tank type is made according to location to be sited,
safety, reliability, environmental considerations and economic efficiency (Hyo et aI., 2005).
Full containment tanks are used onshore and on LNG ships because of the operational
safety of the tanks and their associated equipment as well as the ease of maintenance. The
storage tank and the associated pipes can be affected by the following six major accident
scenarios which may cause a LNG spill (Hyo et aI., 2005):
• Overfilling of storage tank.
• Over pressurization of storage tank.
• Under pressurization of storage tank.
• Failure of inlet lines.
• Failure of outlet lines.
• Loss of mechanical integrity of tank.
4.7.2. Cargo Handling/Transfer
Cargo handling/transfer is operated with a high level of safety in order to reduce the
occurrence of environmental pollution. The cargo transfer connections are designed to the
standards laid down by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the
SIGTTO. The standards ensure that similar arrangements are defined for jetty loading arms
and pipe-work, together with defined limits on the allowable cargo flow rates and
pressures, as well as the provision of defined and proven arrangements of communications
systems, function monitoring requirements, alarm and emergency shut down arrangement
(Newell, 2003). These standards ensure that LNG and natural gas vapour transfer between
ship and shore can be performed easily and safely. LNG transfer normally takes place
through a set of articulated loading arms mounted on a jetty or a process and storage ship
connected to a shuttle ship. Despite the fact that the OCIMF and SIGTTO set the standards
for design and operation of LNG transfer arms, certain hazards still exist. Some of the
hazards are identified as:
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• Bad weather condition. This affects the ship while discharging or loading thereby
causing LNG transfer to cease due to the inability of most loading arms to cope with
ship movement.
• Overloading of the arms. It causes the breakaway coupling to operate automatically,
system valves to close and loading arms to withdraw, thereby causing LNG spillage
from pipe-work.
4.7.3. Hazard Identification in LNG Carrier Operations
Potential hazards associated with LNG operations can be identified with the help of LNG
experts in the industry. A hazard is defined as a physical situation with a potential to cause
injury, damage to environment or some combination of these (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007).
HAZID team members can be made up of marine engineers, naval architects, structural
specialists, marine officers, risk analysts, and process, mechanical and safety engineers.
The team works with the theme of believability/credibility, which is that there must be
potential for an initiating event to be technically feasible (even if highly unlikely) within
the expected lifetime of the activity (Pitblado et al., 2004). HAZID is carried out from
systematic reviews of all operational modes modelling the different sections of the LNG
industry. The team involved in this research, carried out HAZID using brainstorming and
FTA methods. The team also ensures that the process is proactive and not confined only to
hazards that have materialised in the past. The hazards identified by the team are detailed in
Section 3.5 of Chapter 3.
These identified hazards in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 cause LNG spill, thereby resulting in
more serious consequences, including (CLNG, 2008):
• Rapid phase transition.
• Vapour clouds.
• Rollover.
• Freezing liquids.
• Pool fire.
91
An accident can be defined as an unintended event involving fatality, injury, property loss
or damage, and/or environmental damage (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). "LNG containment
system failure" and "LNG spill from transfer arm" accident scenarios are identified using
FTA as illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. In Figure 4.4, LNG containment system fails
when structural defect, corrosion, fire and explosion, structural pressure difference or
failure of supporting structure happens. Structural pressure difference (PD) occurs when
excessive positive pressure difference (PPD) and corrosion happen simultaneously.
Excessive PPO occurs when pressure relief systems fail and containment pressure occur
simultaneously. Failure of the supporting structure occurs when chock failure or plastic
collapse of supports occurs. Chock failure occurs when excess load, structural defect and
installation defect happen simultaneously. Excess load occurs when corrosion or fire and
explosion happens. Plastic collapse of supports occurs when structural defects, and fire and
explosion happen. Structural defect, corrosion, fire and explosion, installation defect,
pressure relief system failure and containment pressure are basic events. In Figure 4.5, a
LNG spill from the transfer arm occurs when transfer arm failure, material defect or failure
of piping happens. Transfer arm failure occurs when the arm design limit is exceeded, fire
and explosion or mechanical failure within design envelope happens. When manual release,
fire and explosion and auto release failure happen, exceeding of arm design limit occurs.
Mechanical failure within the design envelope occurs when application of ship motion, fire
and explosion, and failure of motion and controls happen simultaneously. Failure of piping
occurs when pipe rupture, pipe coupling sleeve failure and structural defect occur. Pipe
coupling sleeve failure occurs when overpressure and material defect happen
simultaneously. Manual release failure, auto release failure, fire and explosion, application
of ship motion, failure of motion and controls, pipe rupture, overpressure and material
defect are basic events.
4.7.4. Risk Modelling of the LNG Carrier System
Information produced from the HAZID phase will be processed to estimate risk (Pillay,
2001). In "Containment system failure" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm" accident
scenarios, risks are assessed by the quantitative analysis of FIs illustrated in Figures 4.4
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and 4.5. The probabilities of failure of the LNG carrier systems at a particular/specified
time will be calculated using the failure frequencies/rates of "Containment system failure"
and "LNG spill from transfer arm". It will be further used in cost modelling for
improvement of maintenance of the systems. PRA is applied to the top event and the
accident scenarios of Figure 4.4 and 4.5, given the availability of their basic events' data.
4.7.4.1. Risk Modelling of the LNG Containment System and the LNG Transfer Arm
For quantification of the top event, LNG containment system's basic events in Figure 4.4
and their failure frequencies/rates are listed as follows:
• Fire and explosion with failure ~requency of 1.78E-006/hour (SINTEF, 2002) and
failure probability of P(A).
• Structural defects with failure frequency of 2.3Ie-006/hour (SINTEF, 2002) and failure
probability of P(B).
• Corrosion effects with failure frequency of 1.115E-006/hour (SINTEF, 2002) and
failure probability of P(C).
• Containment pressure with failure frequency of O.OI/hour (Hyo et. ai, 2005) and failure
probability ofP(D).
• Pressure relief system failure with failure frequency of 2.12e-005/hour (SINTEF, 2002)
and failure probability of P(E).
• Installation defect with failure frequency of 1.382e-005/hour (SINTEF, 2002) and
failure probability of P(F).
= A+B+C
P(LNG Containment System) = P( A +B +C)
-+ P(A)+ P(B)+ P(C) -P(A) .P(B) -P(A). P(C)-P(B). P(C)+
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P(A). PCB) • pee)
At t = 43,800 hours (5 years)
peA) = I - e-!.t
A = 1_78e-006
P( A) = 1- e -L78e-006x43800
= 1-0.925
= 0.075
Similarly, the failures probabilities, PCB)and P(C) can be calculated as 0.0962 and 0.0477
at t = 43,800 hours and A = 2.3Ie-006 and 1.115e-006 respectively.
P(LNG Containment System) = 0.075 + 0.0962 + 0.0477- (0.075 x 0.0962) - (0.075 x
0.0477) - (0.09623 x 0.0477) + (0.09623 x 0.0477 x 0.075) = 0.2038
P(LNG Containment System) = 1- e -AI x43800
e-Alx43800 = t- 0.2038 = 0.7962
- A, x 43800 x In e = In 0.7962
- A, = -S.203e-006
A,= S.203e-006
The probability of failure of an LNG containment system is 0.2038 at 43,800 hours (5
years) with hazard severity weight SW(I) of 1000 from Table 4.1, which is catatrosphic if it
occurs. The associated failure frequency A, is S.203e-006/hour. In a similar way, the failure
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frequency of the LNG transfer arm can be calculated as 1.293e-005, given that the
minimum cut sets of the top event are 1+N +L, and t = 43,800 hours. The basic events
with their failure frequencies that lead to LNG spill from transfer arm in Figure 4.5 are:
• Manual release failure frequency of 0.0241hour (Risknology, 2006) and failure
probability ofP(G).
• Auto release failure frequency of 0.031hour (Risknology, 2006) and failure probability
ofP(H).
• Fire and explosion of failure frequency of 1.78e-061hour (SINTEF, 2002) and failure
probability of P(I).
• Application of ship motion of failure frequency of 0.000661hour (Risknology, 2006)
and failure probability ofP(J).
• Failure of motion and controls of failure frequency of 1.382e-005Ihour (Risknology,
2006) and failure probability ofP(K).
• Pipe rupture of failure frequency of 2.96e-OlOlhour (Hyo et. ai, 2005) and failure
probability ofP(L).
• Overpressure of failure frequency of 0.0 I/hour (Hyo et. al, 2005) and failure probability
ofP(M).
• Material defect of failure frequency of 11.15e-06Ihour (SINTEF, 2002) and failure
probability of P(N).
4.7.5. Cost Modelling of the LNG Carrier Systems
The cost associated with maintenance of the LNG carrier systems is identified by using GA
on the objective function and constraints of the systems in Equation (4.15). Therefore the
objective function and constraints are expressed as follows:
(
'ICSI'STIiM(I.») ('ICS!'STEM(Z.»)
Rr = SW(I) x (1- e --t, CSI'STIiM(I) ) + SW(2) x (1- e -Az CmTE\I(Z) )
Subject to:
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CT = CSYSnM(I) +CSYSTHM(2)
CSYSTEM(lu) s CSYSTEM(I) s CSYSTEM(lmax)
CSYSTEM(2u) s CSYSTEM(2) sCSYSTEM(lmax)
4.7.5.1. Cost Modelling of the LNG Containment System and the LNG Transfer Arm
The hazard severity weight illustrated in Table 4.1, failure frequency and time of
maintenance associated with the LNG containment system (LNG carrier system 1) in
Section 4.7.4.1 are:
Hazard Severity's Weight of the LNG carrier system 1 (SW(l)) = 1000
Failure frequency of the LNG carrier system 1 (A,) = 5.203e-006/hour
Time of interest (maintenance) of the LNG carrier system 1 ( I)) = 43800 hours
The cost of the LNG membrane containment system that can contain 155,000 m3 of LNG is
$2.16m (Chu, 2007). The unit and maximum costs of maintenance of the LNG membrane
containment system in 43,800 hours time are:
CSYSTEM(lU) = $550,000 and CSYSTEM(lUUIX) = $1,170,000
Substituting the values in the objective function in Section 4.7.5 implies:
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Figure 4.4: Fault Tree of LNG Containment System Failure
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Figure 4.5: Fault Tree of LNG Spill from Transfer Arm
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(
43800X55oooo) -'2('2CSl~TE.\{(2w»)
RT = 1000x (1- e -5.203e-006 CSrSTW(I) ) + SW(2) X (1- e - CSIS7E\{(2»)
Subject to:
CT = CSYSTEM(l) +CSYSTf..M(2)
550000:::;; CSYSTEM(I) s CSYSTEM(lmax)
C.WSTEM(2u) sCSYSTEM(2) s CSYSTEM(2max)
The LNG transfer arm (LNG carrier system 2) has the hazard severity weight illustrated in
Table 4.1, failure frequency (rate), time of maintenance in Section 4.7.4.1 as follows:
Hazard Severity's Weight of the LNG carrier system 2 (SW(2)) = 1000
Failure frequency (rate) of the LNG carrier system 2 (,1'2) = 1.293e-05
Time of maintenance of the LNG carrier system 2 (12) = 43800 hours
The unit and maximum costs for maintenance of the LNG transfer arm in 43800 hours time
are:
CSYSTEM(2u) = $130,000 and CSYSTEM(lmax) = $750,000
To improve the level of safety of the LNG carrier systems, suppose the new cost allocated
for maintenance of the LNG carrier systems is:
CT = $1,300,000
Substituting the values in the objective function in Section 4.7.5 yields:
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(
43800XS50000) (43800X130000)
-5.203e-06 -1.2930-05RT = 1000x (1- e lS!ST£I/(I) ) + 1000x (1- e CS!ST£1/(2l )
Subject to:
1300000 = C,WSTEM(l) +C SYSTEM(2)
550000 sCSYSTEM(J) s 1170000
130000 ~ CSYSThM(2) s 750000
4.7.5.2. Simulation Result/Analysis of Cost of the LNG Carrier Systems: Containment
System and Transfer Arm
The values of the objective function and its constraint parameters defined in Section 4.7.5.1
are used in the Matlab environment for a simulation exercise, using GA to identify
CSYS1'f.M(I) and CSYS1't.M(2) for improvement of level of safety. The objective function and its
constraint in question are expressed as follows:
RT = 2000 -lOOOe -12534O.3/C"'7El/(I) -1000e -73623.42/CsrmM(2)
Subject to:
1300000 = C SYSTEM(J) + CSYSTEM(2)
550000 ~ CSYSTEM(J) s 1170000
130000~ CSYSTEM(2) s 750000
lOO
The GA Matlab 7.7 platform provides the designer/researcher with different GA operators
and parameters that will be selected for identification of CSYSTEM(I) and CSYSTEM(2) , at which
the point of convergence is achieved. The useful operators and parameters are assigned
values in the GA Matlab 7.7 platform (software), which enables the development of a
Matlab file for the objective function. The operators and parameter values are:
1. Population size = 80
2. Fitness Scaling = Rank
3. Selection = Stochastic
4. Crossover = Two point
5. Elite = 2
6. Mutation = Adaptive feasible or constraint dependent default
7. Generation = 51
These operators and parameter values are recommended as the best for a constrained
optimization problem according to Matlab Version 7.7 (R2008b). The next step is to run
the simulation to produce the final result shown in Figure 4.6. In Figure 4.6, the fitness is
plotted against the generation and the optimal solution is found at the point where CSYSTEM(l)
= $729,087 and CSYSTEM(2) = $570,913 with fitness value of 278.94 (Le. RT), after 10th
generation at time limit of 10 minutes and simulation stopped at 51st generation, which can
be illustrated in GA Matlab 7.7 platform. These values of the cost of maintenance of the
LNG containment system and transfer arm are the best for improvement of levels of safety
of the LNG carrier systems.
4.7.5.3. Verification of the Model
The model of an engineering problem needs to be verified. This can be conducted by
carrying out a sensitivity analysis on the model to ascertain the usefulness of the model. In
this research, the model with its simulation illustrated in Figure 4.6 would be verified with
the aim of satisfying the following three axioms:
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• Axiom 1. An increase of the value of CT (total budgeted maintenance cost of the LNG
carrier systems) should result in a decrease of the value of RI' (total risk of the LNG
carrier systems) in the model.
• Axiom 2. An increase of the value of CSYSTEM (Iu) (unit cost of maintenance of the LNG
containment system) should result in an increase of the value of RI' in the model.
• Axiom 3. An increase of the value of CSYSTEM(2u) (unit cost of maintenance of the LNG
transfer arm) should result in an increase of R; in the model.
Best: 278.937 Mean: 278.937
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Figure 4.6: Graph of Fitness against Generation
Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 have been produced after carrying out simulation exercises on the
model with increase of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% of CT, CSYSTEM(IIl) and CSYSTEM(2u) values
from their original values of $1300000, $550000 and $130000 respectively. Table 4.4
shows a resultant decrease of RT value in one direction from its initial/original value of
278.94 because of the 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% increase of the values of CT'
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In Row 2 of Table 4.4, CSYSTEM(1) has a value of $765911 with lower boundary value
(CSYSTEM(1u») of $550000 and 5% increased CT value of $1365000. While CSYSrEM(2) has a
value of $599089 with lower boundary value (CSYSTEM(2u») and CT value of $130000 and
$1365000 respectively. Their fitness function value Rr is 266.6. Other rows in Table 4.4
follow a similar pattern and have R; values of 255.31, 244.93 and 235.36 with respect to
10%, 15% and 20% increase of CT value. This is in line with Axiom 1.
Table 4.4: Model Verification by Increase of CT Value
CSYSTt.M(I) CSYSTEM(2) CT ($) Lower Lower Percentage Fitness
($) ($) boundary boundary increase of function
of of CT value R;
CSYSTEM(I) CSYSTEM(2)
Le. I.e.
CSYSTEM(lu) CSYSTEM(2u)($)
($)
729087 570913 1300000 550000 130000 Nil 278.94
765911 599089 1365000 550000 130000 5% 266.6
802733 627267 1430000 550000 130000 10% 255.31
839552 655448 1495000 550000 130000 15% 244.93
876370 683630 1560000 550000 130000 20% 235.36
In a similar way, Table 4.5 is described. In Table 4.5, there is an increase of the R; value
from its original value of 278.94 as a result of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% increase of the
CSYSTEM(1U) value in the model. The resultant Rr values are 286.12, 293.31, 300.14 and
306.99 respectively. This is in line with Axiom 2.
Similar to Table 4.5, the value of R; increases from its original value of 278.94 as a result
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of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% increase of the CSYSTEM(2u) value in Table 4.6. The resultant
values of RT are 284.56, 290.08, 295.51 and 300.86 respectively. This is in harmony with
Axiom 3. The increase and decrease of RT values as a result of the increase of CT,
CSYSTEM(lU) and CSYSTEM(2u) values are illustrated graphically in Figure 4.7.
Table 4.5: Model Verification by Increase of the CSYSTEM(IU) Value
CSYSTEM (I) CSYSTEM(2) CT ($) Lower Lower Percentage Fitness
($) ($) boundary boundary increase of function
of of CSYSTEM(lu) value R;
CSYSTEM(I) CSYSTEM(2) ($) ($)
i.e. I.e.
CSYSTEM(lu) CSYSTEM(2u)($)
($)
729087 570913 1300000 550000 130000 Nil 278.94
736041 563959 1300000 577500 130000 5% 286.l2
742725 557275 1300000 605500 130000 10% 293.31
748828 551172 1300000 632500 130000 15% 300.l4
754725 545275 1300000 660000 130000 20% 306.99
4.7.5.4. Functlons and Effects of Genetic Algorithm Operators on the Simulation
Exercise
The GA operator is the prime determinate of the optimal solution. For the objective
function and constraint in this research, it is recommended (Haupt and Haupt 2004; and
Colley, 1999) to choose a population size of 50-100 in order to obtain the best result.
Fitness scaling has to be ranked because it ensures that the fitness values are ranked from
the lowest to the highest for identification of the best cost (individual or chromosome).
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Though other fitness scaling does exist, this may suit different scenarios or objective
functions and their respective constraints. Stochastic uniform selection method selects the
best cost from the ranked cost for the next generations while the two point crossover
operator, reproduce new cost that will replace the costs that were not selected. Elitism
guarantees that the two best costs always survive in the next generation until convergence is
met before the 51st generation, after introduction of adaptive feasible mutation to ensure
genetic diversity within the constraint of the objective function.
Table 4.6: Model Verification by Increase of the CSySTf•M(2u) Value
CSYSTEM(I) CSYSTEM(2) CT ($) Lower Lower Percentage Fitness
($) ($) boundary boundary increase of function
of of CSYSTEM(2u) value RT
CSYSTEM(I) CSYSTEM(2)
i.e. I.e.
CSYSTEM(lu) CSYSTEM (2u)($)
($)
729087 570913 1300000 550000 130000 Nil 278.94
721743 578257 1300000 550000 136500 5% 284.56
714748 585252 1300000 550000 143000 10% 290.08
708073 591927 1300000 550000 149500 15% 295.51
701693 598307 1300000 550000 156000 20% 300.86
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Sensitivity Analysis of Fitness Value RT
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Figure 4.7: Graph of RT Against Percentage Change of CT, CSYSTEM(ll1) and CSYSTEM(2l1)
4.8. Conclusion
The cost effectiveness of improving the level of safety (reduction of risk) is identified as a
method of ensuring that a high level of safety of LNG carrier systems is maintained.
Attention is focused on areas of high risk in the LNG industry such as containment system
and transfer arm in this research, which could cause LNG spill, in case of system failure.
The total risk of the LNG containment system and transfer is developed mathematically
from first principles which serve as an objective function to be minimised for cost
effectiveness of the systems maintenance, while the initial cost of maintenance and an
allocated cost for improvement of the LNG containment system and transfer arm safety
from its former safety/risk level serve as constraints and boundaries where the optimisation
processes could be practiced. A powerful tool of GA that can search the optimal solution
globally is employed for this service. GA is attached with Matlab 7.7 software in
optimization of the mathematical model. GA successfully identified the cost of maintaining
the LNG containment system and transfer arm by applying its mechanism on the objective
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function and constraint. Though it has not been fully addressed, uncertainty treatment of
failure frequencies and cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems will be analysed in
the next chapters.
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Chapter 5 - A Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm Approach to Analyse
Maintenance Cost of High Risk Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier
Systems under Uncertainty
Summary
A FGA is used to treat uncertainties associated with unit costs of maintenance of LNG
carrier systems such as a containment system and a transfer arm. A FRB is established
to identify the unit costs of maintenance of the LNG containment system and transfer
arm. It includes 125 LNG carrier maintenance cost rules, which used technical
consultancy cost, maintenance duration, and spare part cost as the antecedents and
maintenance cost as the consequent. The outcome from the FRB is used to optimise a
risk model using GAprinciples tofind the new/optimal maintenance cost of each system
with provided information on their respective time of interest, failure probability,
failure rate and maintenance cost of the whole LNG carrier systems.
5.1. Introduction
In the maritime industry, LNG carriers are among the vessels in which safety is
incorporated in their design stage. A proactive approach has been used to tackle the
potential hazards and threats associated with the LNG carrier operations. Risk
mitigation measures of failure frequencies and their possible consequences of the
hazards and threats have always been put in place. These have led to the introduction of
regulations by appropriate authorities to check the operations of LNG carriers and
maintain their safety record.
Several guidelines, rules and regulations are currently in place to avoid and respond to
the release of LNG (Aspen Environment Group, 2005; Nova Scotia Department of
Energy, 2005; SIGTTO, 1997). LNG carriers have been designed with a double hull,
which ensures safe transportation of LNG by provision of optimum protection for the
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integrity of the cargo in the event of collision or grounding as well as separate ballast
(Foss, 2003). Various organisations such as the SIGTTO, the IMO and the lACS have
contributed immensely in prevention and mitigation of potential risks associated with
LNG carriers and their systems and subsystems. The maritime industry classifies LNG
carriers using members of the lACS. They have been proactive in enhancing the safety
of the LNG carriers through emphasizing the need for incorporation of risk analysis in
ships. Their recommendations for maintenance of any LNG carrier system and
subsystem that did not meet the IMO safety standard are always implemented.
Maintenance is defined as the combination of all technical and administrative actions,
including supervision actions, intended to retain an entity in, or restore it to a state in
which it can perform a required function (Pillay and Wang, 2003). It could be
preventive, reactive, predictive or proactive maintenance (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Ben-
Daya and Hariga, 1998; Crocker, 1999; Lofsten, 1999) as described in Chapter 2.
The existence of uncertainties associated with the unit cost of maintenance of LNG
carrier systems, makes this work very important in the determination of the maintenance
cost of the LNG carrier systems using a risk model. A combination of algorithms such
as FGA facilitates the process. Therefore, the FGA approach is used to address the high
level of uncertainties associated with the unit cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier
systems and optimisation of the risk model. The step by step FGA approach is applied.
The unit cost of maintenance of each LNG carrier system is treated with a suitable
uncertainty technique such as a FRB for combination with a continuous steady-state GA,
because its operations can be easily computed.
The FRB is used to provide a reasonable interpretation of linguistic variables.
Membership values are assigned between 0 and 1 in the FRB. There is a definition of
the fitness function of the risk model and parameters of GA before simulation is carried
out with MATLAB 7.7 until a fixed number of generations have elapsed or some forms
of convergence criteria have been met, producing an optimal risk solution. The
objective of this work is to explore the application of FGA to the determination of
maintenance cost of the LNG carrier systems considering uncertainties of their unit cost
of maintenance.
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5.2. Background Analysis
The welcome development of the fuzzy logic and its combination with other algorithms,
including the GA has been effectively applied to the industrial challenges such as
uncertainty of data. Notable professionals like Zadeh (Zadeh, 1965) and Holland
(Colley, 1999; Golberg, 1989; Haupt and Haupt, 2004) invented the fuzzy logic in the
mid 60s and GA in mid 70s respectively. The FRB method is developed using IF-THEN
rules. The usefulness of the FRB has attracted experts to employ the service for decision
making in engineering, technology, science and management.
In the field of maritime safety, applications of the FRB have been carried out on the
marine and offshore systems and their environments (Yang, 2007; Ung, 2007; Eleye-
Datubo, 2006; Pillay, 2001; Sii et al., 2001). A Fuzzy Rule Base-Evidential Reasoning
(FRB-ER) algorithm is used to conduct threat and hazard based risk assessment in
container supply chain systems (Yang, 2007). The FRB inference system estimates the
safety level of each basic event while the ER is used to synthesise all the basic events
for each RCO. Similarly, a safety assessment is carried out on the risks introduced by
collision of a Floating Production, Storage and Offioading (FPSO) unit and a shuttle
tanker using the FRB-ER (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). In this evaluation, 32 rules are fired for
actual safety assessment.
The usefulness of a FRB is also proved in risk assessment of port security with the
adoption of FMECA (Ung, 2007). The concept of FMECA is used in the development
of the "IF" and "THEN" part of the 625 rules of a FRB. The FRB-FMECA processes
identified the risk ranking of the port security. Similarly, a combination of FRB and
FMEA is used to assess safety of the structure, propulsion, electrical and auxiliary
systems of a fishing vessel (Pillay and Wang, 2003). A FRB that is made up of 125
rules is developed using probability of occurrence, severity and detectability as the
antecedents and priority for attention as the consequent for effective safety assessment
of the systems of a fishing vessel.
A FRB has solved manufacturing problems in delay time analysis of an environmental
model (Jones, 2009). The uncertainties surrounding the parameters of the delay time
analysis of an environmental model are solved by firing the relevant rules of the 25
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rules of a FRB in the model. The model is used to find the optimal inspection period
based on minimal cost to the environment.
In nuclear engineering, the FGA approach is used to find test interval optimization of
safety systems of a nuclear power plant (Durga Rao et al., 2007). A fuzzy logic based
on an alpha cut method (Soman and Misra, 1993), also known as resolution identity is
used to treat uncertainties in the parameters of the developed mathematical model. The
civil engineering experts also used the FGA approach in solving structural engineering
optimization problems (Yang and Soh, 2000; Soh and Yang, 1996).
There is no doubt that the FGA is useful to the LNG industry using a FRB method.
Expert judgement is used to develop a FRB that has 125 rules for treatment of
uncertainties associated with the unit costs of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems.
The rules have LNG Carrier System Technical Consultancy Cost (LTCC), LNG Carrier
System Maintenance Duration (LMD), and LNG Carrier System Spare Part Cost (LSPC)
as the antecedents, and LNG Carrier System Maintenance Cost (LMC) as the
consequent. The unit costs of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems are parameters in
the risk model that is optimised using a continuous steady-state GA in this work.
5.3. Genetic Algorithm
The GA and its methodology have been discussed in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4. In this
work, a continuous steady state GA is used in optimisation of a risk model because the
algorithm uses real numbers in encoding the parameters of the risk model, thereby
avoiding data loss during computational processes. The GA can be easily combined
with other algorithms such as fuzzy logic as illustrated in Figure 5.1, which is used to
solve the uncertainties of the unit costs of maintenance of LNG carrier systems.
The information flow in Figure 5.1 started from problem formulation and gathering of
data for a solution, which is referred to the risk model that needed to be optimised using
the GA methodology, after treatment of uncertainties of unit costs of maintenance of
LNG carrier systems.
111
Select and fire the needed rules, and find their
fuzzy conclusion based on their DoBs
Find the final fuzzy conclusion of LMC
i.e. a unit cost of maintenance of LNG
carrier system using max-min method.
Develop 125 rules of
FRB using LTCC,
LMD and LSPC as
the antecedents, and
LMC as the
consequent.
Defuzzify the fuzzy conclusion of the
LMC using WMoM
The development
of triangular type
membership
functions of
LTCC,LMD,
LSPC and LMC
using expert
judgement
Populationsize Fitnessscaling
LNG carriersystemcost parameters
input
• LTce
• LMD• Lspe
No I
LNG carriersystemriskparametersinput
• Timeof interest
• Failurerate
• Failureprobability
• Maintenancecost
Figure 5.1: A Flow Chart of Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm Methodology
The risk model has parameters such as time of interest, failure rate, failure probability
and maintenance cost as illustrated in Figure 5.1. A FRB methodology is used in the
treatment of uncertainties of unit costs of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems. The
first step of establishing the FRB is use of LNG carrier system cost parameters such as
LTCC, LMD and LSPC as components of the antecedent part of IF-THEN rules, which
used triangular membership functions in estimation of LMC, guided by the 125 fuzzy
rules of the LNG carrier system maintenance cost as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The
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resultant fuzzy values of the LMC are defuzzified to crisp values using a WMoM
method before being used in the risk model for the definition of the fitness function.
The definition of fitness function is the first step of the GA methodology, followed by
population size, fitness scaling and selection of fittestlbest individuals (chromosomes).
The type of objective function of the risk model is chosen, followed by an elitism
operator that ensures the best individuals are retained in the population as illustrated in
Figure 5.1. The individuals undergo crossover and mutation processes accordingly, and
the ones reproduced via these processes, replaced the ones that are not selected after the
fitness scaling. The FGA process ends, if the risk model has converged, otherwise, the
iteration continues from the fitness scaling until an optimal risk solution is found as
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
5.4. Risk and Cost Modelling of the LNG Carrier Systems
The risk and cost model are developed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 of Chapter 4 with
parameters such as time of interest, failure rate, failure probability, unit cost of
maintenance of each LNG carrier system and budgeted maintenance cost of the whole
LNG carrier systems. Therefore, the objective function that will be optimised using GA
is expressed as follows:
Subject to:
C; = CSYSTEM (I) +CSYSTEM(2) + ........C SYSTEM(n) (5.1)
CSYSThM(iU) ~ CSYSTEM(i) ~ CSYSTEM(iDI8X)
i = 1,2....n or (i E n)
where, RT = Total risk of the LNG carrier systems
SW(i) = Hazard severity's weight of the LNG carrier system i
Ai = Failure rate of the LNG carrier system i
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t, = Time of interest of the LNG carrier system i
C, = Total cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems
CSYSTtM(i) =New cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system i
CSYSTcM(iU) =Unit cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system i
CSYSnM(imax) =Maximum cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system i
5.5. Fuzzy Logic
The fuzzy logic is a logic developed from FST, which uses a range from 0 to 1 to
express the degree of truth of a sentence. Since 1965, Zadeh and various experts such as
E. H. Mamdani (Mamdani, 1974), T. Takagi and Professor M. Sugeno (Sugeno and
Kang, 1988; Sugeno and Yasukawa 1993) and B. Kosko (Kosko, 1994; Kosko, 1997)
have improved the strength of the algorithm by development of a FRB method. Fuzzy
logic systems are knowledge/rule based systems constructed from human knowledge in
form of Fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Wang, 1997). The IF-THEN rules of FRB are fuzzified
using membership functions.
5.5.1. Fuzzy Membership Functions
There are many fuzzy membership functions used to solve challenging problems in
different fields. The trapezoidal and triangular membership functions are often used in
the maritime industry (Yang, 2007; Ung, 2007; Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Pillay and Wang,
2003; Sii et al., 2001). A particular fuzzy membership function chosen for solving
engineering problems depends on the choice of the experts involved and the problem
formulated. In this work, a triangular membership function is used because of its
computational simplicity.
5.5.1.1. Triangular Membership Function
Three parameters are used to specify a triangular membership function. The parameters
are a, b and c, as expressed below:
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0 x<a
triangle (x: a,b,c) = (x-a)/(b-a) a~x~b
(c-x)/(c-b) b~x~c (5.2)
0 x>c
The appearance of the function is determined by the choice of the parameters a, b and c
(Yen and Langari, 1999). A triangular membership function is defined using the three
parameters a, b, and c with values of 1, 5 and 9 as the points that formed the triangle
shown in Figure 5.2.
1.0 ········..·· ···1········...······1········.········1········.········1········.········..·······1"·······.········1········.···.. ···1·..•···..········,········.········1····
0.5
II i Ii
o 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 5.2: A Triangular Membership Function
5.5.2. Fuzzy Rule Base
A fuzzy IF-THEN rule is a knowledge representation scheme for capturing human
knowledge that is imprecise by nature (Yen and Langari, 1999). This is' achieved by
using linguistic variables to describe conditions that can be satisfied to a degree in the
"IF" part of the fuzzy rules (Yen and Langari, 1999). A fuzzy rule has two main parts
such as an "IF" and a "THEN" part. The "IF" part is called "antecedent" while the
"THEN" part is called "consequent". The fuzzy rule sentence is expressed as follows:
IF<antecedent>THEN<consequent>
In most cases, the "antecedent" uses logic connectors such as AND, OR and NOT. This
depends on the number of inputs and nature of the engineering problem. In this work,
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AND is used to develop fuzzy IF-THEN rules for uncertainty treatment of the unit cost
of maintenance of LNG carrier systems. The components of the LNG carrier systems
maintenance cost framework are illustrated in Figure 5.3, which are used to develop the
FRB methodology shown in Figure 5.4. The descriptions of the linguistic variables of
the "IF" and "THEN" parts are illustrated in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, and their
respective membership functions shown in Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. The 125 rules
of FRB of the LNG carrier system maintenance cost are outlined in Appendix D 1.1. The
rules are 125 because there are 3 antecedents each of which is described with 5
linguistic terms (Le. 5 x 5 x 5). The triangular shapes of Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 are
independent from one another. Figure 5.8 has a monetary scale value that can be used to
describe the maximum possible values of the linguistic terms ("very cheap", "cheap",
"normal", "expensive" and "very expensive"), to facilitate defuzzification process. At
the maximum possible value (Le. membership function value of 1), "very cheap",
"cheap", "normal", "expensive" and "very expensive" linguistic terms have scale values
of$125000, $250000, $937500, $2187500 and $2500000 respectively.
Experts used the methodology of the FRB in Figure 5.4 for decision making on the unit
cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems. The fuzzy conclusion is achieved using
a max-min method (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii et al., 2001; Yen and Langari, 1999).
The crisp value of a membership function is produced using a defuzzification method
such as WMoM (Andrew and Moss, 2002; Pillay and Wang, 2003). The max-min
method for any category (linguistic term) of the consequent part (LMe) of fired fuzzy
rules can be expressed as follows:
i =1.. .n; j =1.. 5 (5.3)
where, J.l~c = Maximum fuzzy membership function value of a category (linguistic
term) of the consequent part of the fired fuzzy rules.
J.llrcc = Fuzzy membership function value of the LTee for fired fuzzy rule i.
J.l~D = Fuzzy membership function value of the LMD for fired fuzzy rule i.
J.l~pc = Fuzzy membership function value of the LPSe for fired fuzzy rule i .
j = 5 linguistic variables/terms of consequent part (Table 5.4).
116
n= Number of the rules of having the same jth linguistic variable of the consequent.
LNG carrier system maintenance cost (LMC)
t
1
LNG carrier system labour cost LNG carrier system spare part cost (LSPC)
LNG carrier system technical
consultancy cost (LTCC)
LNG carrier system maintenance
duration (LMD)
Figure 5.3: LNG Carrier System Maintenance Cost Framework
The uncertainty of unit costs of maintenance of H The development of a triangular type membership of ILNG carrier systems and gathering of data for a LTCC, LMD, LSPC and LMC using expert judgement.solution.
~
Select and fire needed rules, and find their I I Develop 125 rules ofFRB using LTCC, LMD, and
fuzzy conclusion based on their DoBs. r I LSPC as the antecedent, and LMC as the consequent.
~
Find the final fuzzy conclusion ofLMC i.e. a _j Defuzzify the fuzzy conclusion ofLMC using WMoM. Junit cost of maintenance of LNG carrier "Isystem using max-min method.
Figure 5.4: A Fuzzy Rule Base Methodology for LNG Carrier System Maintenance
Cost.
The judgement of two or more experts with equal experience of LNG carrier systems
maintenance cost can be, combined using the mathematical expressions as follows (Klir
and Yaun, 1995):
A(x) (5.4)
n
where A(x), the final fuzzy value is produced as a result of expert judgements made by
n experts with equal LNG carrier systems maintenance cost experience and al(x) is the'
fuzzy value of each expert's judgement, i.e. i En.
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Table 5.1: Categories ofLTCC
Category Description of Level of Damage on Level of Injury/Illness on
LTCC LNG Carrier Systems LNG Carrier Personnel
(Linguistic
Terms)
1 Very Low <Minor System Damage <Minor Injury/Illness
2 Low Minor System Damage Minor Injury/Illness
3 Moderate Multiple System Damage Multiple Injury/Illness
4 High Major System Damage Severe Injury/Illness
5 Very High System Loss Death
Table 5.2: Categories ofLMD
Category Description of Level of Damage on Level of InjurylIllness on
LMD LNG Carrier System LNG Carrier Personnel
(Linguistic
Terms)
1 Very Short <Minor System Damage <Minor Injury/Illness
2 Short Minor System Damage Minor Injury/Illness
3 Medium Multiple System Damage Multiple Injury/Illness
4 Long Major System Damage Severe Injury/Illness
5 Very Long System Loss Death
Table 5.3: Categories of LSPC
Category Description Level of Damage on Level ofInjurylIllness on
of LSPC LNG Carrier System LNG Carrier Personnel
(Linguistic
Terms)
1 Very Cheap < Minor System Damage <Minor Injury/Illness
2 Cheap Minor System Damage Minor Injury/Illness
3 Average Multiple System Damage Multiple InjurylIllness
4 Costly Major System Damage Severe Inj'!!YiIllness
5 Very Costly System Loss Death
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Table 5.4: Categories ofLMC
Category Description of Level of Damage on Level of Injury/Illness on
LMC LNG Carrier System LNG Carrier Personnel
(Linguistic
Terms)
1 Very Cheap < Minor System Damage <Minor Injury/Illness
2 Cheap Minor System Damage Minor Injury/Illness
3 Normal Multiple System Damage Multiple Injury/Illness
4 Expensive Major System Damage Severe Iniury/Illness
5 Very Expensive System Loss Death
Very Low Moderate High Very HighLow
1.0
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Figure 5.5: A Membership Function for Linguistic Terms of LTCC
Very Short Mediwn Long Very LongShort
1.0
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Figure 5.6: A Membership for Linguistic Terms ofLMD
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Very Cheap Cheap Average Costly Very Costly
1.0
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Figure 5.7: A Membership for Linguistic Terms of LSPC
Very Cheap Cheap Normal Expensive Very Expensive
1.0
o .25m .Sm .75m 1m 1.2Sm I.5m 1.75m 2m 2.2Sm 2.Sm
Figure 5.8: A Membership Function for Linguistic Terms of LMC
5.5.3. Defuzzification
Defuzzification is the process of transformation of a fuzzy conclusion set to a crisp
number. It creates a single assessment from the fuzzy conclusion set, expressing the
exact unit cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier system defined by the experts. It is
applied in situations where the fuzzy membership output needs to be a single scalar
quantity as opposed to a fuzzy set. The output of a fuzzy process can be the logical
union of two or more fuzzy membership functions defined on the universe of discourse
of the output variable (Ross, 2004). The two main defuzzification methods that are
commonly used are a WMoM method (Andrew and Moss, 2002; Pillay and Wang, 2003;
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Ung, 2007) and a centroid method (Jiang and Li, 1999; Sii et aI., 2001; Wang et al.,
2009). In this work, the WMoM is used because it can be easily computed.
5.5.3.1. Weighted Mean of Maximum
The WMoM defuzzification method averages the points of maximum possibility of each
fuzzy conclusion, weighted by their degrees of truth (Pillay and Wang, 2003). This
defuzzication method can be expressed as follows:
nLW;x;
WMoM(Z) = ....:..;;c;=;._~ -
LW;
;=1
(5.5)
where X; is the point of maximum possibility of each fuzzy conclusion while W; is the
degree of beliefs (DoBs) to which the conclusion belongs to the ith linguistic term in
the consequent.
5.6. A Test Case of Application of Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm to the Determination
of Maintenance Cost of the LNG Carrier Systems
The two main systems of a LNG carrier such as the containment system and transfer
arm are identified as areas of high risk in Chapter 3. The uncertainties associated with
. their unit costs of maintenance hinder the exact minimisation of the total risk of the
LNG carrier systems using GA, thus, making it difficult to find the exact new
maintenance cost of the LNG carrier systems based on budgeted maintenance cost. In
this study, four experts with equal experience of the maintenance of the LNG carrier
systems used an engineering judgement in a fuzzy environment to tackle the
uncertainties associated with the unit costs of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems.
The four experts and their levels of experience in marine technology have been
described in Chapter 3.
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5.6.1. Risk and Cost Modelling of LNG Carrier Systems Using Fuzzy Genetic
Algorithm
The risk model is optimised using GA for the identification of maintenance cost of the
LNG containment system and transfer arm based on budgeted maintenance cost. The
uncertainties associated with the unit cost of maintenance of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm are treated using the FRB methodology in Figure 5.4, before
the optimisation of the risk model. Therefore, the objective function is expressed as
follows:
Subject to:
CT = CSYSTEM(I) + CSYSTEM(2) (5.6)
CSYSTEMCIU) s CSYSTEM(I) s CSYSTEM(lmax)
CSYSTEMC2u) s CSYSTEM(2) s CSYSTEM(2max)
where, SW(I) = Hazard severity's weight of the LNG containment system.
SW,(2) = Hazard severity's weight of the LNG transfer arm.
A, = Failure rate of the LNG containment system .
..12 = Failure rate of the LNG transfer arm.
(I = Time of interest of the LNG containment system.
(2 = Time of interest of the LNG transfer arm.
CT = Totallbudgeted cost of maintenance of the LNG containment system and
transfer arm.
C SYSTEM (I) = New cost of maintenance of the LNG containment system.
CSYSTEM(2) = New cost of maintenance of the LNG transfer arm.
122
CSYSTEM(lu) =Unit cost of maintenance ofthe LNG containment system.
CSYSTEM(2u) =Unit cost of maintenance of the LNG transfer arm.
CSYSTEM (Imax) =Maximum cost of maintenance of the LNG containment system.
C SYSTEM (2max) =Maximum cost of maintenance of the LNG transfer arm.
From Section 4.7.5 ofChapter4, SW(I)' SW(2P~' ,.1,2' fl, f2, CSYSTBM(lmax)' CSYSTEM(2max)
and CT are given as 1000, 1000, 5.203e-06/hour, 1.293e-05/hour, 43800 hours, 43800
hours, $1,170,000, $750,000 and $1,300,000 respectively. Since the unit costs of
maintenance of the LNG containment system (CSYSTBM(IU») and transfer arm (CSYSTEM(2uJ
are associated with uncertainties, the uncertainties must be treated for more reasonable
minimisation of the model, thus producing the new maintenance costs of the LNG
containment system and transfer arm.
5.6.2. Uncertainty Treatment of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of the LNG
Containment System
The LNG containment system has been described in Section 4.7.1 of Chapter 4. The
uncertainty associated with the unit cost of maintenance of the LNG containment
system is tackled using the FRB methodology in Figure 5.4. Five linguistic terms are
used to describe each of the antecedents (LTCC, LMD and LSPC), and the consequent
(LMC), for effective treatment of the uncertainty associated with the unit cost of
maintenance of the LNG containment system.
5.6.2.1. Expert #1 Opinion
Expert #1 estimates the values ofLTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.27,0.45, and 0.68 on
the scale of [0, 1] as illustrated in Figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 respectively. In the
fuzzification processes, LTCC, LMD and LSPC can be described as (0.65, low; 0.35,
very low), (0.75, short; 0.25, medium) and (0.6, average; 0.4, costly) respectively. In
doing so, there are 8 fired fuzzy rules of the LNG carrier system maintenance cost out
of the 125 rules. These are:
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Rule #3: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #8: IF LTCC is low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMe is
normal.
Rule #79: IF Lrcc is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMe is
normal.
Rule #84: IF LTee is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is normal.
Rule #103: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #104: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #108: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #109: IF LTCC is low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
1.0
Low Moderate
0.65 -
0.35 _
o 0.1 0.2 0.~70.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Figure 5.9: A Membership Function for LTCC
The membership function values are assigned to the selected fuzzy rules using the
information provided in their respective membership functions in Figures 5.9, 5.10, and
5.11. A max-min method is applied using Equation (5.3), on the membership function
values of the LTCC, LMD, and LSPC to produce the membership values of the LMC.
The fired fuzzy rules and their membership values are illustrated in Table 5.5.
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Very Short Short Medium
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 o.As 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Figure 5.10: A Membership Function for LMD
1.0
0.6
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.$0.7 0.8 0.9
Figure 5.11: A Membership Function for LSPC
In Table 5.5, the third row has a fuzzy rule number 3 and the membership function
values of 0.65, 0.25, 0.6 and 0.25 of LTCC, LMD, LSPC and LMC respectively. The
value of LMC, 0.25 is calculated by min (0.65, 0.25, 0.6). In the same row, the LTCC,
LMD, LSPC and LMC are respectively described with "very low", "medium",
"average", and "normal" linguistic terms. In a similar way, the other rows of Table 5.5
are interpreted.
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Table 5.5: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of the
LNG Containment System
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (,u) Linguistic terms
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LTCC LMD LSPC LMC
#3 0.65 0.25 0.6 0.25 Very Low Medium Average Normal
#8 0.35 0.25 0.6 0.25 Low Medium Average Normal
#79 0.65 0.75 0.4 0.4 Very Low Low Costly Normal
#84 0.35 0.75 0.4 0.35 Low Low Costly Normal
#103 0.65 0.75 0.6 0.6 Very Low Low Average Cheap
#104 0.65 0.25 0.4 0.25 Very Low Medium Costly Normal
#108 0.35 0.75 0.6 0.35 Low Low Average Normal
#109 0.35 0.25 0.4 0.25 Low Medium Costly Normal
5.6.2.2. Fuzzy Conclusion
The second step of the max-min method is selection of the maximum values of the same
linguistic term of the LMC i.e. unit cost of maintenance of the LNG containment system,
in the fired fuzzy rules in Table 5.5. Expert #1's fuzzy conclusion is:
From Rule #103, the LMC has a ,uIMC value of 0.6 associated with "cheap" linguistics
term, where 0.6 = max (0.6).
From other fuzzy rule numbers in Table 5.5, the LMC has a ,uIMC value of 0,4
~
associated with "normal" linguistics term, where 0,4 = max (0.25, 0.25, 0.4, 0.35, 0.25,
0.35, 0.25).
In a similar way, the fuzzy conclusions of Experts #2, #3 and #4 are produced (see
Appendix D 1.2 for details). The fuzzy conclusion of Expert #2is:
• The LMC has a ,uIMC value ofO.55 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a,uIMC value of0,45 associated with "normal" linguistics term.
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The fuzzy conclusion of Expert #3 is:
• The LMC has a /-LIMC value ofO.5 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a/-LLMC value ofO.5 associated with "normal" linguistics term.
The fuzzy conclusion of the Expert #4 is:
• The LMC has a f.iLMC value ofO.65 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a f.iIMC value of0.35 associated with "normal" linguistics term.
The fuzzy conclusions of Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 can be combined using Equation
(5.4) as follows:
For "cheap" linguistic term, the A(PLMc) value ofLMC is:
(0.6 + 0.55 +0.5 + 0.65)/4 = 0.575
For "normal" linguistic term, the A(/-LLMc) value ofLMC is:
(0.4 + 0.45 + 0.5 + 0.35)/4 = 0.425
5.6.2.3. Defuzzification of the Fuzzy Conclusion
The defuzzification of the fuzzy conclusion is carried out using the WMoM because of
its computational effectiveness. Using Equation (5.4), the WMoM can be calculated as
follows:
. I Z W1X1 +W2X2 0.575x250000+0.425x937S00 $542188Cnsp va ue, = = =
WI + w2 0.575 + 0.425
Therefore, CSYSTEM(IU) = $542188
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5.6.3. Uncertainty Treatment of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of the LNG Transfer
Arm
The LNG transfer arm is one of the LNG carrier systems discussed in Section 4.7.2 of
Chapter 4. The four experts used in Section 5.6.2 are involved in the decision making
process of the unit cost of maintenance of the LNG transfer arm (CSYSTEM(2uJ. The
application of the FRB methodology in the determination of the CSYSTEM (2u) of the LNG
transfer arm is detailed in Appendix Dl.3. The fuzzy conclusions of the four experts are
aggregated to a single fuzzy conclusion which is then defuzzified. The crisp value
produced is $162500 for CSYSTEM(2u) (see Appendix D1.4 for details).
5.6.4. Simulation of the Result
A simulation exercise is carried out on the risk model using GA in Matlab 7.7
environment to find CSYSTEM(I) and CSYSTEM(2). The substitution of the values of the
parameters in the risk model produces the objective function expressed as follows:
(
43800x542188) (43800XI62500)
RT = 1000 x (1- e -5.203e-06 CSmEII(l) ) + 1000 x (1- e -1.293e-OS CSmEII(2) )
Subject to:
1300000= CSYSTEM (I) +CSYSTEM(2)
542188~CSYSTEM(I) s 1117000
162500~ CSYST£M(2) s 750000
The GA operators and their values for the simulation, and the resultant Rr, CSYSTEM (I)
and CSYSTEM(2) as illustrated in Figure 5.12 are:
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1. Population Size = 80
2. Fitness Scaling = Rank
3. Selection = Stochastic
4. Crossover = Two point
5. Elite = 2
6. Mutation = Adaptive feasible or constraint dependent default
7. Generation = 51
8. RT = 303.99
9. CSYSTEM (I) = $693517
10. CSYSTEM(2) = $606483
Figure 5.12 is a graph of fitness value against generation used to demonstrate how the
model converged. The fitness value and generation are at the vertical axis and horizontal
axis of the graph respectively. The dotted line is used to show when the model
converged. The model converged at fitness value of 303.99 after 10th generation. The
simulation stopped at 51th generation as shown on the horizontal axis of the graph and
the plane of stopping criteria. The stall (G) can be used to stop the simulation at any
time if need be.
Best: 303.9856 Mean: 303.9856
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Figure 5.12: Graph of Fitness against Generation
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5.6.5. Result Verification
The identified new maintenance costs of the LNG containment system and transfer arm
are verified via sensitivity analysis of the model. The values of their new maintenance
costs are considered to be acceptable if three axioms are satisfied as follows:
• Axiom 1. The value of RT (total risk of the LNG carrier systems) should decrease
whenever there is a slight increase of the value of CT (total budgeted maintenance
cost of the LNG carrier systems) in the model.
• Axiom 2. The value of RT should increase whenever there is a slight increase of the
value of CSYSTEM(lu) (unit cost of maintenance of the LNG containment system) in the
model.
• Axiom 3. The value of RT should increase whenever there is a slight increase of the
value of C SYSTEM (2u) (unit cost of maintenance of the LNG transfer arm) in the
model.
The model is verified by increasing the values of CT, C SYSTEM (lu) and C SYSTEM (2u) as
follows:
• Increase the value of CT by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% as illustrated in Table 5.6 and
graphically presented in Figure 5.13.
• Increase the value of CSYSTEM(lu) by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% as illustrated in Table
5.7 and graphically presented in Figure 5.13.
• Increase the value of C.'>YSTEM(2u) by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% as illustrated in Table
5.8 and graphically presented in Figure 5.13.
Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 have their Row 2 as the reference point while the rest of the
rows are the resultant values of CSYSTEM(I) ~ CSYSTEM(2)' CT , CSYSTEM(IU) and CSYSTEM(2u)
because of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% increase of the values of CT of Table 5.6,
CSYSTEM(lU) of Table 5.7 and CSYSTEM(2u) of Table 5.8.
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Table 5.6: Model Verification by Increase of CT Value
CSYSTl:M(I) CSYSTE.M(2) Cl' ($) Lower Lower Percentage Fitness
($) ($) boundary boundary increase of function
of of Cl' value RI'
CSYSTEM(I) CSYSTEM(2)
i.e,
i.e.
CSYSTEM(lu)
CSYSTEM(2u)($) ($)
693517 606483 1300000 542188 162500 Nil 303.99
728425 636575 1365000 542188 162500 5% 290.62
763331 666669 1430000 542188 162500 10% 278.39
798235 696765 1495000 542188 162500 15% 267.l4
833138 726862 1560000 542188 162500 20% 256.76
Table 5.7: Model Verification by Increase of the CSYSTEM(IU) Value
CSYSTEM (I) CSYSTEM(2) CT ($) Lower Lower Percentage Fitness
($) ($) boundary boundary increase of function
of of CT value RI'
CSYSTEM(I) CSYSTEM(2)
Le. Le.
CSYSTEM'(lu)
CSYSTEM (2u)($) ($)
693517 606483 1300000 542188 162500 Nil 303.99
700556 599444 1300000 569297 162500 5% 31l.38
707213 592787 1300000 596407 162500 10% 318.64
713522 586478 1300000 623516 162500 15% 325.79
719512 580488 1300000 650626 162500 20% 332.84
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Table 5.8: Model Verification by Increase of the CSYSTEM(211) Value
CSYSTEM(l) C SYSTEM(2) CT ($) Lower Lower Percentage Fitness
($) ($) boundary boundary increase of function
of of CT value R;
CSYSTEM(l) CSYSTEM(2)
i.e. i.e.
C SYSTEM (Ill) CSYSTEM (211)($) ($)
693517 606483 1300000 542188 162500 Nil 303.99
686235 613235 1300000 542188 170625 5% 310.45
679314 620686 1300000 542188 178750 10% 316.80
672726 627274 1300000 542188 186875 15% 323.04
666442 633558 1300000 542188 195000 20% 329.19
Sensitivity Analysis of F'rtn_ Value RT
350 ~-----------------
~200~------------------
J
~
I15O~------------------------------e
-.- Fitness value RTdue to" Increase in er
..... Fitness VJlue RTdue to" Inere_1n
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lOO~-------------------
..... FItne55 VJlue RT due to" incre_ in
CSYSTEM(2U)
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Figure 5.13: Graph of s, Against Percentage Change of c; CSYSTEU.1U) and CSYSTEM(2U)
Values
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In Row 3 of Table 5.6, CSYSTEM (I) and CSYSTIiM(2) have values of $728425 and $636575
respectively, where CT' CSYSTEM(lu)and CSYSTEM(2u)have values of $1365000, $542188
and $162500 respectively, because of 5% increase of the Cl' value of the model. The
fitness function value RT decreased from 303.99 to 290.62. Other rows in Table 5.6 are
described in a similar way and have decreased values of RT (278.39, 267.14 and
256.76). This is in consistence with Axiom 1.
In a similar way, Table 5.7 is described. Table 5.7 has RT values of 311.38,318.64,
325.79 and 332.84 in Rows 3, 4,5 and 6 respectively, as a result of 5%, 10%, 15% and
20% increase of the CSYSTEM(lu) value of the model. Therefore, Axiom 2 has been
satisfied.
Table 5.8 is explained in a similar way to Table 5.7, with 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%
increase of the CSYSTI:.M(2u) value. The resultant RT values of 310.45, 316.8, 323.04 and
329.19 are in Rows 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5.8 respectively. The increase in the values of
RT is in harmony with Axiom 3.
5.6.6. Comparison of the Maintenance Cost of the LNG Containment System and
Transfer Arm with the Previous Study
The comparison is carried out using the maintenance costs of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm in Section 4.7.5 of Chapter 4. In the previous study,
CSYSTEM (Iu) , CSYSTEM (2u) , CSYSTEM (I) , and CSYSTEM(2) have significant difference from the
new study as shown in Table 5.9. In Table 5.9, Row 2 has the CSYSTEM (tu) value of
$550000 in the previous study and a new value of $542188. In a similar way, Row 3, 4
and 5 are described.
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Table 5.9: Comparison of Previous and New Maintenance Cost
Parameter Previous study New study
CSYSTEM(lu) $550000 $542188
CSYSTEM(2u) $130000 $162500
CSYSTEM(I) $729087 $693517
CSYSTEM(2) $570913 $606483
5.7. Conclusion
The uncertainties associated with the unit costs of maintenance of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm have been treated and optimal risk solutions found successfully
using FGA, which produced the new maintenance costs of the systems. The mechanism
of the algorithm tackled the problem by firing the relevant rules in the LNG carrier
maintenance cost FRB for the identification of the unit cost of maintenance of the LNG
containment system, which is described with five linguistics terms ("very cheap",
"cheap", "normal", "expensive" and "very expensive"), and the fuzzy conclusion is
defuzzified using the WMoM method. The LNG transfer arm followed similar
processes but with firing of another set of relevant rules in the LNG carrier maintenance
cost fuzzy rules. The identified unit costs of maintenance of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm are used to find the more reasonably estimated maintenance
cost of these LNG carrier systems, based on their budgeted maintenance cost using a
GA in a Matlab environment. A comparison of maintenance costs with the previous
study is carried out and the differences are noted. The ability of the fuzzy logic in the
treatment of uncertainty will be extended in risk analysis of the LNG carrier systems
using a FER approach in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6 - A New Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning Method for Risk
Analysis and Control of Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems
Summary
In this chapter, safety/risk levels of LNG carrier systems are investigated through the
application of a FER method to uncertainty treatment of their failure modes (basic
events). A fuzzy set manipulation formula that has parameters such as consequence
severity, failure consequence probability and failure likelihood is used to assess the
safety/risk levels of failure modes of the systems (LNG containment system and transfer
arm). Such failure estimations are synthesised to evaluate the systems' safety/risk levels
using an ER approach. RCOs are developed for the reduction/control of safety/risk
levels of the systems. The best RCO, which is the one with the highest preference
degree, is used to control the high level risks of the systems.
6.1. Introduction
LNG carriers are quite important and necessary for transportation of LNG in the marine
and offshore industries. Although they are reliable in their in-service operation, they can
still be prone to accidents. The IMO adopted the FSA concept to proactively ensure the
safety of shipping vessels, including LNG carriers and their systems/subsystems as well
as their pollution prevention to the maritime environment. However, the evaluation of
safety/risk level of LNG carrier systems may be difficult, given the high level of
uncertainties in the historical failure data associated with LNG carrier operations.
The inherent uncertainty can be caused by imperfect understanding of the domain,
incomplete knowledge of the state of the domain at the time where a given task is to be
performed, randomness in the mechanisms governing the behaviour of the domain, or a
combination of these (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). The current and future development of the
FSA methodology and its various applications to marine and offshore facilities has been
discussed in many publications (Fang et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2001;
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lACS, 2004; IMO, 2002a; Rosqvist and Tuominen, 2004; Soares and Teixeira, 2001;
Vanem et al., 2008; Wang, 2001; Wang and Foinikis, 2001). This can support the
argument of this study that the safety of LNG carriers needs to be appropriately
addressed by carrying out comprehensive risk assessment and particularly applying the
FSA in an uncertainty environment, given the recent rapid enlargement of the LNG
carrier fleet.
In this chapter, FSA will be applied to LNG carrier systems such as a containment
system and a transfer arm as these are areas of high risk that can lead to LNG spills.
FSA is feasible on LNG carrier operations using advanced computational techniques. A
FST coupled with an ER approach can be used to address the uncertainty problem in the
LNG industry. FST will ascertain safety levels of the failure modes (basic events) while
the ER tool will use its mechanism for hierarchical propagation of various failure
modes' safety levels that lead to the top event (LNG containment system failure and
LNG spill from the transfer arm).
The modelling of the failure modes of the LNG containment system and the LNG
transfer arm includes parameters such as failure likelihood, consequence severity,
failure consequence probability, cost expression and safety expression. The parameters
are described by linguistic terms, which are characterised by membership functions to
the defined categories. The best RCO is based on the option with the highest preference
degree.
6.2. Background Analysis
A practical solution is by far the most desired output when making decisions under the
realm of uncertainty on a LNG carrier and its systems/subsystems. The FER deals with
those uncertainties while following the FSA procedure. Researchers have tapped the
uncertainty treatment capability of the FER as a stand alone method or in combination
with the FSA methodology and other reliable and meaningful techniques (Yang et al.,
2005; Yang and Singh, 1994; Wang, 1997; Liu et al., 1994; Godaliyadde et al., 2009).
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According to Yang et al. (2005)'s work, after the 9/11 terrorism attacks, the lock-out of
the American West Ports in 2002 and the breakout of SARS disease in 2003 have
further focused the mind of both the public and industrialists to take effective and
timely measures for assessing and controlling the risks related to container supply
chains. A FER method was used to deal with those threat-based risks, which were more
ubiquitous and uncertain than the hazard-based ones in the chains. Its feasibility was
validated by a case study associated with a threat of terrorists attacking ports (Yang et
al.,2005).
In another study, the advantage of the feasibility of a combination of FER and FSA was
used (Wang, 2000). A FER method for analysing subjective safety and cost was
illustrated based on a proposed formal ship safety assessment in situations where a high
level of uncertainty was involved. A similar approach of the FER algorithm has been
used in several other risk and safety assessment studies (Godaliyadde et aI., 2009; Wang
et aI., 1995; Wang et aI., 1996; Wang, 1997).
FSA has been applied to a LNG carrier using a quantitative risk analysis method with
safety analysis technique such as ETA (Vanem et al., 2008). In their work, they used the
FSA methodology to tackle total risk of a LNG carrier that is made up of collision,
grounding, contact, fire/explosion and loading/unloading risks.
The relevant combination of FER and FSA with the adoption of FTA is extended to
LNG carrier systems. In this work, the uncertainties surrounding failure modes (basic
events) ofFTA of the LNG containment system and the LNG transfer arm are tackled
using the aforementioned FER and FSA.
6.3. Formal Safety Assessment
FSA is the process of identifying hazards, evaluating risks and deciding on an
appropriate course of action to manage these risks in a cost-effective manner (Trbojevic
and Carr, 2000). Marine and offshore accidents that happened in the past made the
United Kingdom Maritime and Coastguard Agency (UK MCA) propose to the IMO in
1993 that FSA should be applied to ships (Wang, 2001). The application to ships will
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improve the safety of ships and drastically reduce the rate of negative effect to the
environment, systems and personnel onboard vessels. The UK MCA recommended that
the application of FSA should be from the design of ship to its operation (Wang, 2001).
The IMO adopted this process as interim guidelines for their rule making process after
studying notable incident/accident investigation reports (IMO, 2002a; IMO, 1997a).
These include:
• Lord Carver's report on the investigation of the capsize of the Herald of Free
Enterprise (House of Lords, 1992).
• Lord Cullen's report on the Piper Alpha accident (Department of Energy, 1990).
These reports and other incidents/accidents (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007) that happened
in the maritime and offshore industry made the IMO attempt application of FSA on
various vessels and systems so as to ensure the best safety practice. This includes:
• Application to the transportation of dangerous goods on passenger ships (IMO,
1998a).
• Application on high speed catamaran passenger vessels (IMO, 1997b).
• Application to novel emergency propulsion and steering devices for oil tankers
(IMO, 1998d).
• Trial application on bulk carriers (MCA, 1998).
A company such as P &°Cruises Ltd has proved the benefits of FSA by application of
the methodology to their carriers. The various steps helped to solve challenging
problems of hazards, risks, RCOs and their costs and benefits in a rational, structured
and auditable manner that improved the safety of their fleet of carriers. Adopting this
process as a regulatory tool is of great benefit. These benefits are (MSA, 1993):
• A consistent regulatory regime that addresses all aspects of safety in an integrated
way.
• Cost effectiveness, whereby the safety investment is targeted where it will achieve
the greatest benefit.
138
• A proactive approach, enabling hazards that have not yet given rise to accidents to
be properly considered.
• Confidence that regulatory requirements are in proportion to the severity of the
risks.
• A rational basis for addressing new risks posed by the ever-changing marine
technology.
The five steps of the aforementioned FSA methodology are (lMO, 2002a; IMO, 1997a;
Pillay and Wang, 2003; Wang, 2001):
1. Hazard Identification (HAZID).
2. Risk Assessment.
3. Risk Control Options (RCOs).
4. Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA).
5. Decision Making.
The FSA methodology is illustrated in Figure 6.1, which shows the relationship of the
steps with the aim of reducing the risk associated with hazards to an ALARP level,
using the best RCO, considering the cost of controlling the risk and benefit of such risk
control with respect to the cost. The FSA methodology is further broken down in Figure
6.2 to accommodate uncertainties in risk analysis of the LNG carrier systems, using the
powerful tool of FER.
The information flow in Figure 6.2 starts from the description of a LNG carrier system.
The next step is development of the system's FTA diagram for identification of its
failure modes. Once all the failure modes have been identified, their safety levels are
estimated using a fuzzy manipulation formula. Otherwise, the system's FTA diagram is
re-examined before safety assessment of its failure modes. In a situation where there are
two or more failure modes, ER is used to combine them in order to estimate the safety
level of a top event. If the safety level of the top event is not acceptable, RCOs are
identified. The cost and benefit of each RCO are investigated using cost and utility
expression as illustrated in Figure 6.2. The ReO that has highest preference degree is
the best one for safety improvement of the LNG carrier system.
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Figure 6.1: A Flow Chart of the FSA Methodology (Pillay and Wang, 2003)
6.3.1. Hazard Identification
The first step and foundation of FSA is HAZID. Hazard is a physical situation or
condition with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the
environment or a combination of them (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The objective of
this step is to identify all relevant hazards that might affect the proper functions of LNG
carriers. A technique used for identifying relevant hazards in LNG carriers is called
brainstorming, which is a technique for tapping the creative thinking of a team to
generate and clarify a list of ideas, problems and issues. The team involved in HAZID
consists of experts from various aspects of the shipping industry such as ship design,
operations and management, and specialists in the HAZID process. The team ensures
that previous experience is properly taken into account, and typically makes use of
background information such as applicable regulations and codes, available statistical
data on accident categories and list of hazards to personnel, hazardous substances and
ignition sources. The brainstorming technique is used to recommend safety analysis
techniques that can be used to know hazards and possible causes and outcomes of each
accident category, outlined in Chapter 3. An accident is an unintended event involving
fatality, injury, property loss or damage and/or environmental damage (Wang and
Trbojevic, 2007).
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; 1
Figure 6.2: A Flow Chart of the FSA Methodology Based on a FER Method in
Uncertainty Environment.
6.3.2. Risk Assessment
The purpose of Step 2 of FSA in the LNG industry, which is risk assessment, is to
identify the distribution of risk, thereby focusing on high risk areas that will be
evaluated and controlled. Risk is defined as a combination of the probability of
141
occurrence of an undesired event and the degree of its possible consequences (Wang
and Trbojevic, 2007). Risk assessment is a comprehensive estimation of the probability
and the degree of the possible consequences in a hazardous situation in order to select
appropriate safety measures (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). In this step, risks associated
with the identified hazards of the LNG carrier in Step 1, are evaluated to know if they
are significant.
Risk assessment can be carried out on various areas of a LNG carrier and other facilities
used in the LNG industry by using a diagram called "Risk Contribution Tree (ReT)".
An ReT is a combination of FT and ET, showing causes and consequences of an
accident. Risk assessment provides qualitative and/or quantitative information to
decision makers (Pillay, 2001). ReT can be used to calculate the Frequency versus No
of fatalities (F-N) and Potential Loss for Life (PLL). Qualitative and quantitative risk
analyses are explained in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. If there is no availability of data or
existence of uncertainty for quantification of the FTA or ETA, a special technique such
as the FER method can be used to access the risk of the LNG carrier as illustrated in
Figure 6.2.
6.3.2.1. Risk Assessment Using Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning Method
Unavailability of data and uncertainty of a LNG component often makes PRA
impossible, thereby giving room for application of FST coupled with ER. This is
capable of combining uncertain evaluations at a single level and implementing
hierarchical propagation of such evaluations between different levels in risk assessment
of a LNG carrier system.
6.3.2.1.1. Fuzzy Set Modelling
To assess the fuzzy safety associated with an event or element, it is required to
synthesize the associated occurrence likelihood, consequence severity and failure
consequence probability (Wang et al., 2004). The fuzzy set manipulation used in risk
assessment is (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007):
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(6.1)
This can be represented in terms of membership functions as follows:
(6.2)
where, S, means risk/safety score.
C, means fuzzy set of consequence severity of a failure mode i .
o means Composition operation.
x means Cartesian product operation.
E, means fuzzy set of failure consequence probability of a failure mode i .
Lj means fuzzy set of failure likelihood of a failure mode i .
Ils
i
means description function of S; in terms of membership degrees
Il~ (j = 1,2,3 7) associated with the defined categories.
I
II means description function of E,. in terms of membership degreer:s,
11k, (j = 1,2,3 7) associated with the defined categories.
Ilc
i
means description function of C; in terms of membership degree
Il~ (j = 1,2,3 7) associated with the defined categories.
I
II means description function of L,. in terms of membership degreer t,
ilL (j = I,2,3 7) associated with the defined categories.
I
Ils, is obtained using a max-min method that is illustrated in Example 1 of Appendix
E1.1.
The membership values, categories and linguistic variables/terms of L, E, C and S are
shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007, Wang et aI., 1995).
The choice/estimation of membership values of L, E, C and S depends on the
experience of the safety analysts.
143
Table 6.1: Failure Likelihood CL)
Linguistic variables Categories
JiL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Highly frequent 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1
Frequent 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.25
Reasonably frequent 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.25 0
Average 0 0 0.5 1 0.5 0 0
Reasonably low 0 0.25 1 0.75 0 0 0
Low 0.25 1 0.75 0 0 0 0
Very low 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.2: Failure Consequence Probability CE)
Linguistic variables Categories
JiE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Definite 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1
Highly likely 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.25
Reasonably likely 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.25 0
Likely 0 0 0.5 . 1 0.5 0 0
Reasonably Unlikely 0 0.25 1 0.75 0 0 0
Unlikely 0.25 1 0.75 0 0 0 0
Highly Unlikely 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
From the information provided in Tables 6.1-6.4, failure mode modelling can be carried
out. For instance, the linguistic variables "negligible", "highly unlikely", "very low",
and "excellent" can be modelled by:
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Negligible = {Ill, 2/0.75, 3/0,4/0,510,6/0, 7/0}
Highly unlikely = {Ill, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
Very low = {Ill, 2/0.75,3/0,4/0,510,6/0, 7/0}
Excellent = {Ill, 2/0.75,3/0,4/0,510,6/0, 7/0}
Table 6.3: Consequence Severity (C)
Linguistic variables Categories
Pc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Catastrophic 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1
Critical 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.25 0
Marginal 0 0.25 1 0.75 0 0 0
Negligible 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.4: Safety Expressions (S)
Linguistic variables Categories
Ps
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1
2. Average 0 0 0 0.5 1 0.25 0
3. Good 0 0.25 1 0.5 0 0 0
4. Excellent 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
Where the integers in the numerator of each term within the brackets represent the
categories, and the real values in the denominator stand for the membership degrees
(Wang et al., 1995). In Tables 6.1-6.4, the first row represents the categories (1-7) while
the other rows represent the membership degrees. Thus,
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flnegligible = {I, 0.75, 0 .... O}
flhighlyunlikely = {I, 0.75, 0 ... O}
flverylow = {I, 0.75, 0 .... O}
flexcellent = {I, 0.75, 0 .... O}
The safety expressions "poor", "average", "good" and "excellent" are incorporated into
safety score as follows (Wang et al., 1995):
1. Spoor = Ccatastrophic 0 E definite xL high frequent
2. Saverage = Ccritical 0 E reasonable likely X Lreasonably frequent (6.3)
3. s.: = Cmarg inal 0 E reasonable unlikely X L reasonably low
4. Sexcellent = Cnegligible 0 E highly unlikely X Lvery low
Using the Best-Fit method, the obtained fuzzy safety/risk score description Si of failure
mode i of a component can be mapped back to one (or all) of the defined safety
expressions (i.e. "excellent", "good", "average" and "poor") (Wang and Trbojevic,
2007; Wang et al., 1995). The method uses the distance between Si and each of the
safety expressions to represent the degree to which Si is confirmed to each of them
(Wang and Trbojevic, 2007; Wang et aI., 1995). An illustration is given below using the
safety expressions "poor", "average", "good" and "excellent".
[
7 ]1/2
di2 (S;, average) = L(u~;- P~verage )
J=I
(6.4)
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[7 ]1/2
a; (Si' excellent) = ~ {.u~i - f.1;xcellent Y
When the unsealed distance d ij(j= 1,2,3,4 ) is equal to zero, Si is just the same as the
jth safety expression in terms of membership functions. In such a condition, S should
I
not be evaluated to other expressions at all due to exclusiveness of these expressions
(Wang et al., 1995). Therefore, diJ (1s J:S; 4) is introduced and defined based on
d ij (j = 1,2,3,4), to embody such feature. The smallest value of d iJ for any given
distances for S; is used to find aij . aij is reciprocals of the relative distances
between y, and each safety expression with reference to d~. aij is normalised into new
index Pij (j = 1,2,3,4 ) in order to more clearly express the safety level of S;' a ij can
be defined mathematically as:
j=I,2,3,4 (6.5)
If dij is equal to zero, it follows that Pij is equal to 1 and the others are equal to O. In
other situations, P ij can be expressed as:
P -/i.ij '-1234u " 4 j-",Laim
m=1
(6.6) .
where each Pij·(j = 1,2,3,4 ) represents the extent to which Sibelongs to thejthdefined
safety expression. Mapping it back to safety expressions implies:
S(S;) = {(Pll'" poor"1 (Pi2'" average"1 (Pi3'" good"1 (Pi4." excellent")}. (6.7)
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6.3.2.1.2. Evidential Reasoning
If there is more than one component that make up a system, the ER approach can be
used to synthesise the multiple S(S;)with the help of the Intelligent Decision System
(IDS) software (Yang and Xu, 2000). The mechanism of ER can be explained using the
aggregation of two safety assessments. The two assessments are:
S(s )= JI(P~ "Poor"\ (0: "Average"\ (03 "Good"\ (04 "Excellent,,),l
II ~ SiI' ).\PSiI' J.\PSiI' J.\PSiI' J
(6.8)
S(s )=JI(PI "Poor,,\(02 "Average,,\(03 "Good,,\(o4 "Excellent')}
12 ~ S12' J.\PSi2' J.\PSi2' ,,\PSI2'
where each f3~ and p~ (j = 1,2,3,4) represent the extent to which Sj) and S;2 are
II ·12
confirmed to jth safety expression. Suppose the relative weights for .5(S,1) and
.5(8,2) are WI and w2• The relative weights of .5(5;1) and .5(8,2) are normalised using the
expression as follows.
2LW; =1; O~W; ~1
;=)
(6.9)
For S(Sj)) and S(S;2) , the probability masses are expressed as follows:
(6.10)
Similarly,
(6.11)
(6.12)
Similarly,
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(6.13)
where SilH and Si2H represent the degree to which other assessors or failure modes can
playa role in the assessment.
SilH -W(I- ~pj J-w [I_{nl -t: -r: +p4)~- I f:t Sil - I \Ps,. S,. S,. s,. 'J (6.14)
Similarly,
Si2H -w (1- ~pj J-w [1_{nl -r: -s: -t: )~- 2 f:t S'2 - 2 \PS/2 Si2 S'2 SI2 ~ (6.15)
where SilH and Si2H are the individual remaining belief values unassigned for S(Sil)
and S(Si2) respectively.
SilH = SilH + SilH (6.16)
Si2H = Si2H + Si2H (6.17)
where, S ilH and S i2H represent possible incompleteness in the subsets S(Sil) and
S(Si2) • The combined probability masses, Sim and SiH are generated using basic
probability masses, SilmandSi2m, and Snn and Si2H as follows:
(6.18)
(6.19)
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(6.20)
The combined DoBs can be calculated as follows:
Plm = S;m I 2 3 4_::::...__, m = , , , (6.21)
where p;m (m = 1,2,3,4) are the resultant DoBs of the synthesised two fuzzy sets,
S(S;() andS(S;2) . Three or more fuzzy sets can also be synthesised in a similar way, in
which the obtained p;m can be combined with the third or more subset(s}.
To rank the risk levels of the failure modes, the crisp values of their fuzzy safety
estimates can be calculated using preference degree formula as follows:
(6.22)
v;' , V; , V; , and V~ represent the unsealed numerical values associated with the
linguistic terms (Le. "poor", "average", "good" and "excellent") of the safety expression
shown in Table 6.4. V;', V;, V;, and V~can be calculated while normalization of p;m of
each linguistic term in Table 6.4 as follows:
v;' = [0.75/(0.75 + l)]x 6 + [1/(0.75 + l)]x 7 = 6.571
V; = [0.5/(0.5 + 1+ 0.25)]x 4 + [1/(0.5 + 1+ 0.25)]x 5 + [0.25/(0.5 + 1+ 0.25)]x 6 = 4.854
V; = [0.25/(0.25 + 1+ 0.5)]x 2 + [1/(0.25 + 1+ 0.5)]x 3+ [0.5/(0.25 + 1+ 0.5)]x 4 = 3.141
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V~= [1/(1+ 0.75)]x 1+ [0.75/(1 +0.75)]x 2 = 1.428
Substituting the values of ~ , V2 ' V3 and V4 in Equation (6.22) yields:
Q; = 0.217 x p / + 0.478 x P / + 0.739 x P / + 1 x P / +
(
0 .217 + 0.478
4
+ 0.739 + 1 ) x {,1_ (p ,.1 2 3 4 ):\\! +P; +p; +P; '}
(6.23)
where Q;(i = 1,2,3 ...n) is the preference degree of the ith failure mode. Each
Q;(i = 1,2,3 ...n) is used to represents the risk rank of the ith failure mode. A low risk
failure mode is associated with larger preference degree and vice versa.
6.3.3. Risk Control Option
In this step, effective Risk Control Measures (RCMs) are developed based on the risk
assessment (Step 2) of the hazards (Step 1) and cost benefit assessment (Step 4). The
RCM that are not identified by existing measure can be known with the use of casual
chains. Casual chain can be used to develop appropriate measures at a selected control
point in sequence of "Cause --+Incident ~Accident --+Consequence" (Lois et
al., 2004; PVA, 1997). However, the RCMs developed must have the following
attributes (MSA, 1993):
• Those relating to the fundamental type of risk reduction (preventative or mitigating).
• Those relating to the type of action required and therefore to the costs of the action
(engineering or procedural).
• Those relating to the confidence that can be placed in the measure (active or passive,
single or redundant).
The produced RCOs are finally reviewed by assessing their effectiveness in Step 4.
FST can be used to investigate the effectiveness of the RCOs if there is existence of
uncertainties.
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6.3.4. Cost Benefit Assessment
The basis for decision-making about the RCOs is provided by CBA. This step shows
whether the benefits of a measure outweigh its costs. To conduct CBA, it is required to
set a base case that can be used as a reference for comparison (Wang, 2001). A base
case reflects the existing levels of risk associated with the shipping activity before the
implementation of risk control (Wang, 2001). It should be initially carried out for the
overall situation and then for those interested entities influenced by the consideration of
the problem (Pillay and Wang, 2003). The costs should include the following:
• Cost of training, regulations, documentation, equipment, redesign and construction,
inspection and maintenance.
• Reduced commercial use (e.g. reduced deck space with commercial use).
• Operational limitation such as reduced loads and speed.
The benefits are:
• Reduction of costs for injuries and fatalities.
• Reduction of costs for clean up, environmental damage, liability claims and ship
deterioration.
The cost and benefit for each RCO are calculated in terms of its Net Present Value
(NPV) expressed as follows:
NPV = t[(c, - B,Xl-rt']
,=1
(6.24)
where, t = Time horizon for the assessment, starting in year 1.
B, = Sum of benefits in year t.
C, = Sum of costs in year t.
r = Annual discount rate.
n =Number of years in the vessel's lifetime.
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The safety level of a system/component and cost of application of the RCOs can be
modelled using the FST because of the existence of uncertainties. This can be achieved
using Tables 6.4 - 6.6 (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007; Wang et al., 1995). The safety
estimate is mapped onto an utility space to know the utility estimate of the RCO with
respect to safety. The safety estimate obtained in Section 6.3.2 is expressed as follows:
s(S;) = ~,u~,' "poor"H,u~, ' "average"~(,u~,' "good"~ t.ui, "excellent")}
The S(S;) is mapped onto the utility space and expressed in terms of the utility
expressions in Table 6.6 as follows:
U(S;) = {(,u!, ' "slightly preferred'), (,u~,' "moderately preferred'), (p~, ' "preferred'),
(p;, "greatly preferred'w
I
(6.25)
Each p~(j= 1,2,3,4) represents a degree of confidence that Si belongs to the jth
I
utility expression. The safety/risk analyst I can estimate the cost C: for RCa i to
eliminate the failure mode in terms of the cost expressions in Table 6.5. The cost C: is
expressed in terms of membership functions as follows:
(6.26)
The Best-Fit method is used to map the fuzzy cost description onto the defined utility
expressions in a similar way to Section 6.3.2.1.1. The method makes use of the distance
between C: and each of the utility expressions to represent the degree to which C: is
confirmed to each of the defined utility expressions. The distance between the obtained
cost description C: and the expressions are defined as follows:
153
Table 6.5: Cost Expression
Linguistic variables Categories
PL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very high 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1
High 0 0 0 0 0.75 1 0.25
Moderately high 0 0 0 0.5 1 0.25 0
Average 0 0 0.5 1 0.5 0 0
Moderately low 0 0.25 1 0.5 0 0 0
Low 0.25 1 0.75 0 0 0 0
Very low 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.6: Utility Expression
Linguistic variables Categories
Ps
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Slightly preferred 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 1
2. Moderately preferred 0 0 0 0.5 1 0.25 0
3. Preferred 0 0.25 1 0.5 0 0 0
4. Greatly preferred 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
[ 7 2J"2d:1(C: ,slightly preferred'[« ~(p~f - P!tightlypre/erred)
[
7 2J1/2
d:2(C:, moderately preferredt» ~(p~f - P~oderatelyprefemd) (6.27)
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[7 2]1/2
d:3(C:, preferreds= ~(p~: - P~referred)
[
7 ]1/2
d:4 (C: , greatly preferred) = I ~~! - P~reallY preferred r
)=1
where each d~(j = 1,2,3,4) is an unsealed distance. If d~ is equal to zero, C: has the
same values with the jth utility expressions in tenus of membership functions.
I 1
aij=d%"
I)
d~
j = 1,2,3,4 (6.28)
where a~(j = 1,2,3,4) are the reciprocals of the relative distance d~ between the
identified fuzzy cost description C:and each of the defined utility expressions with
reference to d~. d ~ (1 S; J ~ 4) is the smallest of the obtained distances for C: .
When the value of d~ is zero, a~ is assumed to be 1, while others are assumed to be
zero. P~:can be the normalisation of a~ as follows (Wang et al., 1996):
I, aijp~:= 4 j = 1,2,3,4.
La:n
n=1
(6.29)
where each P~:(j = 1,2,3,4) represents the extent to which C: is confirmed to the jth
defined utility expression.
4 .LaIn = 1, is the summation ofa~{j = 1,2,3,4)
n=1
(6.30)
pil (j= 1,2,3,4) is mapped onto the utility space as follows:c,
IS5
U(c:) = {(p:.:: ' "slightlypreferred) ~~:, "moderately preferred'} ~:,: ' "preftrred'}}
~;I'"greatlypreferred'),
(6.31)
The ER approach can be used to synthesise various U(C:) (i =L....n) and combine the
result with U(S;) to obtain utility description U(U; ) as follows:
u(u;) = {(,u;I, "slightly preferred's, (,u}, "moderately preferred'), (,u;, "preferred's,
(,u;4, "greatly preferred')}
(6.32)
The weights of U(C:) and U(S;) play an important role in determination of U(U1 ).
When cost is more important than safety, the weight of U(C:) will be larger than the
one of safety and vice versa.
U(U; ) is used for the analysis ofRCO i ,which states that (Wang et al., 1996):
(6.33)
where, (1- t,u/) = Unassigned degrees of belief.
;=1
K;, K;, K;, and K~ represent the unsealed numerical values associated with the utility
expression (Le. "slightly preferred", "moderately preferred", "preferred" and "greatly
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preferred") illustrated in Table 6.6. K;, K; , K;, and K~ can be calculated while
normalization of p!of each linguistic term in Table 6.6 as follows (Yang, 2006):
K; = [0.75/(0.75 +1)]x 6 + [1/(0.75 +1)]x 7 = 6.571
K; = [0.5/(0.5 + 1+ 0.25)]x 4 + [1/(0.5 + 1+ 0.25)]x 5 + [0.25/(0.5 + 1+ 0.25)]x 6 = 4.854
K; = [0.25/(0.25 + 1+ 0.5)]x 2 + [1/(0.25 +1+0.5)]x 3+ [0.5/(0.25 +1+0.5)]x 4 = 3.l41
K~ = [1/(1+ 0.75)]x 1+ [0.75/(1 + 0.75)]x 2 = 1.428
Substituting the values of K) , K2, K3 and K4 in Equation (6.33) yields:
P; = 0.217 x p} + 0.478 x p / + 0.739 x p;3 + 1 x p;4 +
(
0.217 +0.478 +0.739 +1) (.,1 ( .. ) 2 3 4):\
4 X\! -\Pi +Pi +p; +P; 'J
(6.34)
where p;(i = 1,2,3 ...n) is the preference degree of RCa i . Each p;(i = 1,2,3 ...n)
represents the extent to which RCa i is preferred in comparison with the others. A
larger P, means that RCa i is more desirable. The RCa i with the highest preference
degree will be recommended in the decision making phase.
6.3.5. Decision Making
In this step, decision and recommendation is made for safety improvement of the LNG
carrier operations. The information gathered from Steps 1 to 4 is reiterated for effective
selection of a RCa. The RCOs are compared and ranked using their CBA for selection
of most cost effective one based on the principle of ALARP illustrated in Figure 6.3.
The ALARP diagram illustrates that if a risk lies within the ALARP or intolerable
region, the risk must be reduced using the most cost effective RCa. Conversely, no
RCa is needed if the risk lies at the broadly acceptable region. In event of lack of data
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for the costs of the RCOs, FST can be used to estimate costs incurred for the reduction
of risks, as described in Section 6.3.4.
6.4. A Test Case of Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning Method to Failure Modes
Modelling of LNG Carrier Systems
A combination of the FSA methodology and a FER method is used for uncertainty
treatment of failure modes of the LNG carrier systems such as a LNG containment
system and a LNG transfer arm. The LNG containment system and transfer arm have
been described in Chapter 4, including identification of the respective failure modes for
the top events (a LNG containment system failure and a LNG spill from transfer arm)
using a FTA technique.
Intolerable region
The ALARP region
Broadly acceptable
region
Negligible
Risks
Figure 6.3: Principle of ALARP
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Risk cannot be
justified on any
grounds.
Tolerable only ifrisk
reduction is
impracticable or if its
cost is grossly
disproportionate to the
improvement gained.
Tolerable if cost of
reduction would exceed the
improvement gained.
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk remains
in this level (No need to
demonstrate ALARP).
6.4.1. Hazard Identification
The hazards of LNG carrier operations such as "LNG containment system failure" and
"LNG spill from the transfer arm" are the estimated high risk ones in Chapter 3. The
failure modes of the LNG containment system identified in the FTA diagram in Chapter
4 are fire and explosion, structural defects, corrosion effects, containment pressure,
pressure relief system failure and installation defect. Manual release failure, auto release
failure, fire and explosion, application of ship motion, failure of motion and controls,
pipe rupture, overpressure and material defect are the failure modes associated with the
LNG transfer arm, according to its FTA diagram in Chapter 4.
6.4.2. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is carried out on two hazards, "LNG containment system failure" and
"LNG spill from the transfer arm" based on the available information. The risks
associated with failure modes of the "LNG containment system failure" and "LNG spill
from transfer arm" are assessed using the FER approach in Section 6.3.2. The FST is
used to investigate the safety/risk levels of the hazards because of existence of
uncertainty of data in risk assessment, while the ER is used to synthesise all the failure
modes that lead to the occurrence of the hazards.
6.4.2.1. Failure Mode Modelling
Failure modes associated with "LNG containment system" and "LNG transfer arm'" are
modelled using the FST in combination with the ER to estimate the risk/safety levels of
the systems. A failure mode is defined as a specific manner in which the item under
investigation could malfunction (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Relative weights are
assigned to failure modes that cause the failure of the systems with respect to the gate,
in which the failure modes are the input events, for facilitation of the application of ER.
In an OR gate, all input events of the gate are given the same equal relative weight to
that of the output event of the gate. In an AND gate, the relative weight of all input
events of the gate are assigned through dividing the relative weight of the output event
of the gate by the number of the input events.
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6.4.2.1.1. Failure Mode Modelling of the "LNG Containment System"
The LNG containment system has failure modes of fire and explosion that directly
causes the system failure (fire and explosion 1), fire and explosion that causes plastic
collapse of support (fire and explosion 2), fire and explosion that results in excess load
(fire and explosion 3), structural defect that directly causes the containment system
failure (structural defect 1), structural defect that causes plastic collapse of support
(structural defect 2), structural defect that contributes to chock failure (structural defect
3), corrosion effect that directly causes the containment system failure (corrosion effect
1), corrosion effect that is part of the causes of structural pressure difference (corrosion
effect 2), corrosion effect that caused excess load (corrosion effect 3), containment
pressure, pressure relief system failure and installation defect that lead to the top event
(LNG containment system failure) as illustrated in its FTA diagram in Chapter 4. Their
corresponding relative weights (w) are 1, 1, 0.33, 1, 1, 0.33, 1, 0.5, 0.33, 0.25, 0.25 and
0.33 respectively. The gates of their FTA diagram are used to assign their relative
weights.
For the purpose of combination of all the failure modes using the ER approach, their
relative weight (w) need to be normalised using Equation (6.9). Therefore, the
normalised relative weight (w) of fire and explosion 1, fire and explosion 2, fire and
explosion 3, structural defect 1, structural defect 2, structural defect 3, corrosion effect
1, corrosion effect 2, corrosion effect 3, containment pressure, pressure relief system
failure and installation defect are 0.137, 0.137, 0.045, 0.137, 0.137, 0.045, 0.137, 0.067,
0.045, 0.034, 0.034 and 0.045 respectively.
The failure modes are modelled as follows:
1. Fire and explosion 1
The parameters of the fuzzy set manipulation formula are estimated as follows:
LII = {l/1.0,2/0.9,3/0.2,4/0,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
CII = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.l,6/0.8,7/1}
El1 = {l/0,2/0.1,3/0.75,4j.Ol,5/0.75,6/0, 7/0}
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Sl1 =Cl1 os; xLII = {l/0.1,2/0. 1,3/0.1,4/0,5/0, 6/0, 7/0}
The Best-Fit method (detailed in Example 1 of Appendix EI.I) is applied on the above
expression to obtain the safety level description of fire and explosion 1 as follows:
S(SII) = {(0.2258," poor"), (0.2459," average"~(0.2726," good"~ (0.2557," excellent")}
where Wll = 0.13 7
The risk rank of "fire and explosion 1" can be identified and calculated using Equation
(6.23) as follows:
Ql1 = 0.217 x 0.2258 + 0.478 x 0.2459 + 0.739 x 0.2726 + 1x 0.2557 = 0.624
In a similar way, the safety/risk levels of the other failure modes of the LNG
containment system are calculated as follows (see Appendix E1.2for details):
2. Fire and explosion 2
S(SI2) = {(0.2258," poor"), (0.2459," average"~(0.2726," good"~ (0.2557," excellent)}
where W12 = 0.137; QI2 = 0.624
3. Fire and explosion 3
S(SI3) = {(0.2258, "poor"~ (0.2459," average"~(0.2726, "good"~ (0.2557, "excellent")}
where w13 = 0.045; Ql3 = 0.624
4. Structural defect 1
S(SI4) ={(0.1695," poor"~(0.1806," average"~(O.3778,"good"~(0.2721, "excellent')}
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where Wl4 = 0.137; QI4 = 0.674
5. Structural defect 2
S(SI5)= {(0.1695," poorIt1(0.1806," averagelt),(0.3778," good"), (0.2721, "excellent")}
where WI5 = 0.137; QI5 = 0.674
6. Structural defect 3
S(816) = {(0.1695," poor"),(0.1806," average"1(0.3778," good"), (0.2721, "excellent")}
where WI6 = 0.045; QI6 = 0.674
7. Corrosion effect 1
S(817) = {(0.1544," poor"), (0.5425,1taverage"1 (0.1719," goodIt1(0.1312," excellent")}
where wI7 = 0.137, QI7 = 0.551
8. Corrosion effect 2
S(8Is) ={(0.1544," poor"1(0.5425," average"1(0.1719," good"1(0.1312," excellent")}
where WIS = 0.067; QIS = 0.551
9. Corrosion effect 3
8(819) = {(0.1544," poor"1(0.5425," average"1(0.1719," good"1(0.1312, "excellent")}
where WI9 = 0.045; QI9 = 0.551
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10. Containment pressure
S(SIIO) ={(O.227I," poor"~(O.2730,"average"~(O.2729,"good"~(O.2270,"excellent")}
where wlIO = 0.034; QIIO = 0.608
11. Pressure relief system failure
S(SIII) = {(O.I649, "poor"~ (0.1793," average'~(0.4I03," good"~(O.2455,"excellent)}
where Will = 0.034; QIII = 0.670
12. Installation defect
S(SI12) ={(0.1379," poor"~ (0.5685," average"),(0.1673,"good"~ (0.1263," excellent)}
where wlI2 = 0.045; QI12 = 0.552
Safety/risk level, S(SI )of "LNG containment system failure" is then obtained using the
ER approach attached with IDS software as follows:
S(SJ)= {(0.1776," poor "), (0.3182, IIaverage"1(0.2847, IIgood"1 (0.2195, IIexcellent ")}
This implies that safety/risk level of the LNG containment system belongs to "poor"
with DoB of 17.76%, "average" with DoB of 31.82%, "good" with DoB of 28.47% and
"excellent" with DoB of21.95%.
6.4.2.1.2. Failure Mode Modelling of the "LNG Transfer Arm"
The failure modes that lead to the LNG spill from the transfer arm developed from the
FTA of the LNG transfer arm in Chapter 4 are manual release failure, auto release
failure, fire and explosion that causes transfer arm failure (fire and explosion 1), fire and
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explosion that contributes to mechanical failure within design envelope (fire and
explosion 2), fire and explosion that contributes to the exceed of arm design limit (fire
and explosion 3), application of ship motion, failure of motion and controls, pipe
rupture, overpressure, material defect that directly causes a LNG spill from the transfer
arm (material defect 1), material defect that causes failure of piping (material defect 2)
and material defect that contributes to pipe coupling sleeve failure (material defect 3).
Their respective relative weights (w) are 0.33, 0.33, 1,0.33,0.33,0.33,0.33, 1,0.5, 1, 1
and 0.5 respectively. The relative weights (w) are assigned using the gates of their FTA
diagram. In a similar way to Section 6.4.2.1.1, the safety/risk levels of the failure modes
of the LNG transfer arm and their normalised relative weights (w) and preference
degree values can be obtained as follows (see Appendix E1.3 for details):
1.Manual release failure
S(S21) = {(0.2258,"poor"~ (0.2459,"average"),(0.2726," good"), (0.2557,"excellent)}
where W21= 0.047; Q21= 0.6236
2. Auto release failure
S(S22) ={(0.1544,"poor"),(0.5425," average"~(0.1719," good"~(0.1312, "excellent")}
where W22 = 0.047; Q22= 0.5511
3. Fire and explosion 1
S(S23) = {(0.1695,"poor"~(0.1806, "average"~(0.3778," good"~(0.2721, "excellent")}
4. Fire and explosion 2
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S(824) ={(0.1695," poor"),(0.1806," average"1 (0.3778," good"), (0.2721, "excellent")}
where W24 = 0.047; Q24 = 0.6744
5. Fire and explosion 3
S(825) = {(0.1695," poor"), (0.1806, "average"1(0.3778," good"), (0.2721," excellent")}
6. Application of ship motion
S(826) = {(0.1605," poor"),(0.3218," average"1(0.3478," good"1(0.1699," excellent")}
where W26 = 0.047; Q26 = 0.6156
7. Failure of motion and controls
S(827) = {(0.1863," poor"1(0.2414," average"1(0.3411," good"1(0.2312, "excellent")}
where W27 = 0.047; Q27 = 0.6391
8. Pipe rupture
8(S28) ={(0.2499," poor"1 (0.2729," average"1(0.2499," good"1 (0.2273," excellent")}
9. Overpressure
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8(829) = {(0.1699,"poor"~(0.1811," average"), (0.3859,"good"~(0.2631," excellent")}
IO.Material defects I
8(8210) = {(0.2112,"poor"~(0.2289," average"), (0.2837,"good"~(0.2762, "excellent")}
where w2JO = 0.143; Q2JO = 0.6411
II. Material defects 2
8(S211) ={(0.2112,"poor"~(0.2289," average"), (0.2837, "good"~(0.2762, "excellent")}
where w2ll = 0.14; Q2ll= 0.6411
12.Material defects 3
8(S212) = {(0.2112, "poor"~ (0.2289,"average"~ (0.2837, "good"~ (0.2762,"excellent")}
where w212 = 0.071; Qm = 0.6411
8(82) which is the' safety/risk level of the "LNG spill from transfer arm" is obtained
using the IDS software as follows:
S(S2) = {(0.1932," poor "1(0.2381," average "1(0.3162," good "1(0.2525," excellent ,,)}
This implies that the safety/risk level of the LNG transfer arm belongs to "poor" with
DoB of 19.32%, "average" with DoB of 23.81%, "good" with DoB of 31.62% and
"excellent" with DoB of25.25%.
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6.4.3. Risk Control Option
The main objective of the RCO is to reduce the frequency of failures and/or mitigate
their possible consequences (Pillay, 2001). The RCOs that can be used to control the
hazards of the LNG containment system and transfer arm depend on their CBA and
interest of stakeholders. In this study, the safety levels of the LNG containment system
and transfer arm are improved via selection of RCOs. In view of that, Marine Risk
Analyst (Expert #1), Marine Safety Engineer (Expert #2), Chief Marine Engineer
(Expert #3) and Ship Captain (Expert #4) chose three RCOs for the LNG containment
system and LNG transfer arm, respectively, as possible risk control solutions. The
RCOs for the LNG containment system are:
• RCOIA: Regular inspection of the system per voyage.
• RC02A: Training of crew members on new technology and change of operating
procedures in loading of LNG to the system.
• RC03A: Effective maintenance of the system.
The RCOs for the LNG transfer arm are:
• RCOIB: Use of well experienced personnel in loading/unloading of LNG.
• RC02B: Redesign of the system.
• RC03B: Effective maintenance of the system.
6.4.4. Cost Benefit Assessment,
The cost benefit assessments of the RCOs of the LNG containment system and transfer
arm are investigated using Tables 6.5 - 6.6 and the Best-Fit method. Expert #1, Expert
#2, Expert #3 and Expert #4 with equal experience, estimated the fuzziness of the costs
(Cl'C2,C3 and C;) of all the RCOs of each of the systems using Table 6.5 as a
reference point. The utility descriptions of the costs are identified using the Best-Fit
method. The application of the Best-Fit method to the costs followed similar procedures
in Section 6.3.4, and the resultant utility descriptions of the costs are synthesised with
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those of safety levels to facilitate the determination of the preference degrees of the
ncos.
6.4.4.1. Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Containment System
ReOIA, Re02A and Re03A can be used to improve the safety/risk level of a LNG
containment system. The cost incurred for using the ReOs is very important in decision
making on the best ReO. The safety/risk level associated with the LNG containment
system is illustrated in Section 6.4.2.1.1.
Using ReOlA, the safety levels of failure modes such as corrosion effect 1, corrosion
effect 2, and corrosion effect 3 are improved to "excellent" with DoB of 100%. Their
new safety levels are combined with the one of other failure modes using the IDS to
obtain an improved safety level of a LNG containment system estimated as:
S(SIA) = {(0.1354," poor "),(0.1659," average "}(0.2316," good"} (0.4671, "excellent ,,)}
The safety description is mapped onto the utility space as follows:
u(S.J = {(0.l354, "slightly preferred'), (0.1659, "moderately preferred'), (0.2316,
"preferred's, (0.4671, "greatly preferred')}
The cost incurred for using ReOlA is considered as "Moderately low" with reference
to Table 6.5, and can vary about the "Moderately low". Therefore, Experts #1, #2, #3
and #4 estimated the cost as follows:
etA = {I/O, 2/0.2, 3/1.0,4/0.5, 0/5, 0/6, 7/0}
el2A = {liD, 2/0.l, 3/1.0, 4/0.6, 5/0.2, 6/0, 7/0}
c: = {liD, 2/0.25, 3/l.0, 4/0.5, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0}
el~= {1I0, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.6, 5/0.l, 6/0, 7/0}
168
The Best-Fit method is applied to the estimated costs of RC01A for the LNG
containment system and the utility descriptions of the costs by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4
are expressed as follows:
U(C:A) = {(0.0543, "slightly preferred'), (0.0664, "moderately preferred'), (0.8218,
"preferred's, (0.0575, "greatly preferred')}
U(C)2A) = {(0.1026, "slightly preferred'), (0.1348, "moderately preferred'), (0.6572,
"preferred's, (0.1054, "greatly preferred')}
U(C~A) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (0, "moderately preferred'), 0, "preferred's, (0,
"greatly preferred')}
U(C)~) = {(0.0671, "slightly preferred'), (0.083, "moderately preferred'), (0.7772,
"preferred's, (0.0727, "greatly preferred')}
The combination of the above four judgements resulted to the following:
U(C)A) = {(0.0411, "slightly preferred'), (0.0524, "moderately preferred'), (0.8632,
"preferred's, (0.0433, "greatly preferred')}
Suppose the cost is of equal importance to safety and the weights of both the attributes
are 0.5 and 0.5 respectively, as shown in Table 6.7. U(C)J and U(SJJ can be
synthesised to obtain the utility description as follows:
U(UtJ = {(0.0815, "slightly preferred'), (0.1016, "moderately preferred'), (0.5794,
"preferred"), (0.2375, "greatly preferred')}
I
The preference degree for RC01A by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 can be calculated using
Equation (6.34) as follows:
~A =0.217 x 0.0815 + 0.478 x 0.1016 + 0.739 x 0.5794.+ 1x 0.2375
169
~A =0.7319
Similarly, the preference degree for RC02A by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 is (see
Appendix El.4 for details):
P2A =0.745
In a similar way, the preference degree for RC03A by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 is (see
Appendix El.5 for details):
P3A = 0.6983
Other relative weights of safety and cost (i.e. weight rate between safety and cost) and
the produced preference degree values of RCOIA, RC02A and RC03A are shown in
Table 6.7. In Row 7 of Table 6.7, the values of relative weights of safety and cost are
0.5 and 0.5 respectively, followed by a value of 1, which is the weight rate of safety to
cost. The next values are the preference degree values of 0.7319, 0.745 and 0.6983 for
RC01A, RC02A and RC03A respectively. Subsequent rows of Table 6.7 can be
explained in a similar way.
Table 6.7: Preference Degree of RCOs of the LNG Containment System
Relative weights (w) Weight rates Preference degree of RCOs
between
safety and
Safety Cost cost RCOIA RC02A RC03A
0.167 0.833 0.2 0.7173 0.7097 0.5084
0.286 0.714 0.4 0.7210 0.7182 0.5505
0.375 0.625 0.6 0.7251 0.7279 0.6026
0.444 0.556 0.8 0.7287 0.7370 0.6534
0.5 0.5 1 0.7319 0.7450 0.6983
0.75 0.25 3 0.7435 0.7742 0.8640
0.833 0.167 5 0.7454 0.7794 0.8911
0.875 0.125 7 0.7461 0.7812 0.8999
0.9 0.1 9 0.7440 0.7820 0.9037
170
The influence of relative weights of safety and cost in ranking of the RCOs is shown in
Table 6.8 and graphically illustrated in Figure 6.4. It can be observed in Table 6.8 that
when the relative weights of safety and cost are 0.5 and 0.5 respectively, the RCOIA is
ranked as 2 and RC02A is ranked as 1, while RC03A is ranked as 3. This is as a result
of the preference degree values ofO.7319 for RCOIA, 0.7450 for RC02A and 0.6983
for RC03A in Table 6.7. The ranking of the RCOs in other rows of Table 6.8 is also
influenced by the relative weight of safety and cost. The best RCO for the LNG
containment system and the associated relative weights of cost and safety will be
discussed in decision-making of Section 6.4.5.
Table 6.8: Ranking of RCOs of the LNG Containment System
Relative weights (w) Weight rates Ranking of RCOs based on
between safety their preference degrees
and cost
Safety Cost RCOIA Re02A Re03A
0.167 0.833 0.2 1 2 3
0.286 0.714 0.4 1 2 3
0.375 0.625 0.6 2 1 3
0.444 0.556 0.8 2 1 3
0.5 0.5 1 2 1 3
0.75 0.25 3 3 2 1
0.833 0.167 5 3 2 1
0.875 0.125 7 3 2 1
0.9 0.1 9 3 2 1
6.4.4.Z. Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Transfer Arm
The safety/risk level of the LNG transfer arm has been described in Section 6.4.2.1.2.
Three ReOs such as ReOlB, RC02B and Re03B are identified in Section 6.4.3, as
the possible ReOs that can be used to improve the safety level of the LNG transfer arm.
The cost of each Reo is estimated using expert judgement. When ReO 1B is applied to
the LNG transfer arm, the safety estimates of the system can be described as follows:
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Figure 6.4: Ranking of Preference Degrees of RCOs of the LNG Containment System
S(SIB) = {(O.l932," poor "),(0.2381," average "),(0.3162, IIgood "),(0.2525," excellent ")}
S(SIB) is mapped onto the utility space for utility description of the safety/risk level of
the LNG transfer arm as follows:
U(SIB) = {(0.1932, "slightly preferred'), (0.2381, "moderately preferred'), (0.3162,
"preferred'), (0.2525, "greatly preferred')}
The cost of RCO 1B are estimated by Experts # 1, #2, #3 and #4, and mapped onto the
utility space (see Appendix E1.6 for details). The synthesised utility descriptions of the
cost ofRC01B are given as follows:
U(C1B) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (0, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred's, (1,
"greatly preferred")}
Suppose U(C1B) and U(SIB) are synthesised with safety and cost weights of 0.5 and 0.5
respectively. The following utility description can be obtained:
172
U(U1B) = {(0.0858, "slightly preferred'), (0.1057, "moderately preferred'), (0.1404,
"preferred"), (0.6681, "greatly preferred')}
In a similar way to Section 6.4.4.1, the preference degrees for ReOlB, Re02B and
Re03B are (see Appendix E1.6 -1.8 for details):
~B = 0.8410
P2B =0.7192
P3B =0.6776
Other preference degree values for Reos of the LNG transfer arm and the associated
relative weights of safety and cost are shown in Table 6.9. Table 6.9 is described in a
similar way to Table 6.7.
Table 6.9: Preference Degree of Reos of the LNG Transfer Arm
Relative weights (w) Weight rates Preference degree of ReOs
between
safety and
Safety Cost cost ReOIB Re02B Re03B
0.167 0.833 0.2 0.9869 0.7070 0.5067
0.286 0.714 0.4 0.9544 0.7102 0.5447
0.375 0.625 0.6 0.9147 0.7137 0.5915
0.444 0.556 0.8 0.8758 0.7167 0.6372
0.5 0.5 1 0.8410 0.7192 0.6776
0.75 0.25 3 0.7004 0.7281 0.8295
0.833 0.167 5 0.6717 0.7294 0.8558
0.875 0.125 7 0.6611 0.7298 0.8644
0.9 0.1 9 0.6558 0.7299 0.8684
The tabular and graphical representations of the influence of relative weights of safety
and cost in ranking of the ReOs of the LNG transfer arm are shown in Table 6.10 and
Figure 6.5 respectively. Table 6.10 is explained in a similar way to Table 6.8. The
relative weights of 0.5 for safety and 0.5 for cost, together with the rank of 1 for
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RCOIB, rank of 2 for RC02B and rank of 3 for RC03B, can be found in Row 7 of
Table 6.10. In the same way, other relative weights of safety and cost, and ranks of
RCOs are identified in Table 6.10. The best RCO for safety improvement of the LNG
transfer arm and the associated weights of safety and cost will be recommended in
decision-making of Section 6.4.5.
Table 6.10: Ranking of RCOs of the LNG Transfer Arm
Relative weights (w) Weight rates Ranking ofRCOs based on
between safety their preference degrees
and cost
Safety Cost RC01B RC02B RC03B
0.167 0.833 0.2 1 2 3
0.286 0.714 0.4 1 2 3
0.375 0.625 0.6 1 2 3
0.444 0.556 0.8 1 2 3
0.5 0.5 1 1 2 3
0.75 0.25 3 3 2 1
0.833 0.167 5 3 2 1
0.875 0.125 7 3 2 1
0.9 0.1 9 3 2 1
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Figure 6.5: Ranking of Preference Degrees of RCOs of the LNG Transfer Arm
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6.4.5. Decision Making
The selection of a RCO can be carried out on the basis of the preference degrees
associated with the RCOs with regard to the particular considerations of cost and safety.
The RCOs identified by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 with the highest preference degree
will be chosen as the best RCOs for the LNG containment system and transfer arm. In
this study, safety should be more important than cost because of the catastrophic
consequences of the two hazards of the LNG carrier operations under investigation.
Tables 6.7 - 6.10 can be used to make such a decision. The information provided in
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 is used to develop Table 6.11.
Table 6.11: Preference Degree of the best RCO of the LNG Containment System
RCO Preference degree Rank of Relative weight (w) Relative weight (w)
of the RCO RCO of safety of cost
RC03A 0.8640 1 0.75 0.25
RC03A 0.8911 1 0.833 0.167
RC03A 0.8999 1 0.875 0.125
RC03A 0.9037 1 0.9 0.1
Table 6.11 is explained as follows:
• RC03A with preference degree value of 0.8640' and rank of 1 is associated with
0.75 for relative weight of safety and 0.25 for relative weight of cost.
• RC03A with preference degree value of 0.8911 and rank of 1 is associated with
0.833 for relative weight of safety and 0.167 for relative weight of cost.
• RC03A with preference degree value of 0.8999 and rank of 1 is associated with
0.875 for relative weight of safety and 0.125 for relative weight of cost.
• RC03A with preference degree value ofO.9037 and rank of 1 is associated with 0.9
for relative weight of safety and 0.1 for relative weight of cost.
175
RC03A has been identified as the best RCO that will control/prevent LNG containment
system failure because it has the highest preference degree value and rank of 1 In
situations where safety is more important than cost as shown in Table 6.11.
Table 6.12: Preference Degree of the best RCO of the LNG Transfer Arm
RCO Preference degree Rank of Relative weight (w) Relative weight (w)
of the RCO RCO of safety of cost
RC03B 0.8295 1 0.75 0.25
RC03B 0.8558 1 0.833 0.l67
RC03B 0.8644 1 0.875 0.125
RC03B 0.8684 1 0.9 O.l
In a similar way to Table 6.11, Table 6.12 is developed using the information in Tables
6.9 and 6.10, and described as follows:
• RC03B with preference degree value of 0.8295 and rank of 1 is associated with
0.75 for relative weight of safety and 0.25 for relative weight of cost.
• RC03B with preference degree value of 0.8558 and rank of 1 is associated with
0.833 for relative weight of safety and 0.167 for relative weight of cost.
• RC03B with preference degree value of 0.8644 and rank of 1 is associated with
0.875 for relative weight of safety and 0.125 for relative weight of cost.
• RC03B with preference degree value of 0.8684 and rank of l is associated with 0.9
for relative weight of safety and 0.1 for relative weight of cost.
In situations where safety is more important than cost as shown in Table 6.12, RC03B
is the best RCO that will control/prevent LNG spill from the transfer arm.
6.4.6. Verification of the Results
A partial verification of the safety/risk levels of the LNG containment system and
transfer arm is conducted to ensure that the safety/risk levels of the LNG carrier systems
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estimated using ER are appropriate. The safety/risk levels of the LNG containment
system and transfer arm are determined by the ones of their failure modes. Their failure
modes' safety/risk levels belong to "poor", "average", "good" and "excellent". In this
study, the safety/risk levels of the LNG containment system and transfer arm are
validated by satisfying the following axioms.
• Axiom 1. The safety/risk levels of most of the failure modes of the LNG
containment system belong to "average" and "good" to a large extent in Section
6.4.2.1.1. Therefore, the safety/risk level of the top event (LNG containment system
failure) should belong to either "average" or "good" to a large extent.
• Axiom 2. The safety/risk levels of most of the failure modes of the LNG transfer
arm belong to "good" to a large extent in Section 6.4.2.1.2. Therefore, the
safety/risk level of the top event (LNG spill from the transfer arm) should belong to
"good" to a large extent.
The safety/risk levels of the failure modes of the LNG containment system are
synthesised using IDS in order to estimate the top event's (LNG containment system
failure) safety/risk level. The resultant safety/risk level of the top event's (LNG
containment system failure) belongs to "average" to a large extent. This result satisfies
the Axiom 1.
In a similar way, the safety/risk levels of the failure modes of the LNG transfer arm are
combined using IDS so as to estimate the safety/risk level of the top event (LNG spill
from the transfer arm). The IDS produced a safety/risk level that belongs to "good" to a
large extent. This result satisfies the Axiom 2.
Another partial verification can be conducted to investigate the ranking of the RCOs.
The rank of a RCO is correct if the following axioms are satisfied:
• Axiom 1. When safety is more important than cost (Le. the weight of safety is
greater than the one of cost), the RCO with rank of 1 should improve the safety
level of a LNG carrier system more than others via elimination of failure modes.
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• Axiom 2. When cost is more important than safety (i.e. the weight of cost is greater
than the one of safety), the RCO with rank of 1 needed to improve the safety level
of a LNG carrier system should not be the most expensive one.
In situations where safety is more important than cost, RC03A of the LNG containment
system and RC03B of the LNG transfer arm are ranked first in their respective Tables
6.8 and 6.10. The preference degree values of RC03A and RC03B are graphically
represented in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. RC03A can improve the safety level of
the LNG containment system more than the other RCOs via elimination of failure
modes and the preference degree value is the highest in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.4.
Similarly, RC03B can improve the safety level of the LNG transfer arm more than the
other RCOs via elimination of failure modes and has the highest preference degree
value in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.11. This satisfies Axiom 1 for ranking of the RCOs of
the LNG containment system and transfer arm in situations where safety is more
important than cost.
In this research, when cost is more important than safety, RCOIA or RC02A of the
LNG containment system has a rank of 1 as shown in Table 6.8 and graphically
represented with a highest preference degree value in Figure 6.4. The cost incurred for
carrying out either RCOIA or RC02A is less expensive compared to RC03A. This
result is in harmony with Axioms 2. RCOIB of the LNG transfer arm is ranked as 1 in
Table 6.10 because it has the highest preference degree value among the RCOs, as
illustrated in Figure 6.5. The cost incurred for RCOIB is less expensive compared to
RC02B and RC03B. This is in line with the Axioms 2.
6.5. Conclusion
A FER method has been applied in this chapter incorporating the FSA methodology.
The safety/risk levels of the failure modes of the LNG containment system and transfer
arm are known using a fuzzy set manipulation formula that includes three parameters of
failure likelihood, failure consequence probability and consequence severity. The
parameters are represented by their respective fuzzy values. Each of the parameters is
characterised with seven linguistic terms and assigned fuzzy values for each linguistic
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term with categories ranging from 1-7. The fuzzy values served as a reference/base for
estimation of new ones for the three parameters of each failure mode of the LNG
containment system and transfer arm. The new fuzzy values are developed by varying
the reference/base ones using expert judgement.
Best-Fit method is applied on the safety fuzzy values of each failure mode of the LNG
containment system and transfer arm. The resultant safety/risk levels of each failure
mode of the LNG containment system and transfer arm are synthesised using the ER
mechanism attached with IDS in order to estimate their top events' safety levels. Three
RCOs are chosen and the best one is identified and analysed by four experts using both
cost and safety estimates based on defined utility expression characterised as "slightly
preferred", "moderately preferred", "preferred", and "greatly preferred".
The fuzzy values of the cost expression are used as a base that guided the estimation of
new ones by the experts. The fuzzy cost values estimated by the experts for each RCO
of the "LNG containment system failure" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm" are
evaluated using the Best-Fit method and mapped onto their utility space. Each of their
utility descriptions of cost is aggregated at a single level using the IDS. A further
aggregation is carried out with the safety estimates of the "LNG containment system
failure" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm" respectively with each of their utility
description of cost for the calculation of preference degrees of their RCOs.
The preference degree formula gave room for the utility estimates of the "LNG
containment system failure" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm" to be used in
facilitation of its values. The values of preference degrees of their RCOs are identified.
Finally, RCOs with the highest preference degrees such as RC03A and RC03B are the
best RCOs for safety improvement of the LNG containment system and transfer arm
respectively.
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Chapter 7 - Discussion
Summary
In this chapter, the results produced in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are described. The models
used in this research are outlined, followed by the discussion of how the model tests are
carried out. The strengths and weaknesses of the models are analysed through the test
cases. The industries that will benefit from the research are identified and indicated.
7.1. Discussion of the Results of Chapter 3
The estimation of risks associated with the hazards of LNG carrier operations are
conducted by four experts. It is successful by carrying out a brainstorming session. Scores
of consequence and likelihood of the hazards are described and assigned with respect to
LNG carrier operations. The risk score of a hazard is the summation of its consequence and
occurrence likelihood scores. These scores are expressed in logarithmic scale. Each of the
categories of the consequence of the hazards such as negligible, marginal, critical and
catastrophic is described with a numerical score. The less possible, possible, more possible
and most possible categories of the occurrence likelihood of the hazards are also described
with numerical scores. The categories of the risks of the hazards are described with range of
scores.
In the above analysis, the two high risk hazards such as "a LNG spill from the transfer arm"
and "a LNG containment system failure" have received a risk score of 8. In the risk matrix
approach used in this study, the high risk scores are defined 6 to 8, while the moderate risk
score is 5. Any hazard with a risk score of 3 or 4 is categorised as a low risk hazard, while
the ones with a risk score of 2 is categorised as very low risk hazard. Risk estimations of
the hazards of LNG carrier operations depend on the competency of the experts involved. If
experts involved in this study are not experienced, high risk hazards might be estimated as
180
low risk ones or other categories. In such a situation, oil and gas companies that adopt this
methodology in risk management of their LNG carrier operations will be misled.
Only experienced experts that well understand the hazards of the LNG carrier operations
and their associated risks are used in this study. In the proposed methodology, not all the
causes of the hazards of LNG carrier operations are needed, which helps save time in this
investigation. The methodology is used to prioritise the hazards of LNG carrier operations.
It reveals the hazards associated with catastrophic consequences and high risks, which need
to be further investigated to identify their causes. Although the methodology has shown
some attractiveness, it still exposes some application problems. For example, hazards such
as "a LNG spill from the transfer arm" and "a LNG containment system failure" that have
the same risk score, may have different risk implications in the real world. Therefore,
different causes of the hazards are also analysed in this study.
7.2. Discussion of the Results of Chapter 4
The results of the maintenance cost of a LNG containment system and a LNG transfer arm
have been verified in order to ascertain the purpose of the model. The purpose of the model
is to identify the maintenance cost of the LNG containment system and the LNG transfer
arm so as to reduce the risks associated with their operations. The verification of the model
reveals that its constraint cannot be violated. In LNG maintenance practice, the budget is
always limited, which further indicates the necessity of study of optimising the use of the
limited budget to achieve the highest possible safety. level. The model reveals that the
maintenance cost of a system can increase whenever there is an increase in the system risk
and vice versa.
In the relevant test case (Le. Table 4.4), the developed model is tested by increasing the
values of C; by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. Such increase in the value of Cr reveals that the
value of R; is decreasing. It means that whenever total maintenance cost is increased, the
total risk ofthe LNG containment system and the LNG transfer arm decreased. This is as a
result of more money spent on maintenance of the LNG containment system and the LNG
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transfer arm by using more experienced experts and better quality spare parts. Another
model test is also carried out to analyse the value of CSYSTEM(lu) by increasing its value by
5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. This results in an increase of the value of RT. It means that the
unit (minimum) cost of maintenance of a LNG containment system can help to reveal the
risk of the system. When the unit cost of maintenance of the LNG containment system is
increased, the total risk of the LNG carrier systems will be increased. The results in Table
4.6 are used to demonstrate the behaviour of the model when the value of CSYSTEM(2u) is
increased. In Table 4.6, the value of CSYSTEM(2u) is increased by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% to
analyse its effect on the model. It can be found in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.6 that the value of
RT is increased whenever the value of CSYSTEM(2u) is increased. It means that the minimum
amount of money needed to maintain the LNG transfer arm depends on the risk associated
with its operations. The verification of all the results carried out in this chapter shows that
the model can function well to reflect the reality and the values of CSYSTEM(1) and CSYSTEM(2)
are reasonable. This methodology can be adopted by ship design companies in decision
making on maintenance cost of the LNG carrier systems.
7.3. Discussion of the Results of Chapter 5
The exact unit costs of maintenance of the LNG containment system and the LNG transfer
arm are identified through the use of the FRB method, including the establishment of 125
fuzzy rules, the definition of triangular membership function, the use of WMoM
defuzzification method and four experts with equal experience of LNG carrier maintenance
cost. Change of any of the above elements will affect the exact maintenance cost values of
the LNG containment system and the LNG transfer arm. Therefore, experience of the
experts in the FRB method and maintenance cost of the LNG carrier system is crucial in
this study.
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to verify the new costs of maintenance of the LNG
containment system and the LNG transfer arm, with reference to the optimization of the
model using GA approach. In the optimization of the model, the values of unit costs of
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maintenance of the LNG containment system and the LNG transfer arm that have been
treated from uncertainties are used. Firstly, the value of C T is increased by 5%, 10%, 15%
and 20% to check its effect on the model. Such increment of the value of CT' leads to the
decrease of the value of RT in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.13. This is in line with reality. This
helps achieve the purpose of the model that is to distribute the budgeted maintenance cost
to the high risk LNG carrier systems in order to minimise the total risk of the systems. The
second test of the model is carried out via the increment of the value of CSYSTEM(lu)' The
increment of the value of CSYSTEM(lu) leads to an increment of the value of RT, as shown in
Table 5.7 and Figure 5.13. It keeps consistency with the fact that the model can be used to
reduce the risk of LNG carrier systems by distribution of maintenance cost as safety
improvement measure. Further investigation of the results produced by the model is
conducted through increasing the values of CSYSTEM(2u) by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. The
increment of the value of CSYSTEM(2u) by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% shows that the value of
RT gradually increased up to four times in Table 5.8 and Figure 5.13. This validates the
feasibility of the model and the rationality of the new values of CSYSTEM(I) and CSYSTEM(2)'
Though the strengths of the combination of the FRB and GA methods in optimization of
the model have been revealed, there are still some weaknesses. The antecedent part of the
FRB method used in this research has 3 components such as LTCC, LMD and LSPC. More
components could be identified and used to evaluate the LNG carrier system maintenance
cost. However, it could be prone to error due to involvement of a larger number of fuzzy
. .
rules. Due to the strength of this methodology, ship construction companies can use it in
uncertainty treatment of the cost of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems. The
maintenance department of oil and gas companies can also use the methodology of Chapter
5 in development of planned maintenance strategy of the LNG carrier systems.
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7.4. Discussion of the Results of Chapter 6
The validity of the results produced in Chapter 6 is investigated by carrying out a partial
verification. In the case study, it is found that when the safety/risk levels of failure modes
of a LNG containment system are aggregated using the ER method attached with IDS
software, the top event (LNG containment system failure),s safety/risk level belongs to
"average" to a large extent. Since the safety/risk levels of the failure modes of the LNG
containment system mainly belong to "average" and "good" to a large extent, it shows that
the top event (LNG containment system failure),s safety/risk level is rational. The
safety/risk level of top event (LNG spill from the transfer arm) belongs to "good" to a large
extent. Such safety descriptions of the "LNG spill from the transfer arm" is verified
because most of the safety/risk levels of the failure modes of the LNG transfer arm belong
to "good" to a large extent.
The safety descriptions of the "LNG spill from the transfer arm" and the "LNG
containment system failure" show that the model is feasible and reliable. Another result
verification is conducted to confirm the importance of safety over cost and vice versa.
Three RCOs are identified for safety improvement of the LNG containment system and the
LNG transfer arm. RC03A can be used to improve the safety level of the LNG containment
system, which is better than RCO 1A and RC02A. The cost of implementation of the RCOs
(RCOIA, RC02A and RC03A) differs. The RC03A that can maximally improve the
safety level of the LNG containment system is expected to have the highest preference
degree value, if safety carries more weight than cost. The result shows the RC03A has the
highest preference degree value as can be seen in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.4. Furthermore,
the cost of implementation of the RC03A is the most expensive among the RCOs of the
LNG containment system and is proven to have the lowest preference degree value when
cost is more important than safety.
In control of the risk of "LNG spill from the transfer arm", three RCOs (RCOIB, RC02B
and RC03B) are identified. The RCO that can produce optimal safety level of the LNG
transfer arm should be associated with highest preference degree value. Such safety level of
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the LNG transfer arm can be achieved using the RC03B. proved by its preference degree
value of 0.8684. The preference degree value of the RC03B is the highest as shown in
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.S in the situation where safety is more important than cost. Table 6.9
and Figure 6.S also reveal that the preference degree value of the RC03B becomes the
lowest value when cost is more important than safety. This is because it is more costly to
implement RC03B compared to RCO IB or RC02B. This partially verifies the model.
In Tables 6.8 and 6.10, it can be found that different weights are used to investigate how the
RCOs are ranked with respect to safety and cost. Such illustrations can be used to know the
implications of preferring safety over cost and vice versa. Oil and gas companies can use
the tables in making decision on the best RCOs of the LNG carrier operations, considering
the cost and benefit of each RCO. The methodology of this research can be adopted by
regulatory authorities and oil and gas companies for risk management of their LNG
facilities associated with uncertainties.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion
Summary
In this chapter, the conclusion of the research is described. The summary of how the aim
and objectives of this research are achieved is outlined The limitation of the research is
discussed and the need for further application of the methodologies used in this research to
other areas in the LNG and maritime industries are recommended.
8.1. Introduction
It is obvious that there has been a significant enlargement of the LNG carrier fleet in recent
times, which has raised doubts over maintaining the outstanding safety record of the LNG
carrier operations. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a proactive risk-based approach to
ensure that such safety records of the LNG carrier operations are maintained.
The LNG industry has evolved technically and operationally so as to ensure safe and secure
operations as described in Chapter 2 (Literature Review). Technical and operational
advances include everything from the engineering domain that underlies LNG facilities
from operational procedures to technical competency of personnel. Secondly, the physical
and chemical properties of LNG, which are analyzed in Chapter 2, require risks of hazards
of LNG to be well understood and incorporated into the technology and operations for
prevention and mitigation purposes. Furthermore, the standards, codes and regulations that
apply to the LNG industry ensure safety (Foss, 2003). The double hull construction of LNG
carriers and standards set by the United States Coast Guard Agency (USCGA) contributed
to the safety of LNG during transportation.
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The LNG shipping safety becomes solidified after application of FSA to all ships
(including LNG carriers), so as to ensure oversight of safety and environmental pollution
prevention. In this research, the FSA methodology is applied to the LNG containment
system and transfer arm using a new approach in Chapter 6, after comprehensive study of
Chapters 2 to 5. LNG carrier operations that could cause severe hazards such as explosion,
vapour clouds, rollover, freezing liquid, rapid phase transition, and pool fire were
investigated and addressed using a proactive risk-based maintenance approach and
subjective (possibilistic) risk assessment based on FSA methodology.
8.2. Main Conclusion of the Research
In this research, a proactive risk-based maintenance approach and a subjective risk
assessment based on FSA have been developed to improve the operations of the LNG
carriers. Uncertainty treatments of the unit costs of maintenance of the LNG carrier systems
were incorporated in the research. In view of these, the research findings are summarised
as follows:
• All relevant hazards of LNG carrier operations have been identified using
brainstorming and risk matrix techniques. The risks of the hazards were prioritized to
know the high risk ones. The risk matrix technique has been proved as an effective
method for qualitative risk assessment of a high number of hazards of LNG carrier
operations.
• The occurrence probabilities and frequencies of top events ("LNG containment system
failure" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm") were estimated using a FTA method.
The FTA method demonstrated that the failure logic of the failure modes of the top
events determine their failure probabilities. The mechanism of Boolean algebra was
used to produce reasonable results of top event's probabilities.
• A maintenance decision making model was developed. GA has been demonstrated as a
backbone of this model via optimization of the model (risk model) to determine the
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maintenance cost of high risk LNG carrier systems, needed for the systems' safety
improvement. Reasonable results of maintenance costs were obtained.
• A new maintenance decision making model has been developed to enable the treatment
of uncertainty of unit costs of maintenance of high risk LNG carrier systems with the
use of FRB and GA. A combination of FRB and GA has demonstrated that uncertainty
of maintenance costs can be subdued. Acceptable results of maintenance costs were
produced.
• A FER algorithm has been used to demonstrate how uncertainties of failure modes of
top events ("LNG containment system failure" and "LNG spill from the transfer arm")
can be subdued in the FSA framework. Acceptable results of safety levels and the best
RCDs for addressing the top events were identified.
8.3. Research Contributions
The novel contribution of this research is important and its aim has been achieved. The aim
was to carry out a proactive risk assessment and maintenance modelling using the FSA
methodology on high risk LNG carrier systems. This was achieved in a structured manner
as follows:
• A methodology of identifying hazards of LNG carrier operations and prioritizing their
associated risks was developed using the risk matrix technique in Chapter 3. This
methodology was generic and can be used by other industries.
• A methodology of risk-based maintenance of high risk LNG carrier systems was
developed in Chapter 4. A PRA was carried out using the FTA method on high risk
LNG carrier systems and their maintenance modelling implemented using GA, so as to
investigate the maintenance cost. An optimal risk solution was found, including the
maintenance cost.
• An advanced methodology of risk-based maintenance was developed in Chapter 5. The
methodology was similar to the former, but a difference was the introduction of the
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FRB method for uncertainty treatment of unit costs of maintenance of the high risk
LNG carrier systems in the optimization of the risk model using GA.
• A subjective risk assessment of high risk LNG carrier systems based on FSA
methodology using the FER algorithm was developed in Chapter 6. The FER algorithm
was used for estimation of safety levels and RCOs of these systems to facilitate safety-
based design decisions due to incomplete safety and cost data.
8.4. Research Limitations
Risk estimation has been conducted using the risk matrix technique in Chapter 3, for
investigating areas of high risk on the LNG carrier operations. The LNG containment
system and transfer arm were the areas of LNG carrier operations where the methodologies
of a risk-based maintenance and subjective risk assessment based on FSA principles were
demonstrated. FTA was adopted as quantitative and qualitative techniques that can be used
in PRA of the LNG containment system and transfer, followed by their maintenance
modelling using GA, as the optimization technique in this research. The optimization
process was limited to identification of maintenance cost based on the research framework.
The risk model was developed using an exponential distribution in representation of
probability of failure of a system, therefore other distributions were not considered in the
research framework. The uncertainty treatments of unit costs of maintenance of the LNG
containment system and transfer arm were conducted using the FRB method. The
antecedent part of this method has components such as technical consultancy cost,
maintenance duration and spare parts cost. Therefore, the research was limited to these
components in the uncertainty treatments of the unit costs of maintenance of the systems.
Any unforeseen component was not accommodated in this research framework.
8.5. Recommendation for Future Research
There is need to recommend some areas for further research. Such areas are outlined as
follows:
189
• It will be appropriate that the FSA methodology is developed and applied to all the
aspects of LNG operations. This will ensure uniformity and confirmation of safety
levels in the LNG industry. The application of FSA should focus on components of gas
chain and the environment, in which the onshore tank is sited.
• The author also suggests that risk assessment should need more failure rate data in the
LNG carrier so that a comprehensive assessment of safety level can be carried out on
any LNG carrier systems for effective maintenance modelling. The failure rate data is a
prime factor that determines risk assessment levels. The industries in question should
have an open policy on failure rate data issues so that researchers can have access to
them. This will enable the successful application of risk-based maintenance to various
areas of the LNG carrier operations.
• The FER algorithm can be used for subjective risk assessment of various systems of
the LNG carriers. This research is limited to the LNG containment system and transfer
arm. A comprehensive FTA will be needed for other systems of the LNG carrier, so
that there will be an appropriate consideration of failure modes that lead to their top
events using the FER approach.
• Risk assessment should be extended to the loading and unloading lines of LNG. These
lines are pipes mounted on the top of the LNG tank for loading and unloading of LNG.
The lines are not always under operation, hence there will be some zones where LNG
is locked out and isolated from the main stock in the tank. Once the lines are isolated,
LNG will evaporate due to heat input from the surroundings and result in high pressure
in this section. This situation has potential to cause damage to pipes. The damages can
be identified using HAZOP studies and FTA.
• It will be useful if adequate maintenance strategies are carried out in the LNG industry.
A hazard such as overfilling of the LNG storage tank is caused as a result of the level
indicator failure to indicate the true level of LNG in the tank to the operator. Also, over
pressurization of the LNG storage tank occurs due to blockage of discharge lines by
valve failure, or a sudden drop in barometric pressure. Another hazard such as under
pressurization of the LNG storage tank normally happens as a result of control valve
failure or barometric pressure increases abruptly. At this time, if the gas make-up
190
system fails to actuate after recognising the low-pressure alarm, the pressure in the tank
continuously decreases before the vacuum breaker opens, thereby causing tank
damage. Further research in this aspect is highly necessary.
191
References
ABS (2000), "Guidance Notes on Risk Assessment Application for the Marine and
Offshore Oil and Gas Industries", Houston, U.S.A, June.
ABS Consulting (2004), "Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving
Releases From Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers", A Report for Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Under Contract Number FERC04C40196, U.S.A, May 13.
Alim, F., Ivanov, K. and Levine, S. H. (2007), "New Genetic Algorithms to Optimize PWR
Reactors. Part 1: Loading Pattern and Burnable Poison Placement Optimization Techniques
for PWRs", Annals of Nuclear Energy, Vol. 35, pp. 93-112.
Amari, S., Dill, G. and Howald, E. (2003), "A New Approach to Solve Dynamic Fault
Trees", Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, Annual, pp. 374-379.
Andrew, J. D. and Bartlett, L. M. (2003), "Genetic Algorithm Optimization of Firewater
Deluge System", Quality and Reliability Engineering International, Vol. 19, pp. 39-32.
Andrew, J. D. and Moss, T. R. (2002), "Reliability and Risk Assessment", 2nd Edition,
Professional Engineering Publishing Limited, Suffolk, U.K.
Andrews, J. D. and Ridley, L. M. (2001), "Reliability of Sequential Systems Using the
Cause-consequence Diagram Method", Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Part E: Journal of Process Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 215, Issue 3, pp. 207-
220.
Andrews, J. D. and Ridley, L. M. (2002), " Application of the Cause-Consequence
Diagram Method to Static Systems", Reliability Engineering and System Safety
Vol. 75, Issue 1, pp. 47-58.
192
Ang, A. H. S. and Tang, W. H. (1984), "Probability Concepts in Engineering Planning and
Design", John Wiley Sons.
Arunraj, N. S. and Maiti, J. (2010), "Risk-based Maintenance Policy Selection Using AHP
and Goal Programming", Safety Science, Vol. 48, Issue 2, pp. 238-247.
Aspen Environmental Group (2005), "International and National Efforts to Address the
Safety and Security Risks of Importing Liquefied Natural Gas: A Compendium", Contract
Report, Prepared for California Energy Commission, Contract No. 700-99-014, California.
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publicationslCEC-600-2005-002/CEC-600-2005-002.PDF.
Accessed on 9/Augustl2008.
Baker, R. D. and Wang, W. (1992), "Estimating the Delay Time Distribution of Faults in
Repairable Machinery for Failure Data", IMA Journal of Mathematical Application in
Business and Industry, Vol. 3, pp. 259 - 282.
Bartlett, L. M. (2000), "Variable Ordering Heuristics for Binary Decision Diagrams",
Doctoral Thesis, Loughborough University.
Bartlett, L. M. and Andrews, J. D. (2002), "Choosing an Ordering Heuristics for the Fault
Tree to Binary Decision Diagram Conversion using Neural Networks", IEEE Transactions
on Reliability, Vol. 51, Issue 3, pp. 344-349.
Ben-Daya, M. and Hariga, M. (1998), "Developing and Testing the Delay Time Model",
Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vo1.44, pp.361-374.
BS EN 292 (1991), "Safety of Machinery - Basic Concepts, General Principles for Design,
Part 1: Basic Terminology Methodology; Part 2: Technical Principles and Specification",
British Standards Institution, 1991.
193
Bubbico, R., Cave, S. D. and Mazzarotta, B. (2009), "Preliminary Risk Analysis for LNG
Tankers Approaching a Maritime Terminal", Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, Vol. 22, Issue 5, September, pp.634-638.
Buzzatto, J. L. (1999), "Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Use in
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Licensing
Process", Digital Avionics Systems Conference Proceedings, October 24-29, Missouri,
U.S.A.
California Energy Commission (2003), "Liquefied Natural Gas in California: History, Risk,
Siting", July, U.S.A.
Camero, M. (2006), "An Evaluation System of the Setting Up of Predictive Maintenance
Programmes", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 94, Issue 1, pp. 44-52.
Carmignani, G. (2009), "An Integrated Structural Framework to Cost-based FMECA: The
Priority-cost FMECA" Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 94, Issue 4, pp.
861-871.
CCPS (1992), "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedure", Center for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS), American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2nd Edition, New York, USA.
Chang, D., Rhee, T., Nam, K., Chang, K., Lee, D. and Jeong, S. (2008), "A Study on
Availability and Safety of New Propulsion Systems on LNG Carriers", Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 93, pp. 1877-1885.
Chauvel, A. M. (1997), "Managing Safety and Quality in Shipping: The Key to Success",
The Nautical Institute.
194
Chu, C., Proth, J. and Wolff, P. (1998), "Predictive Maintenance: The One-Unit
Replacement Model", International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 54, Issue 3,
pp. 285-295.
Chu, S. (2007), "Problems Encountered in CPC in LNG Receiving Terminal and Offshore
Pipeline Project", Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Expert Group on Clean Fossil
Energy, November 6, China.
www.china-Ing.com.cn/english/proceedinglsession%205/Shao%20hua%20Chua.pdf
Accessed on 26IMarch/2009.
CLNG (2008), History of LNG in U.S. http://www.lngfacts.orglAbout-LNG/History.asp
Accessed on 41August/2008.
Cocker, J. (1999), "Effectiveness of Maintenance", Journal of Quality in Maintenance
Engineering ,Vol. 5, No.4, pp.307-313.
Colley, D. A. (1999), "An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms for Scientists and
Engineers", World Scientific Publishing, UK.
Crocker, J. (1999), "Effectiveness of Maintenance", Journal of Quality in Maintenance
Engineering, Vol. 5, No.4, pp. 307-313.
Czemy, B. J., D'Ambrosio, 1. G., Murray, B. T. and Sundaram, P. (2005), "Effective
Application of Software Safety Techniques for Automotive Embedded Control Systems"
SAE World Congress, April 11-14, Michigan, U.S.A.
DARRP (20 I0), http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeastlmatthew/index.html. Accessed on
25/0ctober/20 1O.
195
Delvosalle, C., Fievez, C., Pipart, A. and Debray, B. (2006), "ARAMIS Project: A
Comprehensive Methodology for the Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios in
Process Industries", Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 130, Issue 3, pp. 200-219.
Desmond, N. D. H. and Gregory, B. B. (2004), "Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety",
Thomas Telford Ltd, London, UK.
Department of Energy (1990), "The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster", (Cullen
Report), ISBN 0 10 113102, London.
Dowlatshahi, S. (2001), "The Role of Product Safety and Liability in Concurrent
Engineering", Computers and Industrial Engineering, Vol. 41, Issue 2, pp. 187-209.
Durga Rao, K., Monika, V., Kushwaha, H. S., Verma, A. K. and Srividya, A. (2007), "Test
Interval Optimization of Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plant Using Fuzzy-genetic
Approach", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 92, pp. 895-901.
Eleye-Datubo, A. G. (2006), "Integrated Risk-Based Modelling to Safety-Critical Marine
and Offshore Applications", PhD Thesis, Liverpool John Moores University, UK.
Eleye-Datubo, A. G., Wall, A., Saajedi, A. and Wang, J. (2006), "Enabling a Powerful
Marine and Offshore Decision-Support Solution through Bayesian Network Technique",
Risk Analysis, Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp. 695-721.
EPRI, (2001), "Guideline on Proactive Maintenance", Electrical Power Research Institute
Incorporated, Report No. 1004015, California, U.S.A, November.
Ericson II, C. A. (1999), "Fault Tree Analysis - A History", Proceedings of the 17th
International System Safoty Conference, August, Orlando, Florida-USA.
196
Fang, Q., Yang, Z., Hu, S. and Wang, J. (2005), "Formal Safety Assessment and
Application of the Navigation Simulators for Preventing Human Error in Ship Operations",
Journal of Marine Science and Application, Vol. 4, Issue 3, pp. 5-12.
Fletcher, W. J. (2005), "The Application of Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodology to
Prioritize Issues for Fisheries Management", Journal of Marine Science, Vol. 62, Issue 8,
pp. 1576-1587.
Foss, M. M. (2003), "LNG Safety and Security", Centre for Energy Economics, University
of Austin, Texas, U.S.A, October.
Foss, M. M. (2003), "Introduction to LNG", Centre for Energy Economics, University of
Austin, Texas, U.S.A, January.
Gao, D., Jin, Z. and Lu, Q. (2008), "Energy Management Strategy Based on Fuzzy Logic
for a Fuel Cell Hybrid Bus", Journal of Power Sources, Vol. 185, Issue 1, pp. 311-317.
Gasbridge (2010), http://www.gasbridge.co.nzlindex.php?page=52. Accessed on
2510ctober/l o.
Godaliyadde, D. (2008), "Application of Formal Safety Assessment for Ship Hull Vibration
Modelling", PhD Thesis, Liverpool John Moores University, UK.
Godaliyadde, D., Phylip-Jones, G., Yang, Z. L., Batako A. D. and Wang, J. (2009), "An
Analysis of Ship Hull Vibration Failure Data", Journal of UK Safety and Reliability
Society, Vol. 29, No.1, pp. 15-26.
Golberg, D. E. (1989), "Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization and Machine
Learning", Addison Wesley Longman, ISBN: 0 201 157675.
197
Halebsky, M. (1989), "System Safety Engineering as Applied to Ship Design", Marine
Technology, Vol. 26, No.3, pp. 245-251.
Haifang, C., Quan, Z. and Huaizhi, G. (2009), "Risk Identification of Private Capital
Participating in Government Project Based on Risk Matrix", International Conference on
Management and Service Science, Wuham, China, Sept. 20-22, pp.l - 4.
Harikumar, R., Sukanesh, R. and Bharathi, P. A. (2004), "Genetic Algorithm Optimization
of Fuzzy Outputs for Classification of Epilepsy Risk Levels from EEG Signals. TENCON,
IEEE Region 10 Conference, Madurai, India; Nov. 21-24, Volume: C, Vol. 3, pp. 588- 591.
Hatiboglu, M. A., Altunkaynak, A., Ozger, M., Iplikcioglu, A. C., Cosar, M. and Turgut, N.
(2010), "A Predictive Tool by Fuzzy Logic for Outcome of Patients with Intracranial
Aneurysm", Expert Systems with Applications, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 1043-1049.
Haupt, R. L. and Haupt, S. E. (2004), "Practical Genetic Algorithms", 2nd Edition, John
Wiley and Sons Inc., ISBN: 0471455652.
House of Lords, (1992), "Safety Aspects of Ship Design and Technology", Select
Committee on Science and Technology, 2nd Report, HL Paper 30-1.
HSE (2011), "LNG Terminals - Consent and Operational Issues", Health and Safety
Executives, UK. http://www.hse.gov.uk/gas/supply/ingterminals.htm Accessed on
11/May/2011.
Hu, S., Fang, Q., Xia, H. and Xi, Y. (2007), "Formal Safety Assessment Based on Relative
Risks Model in Ship Navigation", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 92, Issue
3; pp. 369-377.
198
Hyo, K., Jae-Sun, K., Youngsoo, K. and Theofanius, G. T. (2005), "Risk Assessment of
Membrane Type LNG Storage Tanks in Korea-based on Fault Tree Analysis", Korean
Journal of Chemical Engineering, Vol. 22, No.1, pp.I-8.
lACS (2004), Experience with Formal Safety Assessment at International Maritime
Organization (IMO), MSC 78/19/1, IMO.
IMO (1997), "International Safety Management (ISM) Code/Guidelines on Implementation
of the ISM Code", London, UK.
IMO (1997a), "IMO/MSC Circular 829, Interim Guidelines for Application of Formal
Safety Assessment to the IMO Rule-Making Process", International Maritime
Organization, London, 17th November.
IMO (1997b), "Formal Safety Assessment Trial Application to High Speed Passenger
Vessels", International Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC 68/14/2 & 68/INF, May.
IMO (1998a), "Aspects of Formal Safety Assessment Methodology: Experience Gained
from the Trial Application undertaken by the United Kingdom", International Maritime
Organization, London, UK, MSC69/INF 14, February.
IMO (1998b), "Joint Nordic Project on Safety Assessment of HSC Operations",
International Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC70IINFI5, October.
IMO (l998c), "Joint Nordic Project on Safety Assessment of HSC Operations",
International Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC70lINF15, January.
IMO (l998d), "Formal Safety Assessment Study on Disabled Oil Tankers", International
Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC70/20/2, July.
199
IMO (1998e), "Formal Safety Assessment Novel Emergency Propulsion and Steering
Devices for Oil Tanker Analysed with the Formal Safety Assessment Method",
International Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC69/14/1, February.
IMO (1998f), "Bulk Carrier Safety", International Maritime Organization, London, UK,
MSC70/4/1, September.
IMO (1998g), "Trial Application of Formal Safety Assessment to the Dangerous Goods on
PassengerlRo-Ro Vessels", International Maritime Organization, London, UK,
MSC69/INF24.
IMO (2000), "Safety of Bulk Carriers - Basis of the International Collaborative Formal
Safety Assessment Study", International Maritime Organization, London, UK,
MSC72IINF 18, March.
IMO, 2002, "Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment for Use in the IMO Rule Making
Process", MSC/Circ. 1023, International Maritime Organization, London.
IMO (2002a), "International Collaborative FSA Study on Bulk Carriers - Step 2",
International Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC751INF22, March.
IMO (2002b), "International Collaborative FSA Study on Bulk Carriers - Step 3",
International Maritime Organization, London, UK, MSC76IINF8, September.
IMO (2007), "Formal Safety Assessment - Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers", MSC 83/21/1,
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Submitted by Denmark.
Jiang, T. and Li, Y. (1999), "Techniques and Applications of Fuzzy Theory in Generalized
Defuzzification Methods and Their Utilization in Parameter Learning Techniques", Fuzzy
Theory Systems, Vol. 2, pp. 871-895.
200
Jones, B. (2009), "Maintenance Modelling of Manufacturing Systems", PhD Thesis,
Liverpool John Moores University, UK.
Karen, A. R. and Andrews, J. D. (2002), "A Fault Tree Analysis Strategy using Binary
Decision Diagrams," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 78, pp.45-56.
Khanlari, A., Mohammadi, K. and Sohrabi, B. (2008), "Prioritizing Equipments for
Preventive Maintenance (PM) Activities Using Fuzzy Rules", Computers and Industrial
Engineering, Vol. 54, Issue 2, pp. 169-184.
Klir, G. J. and Yaun, B. (1995), "Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications",
Prentice Hall Inc., ISBN: 0 13 101171 5.
Kumamoto, H. and Henley, E. J. (1992), "Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management
for Engineers and Scientists", lEE Press, 2nd Edition, ISBN: 0 7803 1004 7.
Kosko, B. (1997), "Fuzzy Engineering", Prentice-Hall Incorporated, USA.
Kosko, B. (1994), "Fuzzy Systems as Universal Approximators", IEEE Transactions on
Computers, Vol. 43, pp. 1329-1333.
Lee, J. 0., Yeo, I.C. and Yang, Y. S. (2001), "A Trial Application ofFSA Methodology to
the Hatchway Watertight Integrity of Bulk Carriers", Marine Structures, Vol. 14, Issue 6,
pp. 651-667.
Lloyd's (2001), "Best Practices from the Bottom Up," Lloyd's List, April2.
Liu, L., Yang, J. B., Wang, J and Sii, H. S. (1994), "Engineering System Safety Analysis
and Synthesis Using the Fuzzy Rule-based Evidential Reasoning Approach", Quality and
Reliability Engineering International, Vol. 21, pp. 387-411.
201
Lofsten, H. (1999), "Management of Industrial Maintenance - Economic Evaluation of
Maintenance Policies", International Journal of Operation and Production Management,
Vol. 19, No.7, pp. 716-737.
Lois, P., Wang, J., Wall, A. D. and Ruxton, T. (2004), "Formal Safety Assessment of
Cruise Ships", Tourism Management, Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 93-109.
Loughran, C., Pillay, A., Wang, J., Wall, A. D. and Ruxton, T. (2003), "A Preliminary
Study of Fishing Vessel Safety", Journal of Risk Research, Vol. 5, No.1, pp. 3-21.
Man, K. F. Tang, K. S. Kwong, S. (1999), "Genetic Algorithms: Concept and Design",
Springer, London, UK.
Mamdani, E. H. (1974), "Application of Fuzzy Algorithms for Control of Simple Dynamic
Plant", IEEE Proceedings, Vol. 121, No. 12. pp. 1585-1588.
Markowski, A. S. and Mannan, M. S. (2009), "Fuzzy Logic for Piping Risk Assessment
(pfLOPA)", Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 22, Issue 6, pp.
921-927.
Marseguera, M., Zio, E. and Podofillini, L. (2004), "Optimal Reliability/Availability of
Uncertain Systems via Multi-objective Genetic Algorithms", IEEE Transactions on
Reliability, Vol. 53, Issue 3, pp. 424-435.
Matlab Version 7.7 (R2008b) Genetic Algorithm and Direct Search Toolbox 2.4.
Mauri, G. (2000), "Integrating Safety Analysis Techniques, Supporting Identification of
Common Cause Failures", PhD Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of
York, UK.
202
Military Standard, (1993), "System Safety Program Requirements", MIL-STD-882c,
January, AMSC Number F6861.
Minster, B., Smalley, J. B. and Padera, B. (1999) "Cost-effective Risk Based in Situ
Bioremediation Design", Proceedings of the 26th Annual Water Resources Planning and
Management Conference, June 6-9, Tempe, Arizona, U.S.A.
Mitchell, M. (1996), "An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms", MIT Press, U.S.A.
MSA (1993), "Formal Safety Assessment", MSC66/14, Submitted by the United Kingdom
to International Maritime Organization, Maritime Safety Committee, London, UK.
MCA, (1998), "Formal Safety Assessment for Bulk Carriers", (Including Annexes A-I),
Informal Paper submitted by UK to IMOIMSC, 70th Session, London, 27th November,
(IMO/MSC 70/INF PAPER).
Mokashi, A. J., Wang, 1. and Verma, A. K. (2002), "A Study of Reliability Centred
Maintenance in Ship Operations", Marine Policy, Vol. 26, No.5, pp. 325-335.
Moon, K., Song, S., Ballesio, J., Fitzgerald, G. and Knight, G. (2009), "Fire Risk
Assessment of Gas Turbine Propulsion System for LNG Carriers", Journal of Loss
Prevention in Process Industries, Vol. 22, pp. 908-914.
Moreno, G. and Pascual, V. (2009), "A Hybrid Programming Scheme Combining Fuzzy-
logic and Functional-logic Resources", Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Vol. 160, Issue 10, pp.
1402-1419.
Naturalgas Online (2010), www.naturalgas.org, Accessed on lIApriV2010.
203
Newell, M. (2003), "Safe Transfer of LNG between a Floating Production or Storage Barge
to a Transportation Vessel at an Exposed Offshore Location", Spring National Meeting,
America Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), March 30-April 3, New Orleans, U.S.A.
Norman, B. F. (1987), "Reliability Engineering for Electronic Design", Marcel Dekker
Incorporated, New York, USA.
Nova Scotia Department of Energy (2005), "Code of Practice: Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities", Department of Energy, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, July 13.
0stvik, I., Vanem, E. and Castello, F. (2005), "HAZID for LNG Tankers", SAFEDOR
Report D.4.3.1.
Pattison, A. C. and Andrews, J. D. (1999), "Genetic Algorithm for Optimal Safety System
Design", Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part E: Journal of
Process Mechanical Engineering. Vol. 213, pp. 187-197.
Pauperas, J. (1991), "Cause-consequence Analysis of a Generic Space Station Computer
System", Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, Orlando, Florida, U. S. A.
Pillay, A. (2001), "Formal Safety Assessment of Fishing Vessels", PhD Thesis, Liverpool
John Moores University, UK.
Pillay, A. and Wang, J. (2002), "Risk Assessment of Fishing Vessels using Fuzzy Set
Approaches", International Journal of Safety, Quality and Reliability, Vol. 9, No.2, pp.
163-181.
Pillay, A. and Wang, J. (2003), "A Risk Ranking Approach Incorporating Fuzzy Set
Theory and Grey Theory", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 79, No.1, pp.
61-67.
204
Pillay, A. and Wang, J. (2003), "Technology and Safety of Marine Systems", Elsevier
Ocean Engineering Book Series, Vol. 7, ISBN: 0080441483.
Pitblado, R. M., Baik, J., Hughes, G. J., Ferro, C. and Shaw, S. J. (2004), "Consequences of
LNG Marine Accidents", CCPS Conference, June 29-July 1, Orlando, U.S.A.
Podofillini, L., Zio, E. and Vatn, J. (2006), "Risk-informed Optimisation of Railway Tracks
Inspection and Maintenance Procedures.", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol.
91, pp.20-35.
Power, B. P. E. (2002), "Assessment of Potential Risk Associated with Location of LNG
Receiving Terminal Adjacent to Bajamar and Feasible Alternative Locations"; Paper
Prepared for Bajamar Real Estate Services, S. A. de C. V. Bajamar, El Sauzal, Baja,
California, June 30.
Pratap, R. (2002), "Getting Started with MATLAB: Version 6: A Quick Introduction for
Scientists and Engineers", Oxford University Press, Inc., ISBN: 0195150147.
Prato, T. (2007), "Assessing Ecosystem Sustainability and Management Using Fuzzy
Logic", Ecological Economics, Vol. 61, Issue I,pp. 171-177.
PVA (1997), A Guide to Improving the Safety of Passenger Vessel Operations by
Addressing Risk, Arlington, pp.I-28.
ReCAAP (2010).
http://www.recaap.org/incidentlpdflreports/201 0/August%2020 10%20Report%20(O).pdf.
Accessed on 25/0ctober/20 1O.
Risknology (2006), "Failure Rate Data to the Independent Risk Analysis of the Cabrillo
Port LNG Deepwater Port", A Report Prepared/or U.S. Coast Guard Agency, January.
205
Ross, T. J (2004), "Fuzzy Logic with Engineering Applications", John Wiley and Sons Inc.,
2nd Edition, ISBN: 9780470860755.
Rosqvist, T. and Tuominen, R. (2004), "Qualification of Formal Safety Assessment: an
Exploratory Study", Safety Science, Vol. 42, Issue 2, pp. 99-120.
Rubinstein, R. Y. and Kroese, D. P. (2007), "Simulation and the Monte Carlo Method",
Wiley Interscience, 2nd Edition, ISBN: 0470139013.
Sakawa, M. (2002), "Genetic Algorithms and Fuzzy Multiobjective Optimization", Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
Samrout, M., Chatelet, E., Kouta, Rand Chebbo, N. (2009), "Optimization of Maintenance
Policy Using the Proportional Hazard Model", Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
Vol. 94, Issue 1, pp. 44-52.
Sandia National Laboratory (2005), "Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of
a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water", A Report Prepared for u.s.
Department of Energy. SAND2004-6258, California.
Savic, D. A., Godfrey, W. A. and Knezevic, 1. (1995), "Optimal Opportunistic Maintenance
Policy using Genetic Algorithm, 1: Formulation", Journal of Quality in Maintenance
Engineering, Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 34-49.
Sii, H. S. (2001), "Marine and Offshore Safety Assessment", PhD Thesis, School of
Engineering, Liverpool John Moores University, United Kingdom.
Sii, H. S., Ruxton, T. and Wang, J., (2001), "A Fuzzy-Logie-Based Approach to Qualitative
Safety Modelling for Marine Systems.", Reliability Engineering and System Safety. Vol.
73, pp.I9-34.
206
SINTEF (2002), "Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA),', 4th Edition, A Handbook Prepared
by SINTEF Technology and Society on the Behalf of the OREDA Project, ISBN: 82 14
027055.
SIGTTO (1997), "Site Selection and Design of LNG Ports and Jetties", Society of
International Gas Tankers and Terminal Operators Ltd, London, UK.
Smith, D. J. (2005), "Reliability, Maintainability and Risk", Butterworth Heinemann, 7th
Edition, ISBN 0 7506 6694 3.
Soares, C. G. and Teixeira, A. P. (2001), "Risk Assessment in Maritime Transportation",
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 74, pp. 299-309.
Soh, C. K. and Yang, J. (1996), "Fuzzy Controlled Genetic Algorithm Search for Shape
Optimization" American Society of Civil Engineers, Journal of Computing in Civil
Engineering. Vol. 10, No.2, pp. 143-150.
Soman, K. P. and Misra, K. B. (1993), "Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis Using Resolution
Identity", International Journal of Fuzzy Sets and. Mathematics, Vol. I, pp. 193-212.
Sonmez, M., Yang, J. B. and Holt, G. D. (2001), "Addressing the Contractor Selection
Problem Using an Evidential Reasoning Approach", Engineering. Construction and
Architectural Management. Vol. 8, No.3, pp. 198-210.
Sophia, R. and Anne, N. (2006), "Economics of the LNG Value Chain and Corporate
Strategies: An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Vertical Integration", 1OthAnnual
ISNIE Conference, September 21-24, Boulder, Colorado - USA.
Sugeno, M. and Kang, K. T. (1988), "Structure Identification of Fuzzy Model", Fuzzy Sets
and Systems, Vol. 28. No. 1. pp. 15-33.
207
Sugeno, M. and Yasukawa. T. (1993), "A Fuzzy Logic Based Approach to Qualitative
Modelling", IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, Vol. 1, No.1. pp. 7-31.
Sullivan, G. P., Pugh, R., Melendez, A. P. and Hunt, W. D. (2002), "Operations &
Maintenance Best Practices, A Guide to Achieving Operational Efficiency" Prepared by
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Under Contract DE-AC06-76RL01831 for the
Federal Energy Management Program, U.S. Department of Energy, December.
Sun, X. and Collins, R. (2007), "The Application of Fuzzy Logic in Measuring
Consumption Values: Using Data of Chinese Consumers Buying Imported Fruit",
Food Quality and Preference, Vol. 18, Issue 3, pp. 576-584.
Sun, Y., Ma, L. and Mathew, J. (2009), "Failure Analysis of Engineering Systems with
Preventive Maintenance and Failure Interactions", Computers and Industrial Engineering,
Vol. 57, Issue 2, pp. 539-549.
Swanson, L. (2001), "Linking Maintenance Strategies to Performance", International
Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 70, Issue 3, pp. 237-244.
Takehis, K., (2006), "A Simple Method to Derive Minimal Cut Sets for a Non-coherent
Fault Tree", International Journal of Automation and Computing, Vol. 3, pp.l51-156.
Tang, W. H., Spurgeon, K., Wu, Q. H. and Richardson, Z. J. (2004), "An Evidential
Reasoning Approach to Transformer Condition Assessment", IEEE Transaction on Power
Delivery, Vol. 19, No.4, pp. 1696-1703.
TimeLeyLaw (2010), http://www.timrileylaw.comILNG_TANKERS.htm. Accessed on
25/0ctober/20 1O.
208
Torres-Echeverria, A. C. and Thompson, H. A. (2007), "Multi-objective Genetic Algorithm
for Optimisation of System Safety and Reliabilty Based on IEC 61508 Requirements: a
Practical Approach", Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part 0:
Journal of Risk and Reliability Engineering, Vol. 221, Issue 0, pp. 193-205.
Trbojevic, V. M. (2002), "Risk Based Methodology for Safety Improvements in Ports",
Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 71, pp. 93-109.
Tummala, V. M. R. and Leung, Y. H. (1995), "A Risk Management Model to Assess
Safety and Reliability Risks", International Journal of Quality and Reliability
Management, Vol. 13, No.8, pp. 53-62.
Ung, S. T (2007), "The Development of Safety and Security Assessment Techniques and
their Application to Port Operations", PhD Thesis, School of Engineering, Liverpool John
Moores University, UK.
Ung, S. T., Williams, V., Chen, H. S., Bonsall, S and Wang, J. (2006), "Human Error
Assessment and Management in Port Operations using Fuzzy AHP", Marine Technology
Society Journal, Vol. 40, No.1, pp. 73-86.
Vanem, E., Antao, P., Ostvik, I and De Comas, F. D. C. (2008), "Analysing the Risk of
LNG Carrier Operations", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 93, Issue 9, pp.
1328-1344.
Vanem, E., 0stvik, I. and Antao, P. (2006), "Risk Analysis of LNG Tankers", SAFEDOR
Report D.4.3.2.
Venkatesan, R. and Kumar, V. (2002), "A Genetic Algorithms Approach to Growth Phase
Forecasting of the Wireless Subscribers", International Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 18,
pp. 625-646.
209
Villemeur, A. (1992), "Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety Assessment",
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK.
Valaityte, A., Dunnett, S. J. and Andrews, J. D. (2009), "Development of an Algorithm for
Automated Cause-consequence Diagram Contruction", International Journal of Reliability
and Safety, Vol. 4, No. I, pp. 46-68.
Vyzaite, G., Dunnett, S and Andrews, J. D. (2006), "Cause-consequence Analysis of Non-
repairable Phased Missions", Reliability Engineering and System Safety
Vol. 91, Issue 4, pp. 398-406.
Walker, A. H., Scholz, D., Boyd, J. and Bums, G. H. (2003), "LNG Transportation, Risk
Management, and Maritime Security", International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
April6-10, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
Wang, J. (1997), "A Subjective Methodology for Safety Analysis of Safety Requirements
Specifications", IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, Vol. 5, No 3, pp. 418-430.
Wang, J. (2000), "A Subjective Modelling Tool Applied to Formal Ship Safety
Assessment", Ocean Engineering, Vol. 27, Issue 10, October, pp.l019-1035.
Wang, J. (2001), "The Current Status and Future Aspects in Formal Safety Assessment",
Safety Science, Vol. 38, pp.19-30.
Wang, J. (2002), "A Subjective Methodology for Safety Analysis of Safety Requirements
Specifications", IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, Vol. 5, No 3, pp. 418-430.
Wang, J. and Foinikis, P. (2001), "Formal Safety Assessment of Containerships", Marine
Policy, Vol. 25, No.2, pp. 143-157.
210
Wang, J., Ruxton, T. and Labrie, C. R. (1995) "Design for Safety of Marine Engineering
Systems with Multiple Failure State Variables", Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
Vol. 50, No.3, pp. 271-284.
Wang, J., Sii, H. S., Yang, J. B., Pillay, A., Yu, D., Liu, J., Maistralis, E. and Saajedi, A.
(2004), "Use of Advances in Technology for Maritime Risk Assessment", Risk Analysis,
Vol. 24, No.4, pp. 1041-1063.
Wang, J. and Trbojevic, V. M. (2007), "Design for Safety of Marine and Offshore
Systems", Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology, London.
Wang, J. and Yang, J. B. (2001), "A Subjective Safety Based Decision Making Approach
for Evaluation of Safety Requirements Specifications in Software Development",
International Journal of Safety, Quality and Reliability, Vol. 8, No.8, pp. 35-57.
Wang, J. Yang, J. B. and Sen, P. (1995), "Safety Analysis and Synthesis Using Fuzzy Set
Modelling and Evidential Reasoning", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 47,
pp.l03-118.
Wang, J., Yang, J. B. and Sen, P. (1996), "Multi-person and Multi-attribute Design
Evaluations Evidential Reasoning Based on Subjective Safety and Cost Analyses",
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 52, No.2, pp.113-128.
Wang, L.X. (1997), "A Course in Fuzzy Systems and Control", Prentice-Hall Incorporated,
U.S.A.
Wang, Y., Chin, K., Poon, G. K. K. and Yang, J. (2009) "Risk Evaluation in Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis using Fuzzy Weighted Geometric Mean", Expert Systems with
Applications, Vol. 36, Issue 2, Part 1, pp. 1195-1207.
211
Wilcox, L. T. R., Burrows, C. D. R. M., Ghost, S. and Ayyub, B. M. (2000), "Risk-Based
Technology Methodology for the Safety Assessment of Marine Compresses Natural Gas
Fuel Systems", In Proceedings of the 8th International Co-operation on Marine
Engineering Systems (IeMES) and Society of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineer
(SNAME), New York Metropolitan Section Symposium, May 22-23, New York, U.S.A, Vol.
38, No.3, pp. 193-207.
Xu, D. L. and Yang, J. B. (2005), "Intelligent Decision System Based on the Evidential
Reasoning Approach and its Application", Journal of Telecommunication and Information
Technology, No.3, pp. 73-80.
Xu, D. L., Yang, J. B. and Wang, Y. M. (2006), "The Evidential Reasoning Approach for
Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis under Interval Uncertainty", European Journal of
Operational Research, Vol. 174, No.3, pp. 1914-1943.
Yang, J. B. (2001), "Rule and Utility Based Evidential Reasoning Approach for
Multiattribute Decision Analysis under Uncertainties", European Journal of Operational
Research, Vol. 131, No.1, pp. 31-61.
Yang, J. B. and Singh, M. G. (1994), "An Evidential Reasoning Approach for Multiple
Attribute Decision Analysis with Uncertainty", lEE Transactions on System, Man and
Cybernetic, Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 1-18.
Yang, J. B. and Xu, D. L. (2000), "Intelligent Decision System via Evidential Reasoning,
Version 1.1, IDSL, Cheshire, England.
Yang, J. B. and Xu, D. L. (2002), "Nonlinear Information Aggregation via Evidential
Reasoning in Multiattribute Decision Analysis under Uncertainty", lEE Transactions on
System, Man and Cybernetic-Part A: Systems and Humans, Vol. 32, No.3, pp. 376-393.
212
Yang, J. B. and Xu, D. L. (2002), "On the Evidential Reasoning Algorithm for Multiple
Attribute Decision Analysis under Uncertainty", lEE Transactions on System, Man and
Cybernetic-Part A: Systems and Humans, Vol. 32, No.3, pp. 289-304.
Yang, Y. and Soh, C. K. (2000), "Fuzzy Logic Integrated Genetic Programming for
Optimization and Design", American Society of Civil Engineers, Journal of Computing in
Civil Engineering, Vol. 14, No.4, pp. 249-254.
Yang, Z. (2006), "Risk Assessment and Decision Making of Container Supply Chains",
PhD Thesis, School of Engineering, Liverpool John Moores University, United Kingdom.
Yang, Z., Bonsall, S., Wall, A. and Wang, J. (2005), "Reliable Container Supply Chains -
A New Risk Assessment Framework for Improving Safety Performance", Journal of World
Maritime University, Vol. 4, No.1, pp. 105 - 120.
Yang, Z., Wang, J., Bonsall, S., Fang, Q. and Yang, J. B. (2005), "A Subjective Risk
Analysis Approach for Container Supply Chains", International Journal of Automation and
Computing, Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 85-92.
Yen, J. and Langari, R. (1999), "Fuzzy Logic Intelligence, Control, and Information",
Prentice Hall, Incorporated, New Jersey, U. S. A.
Zadeh, L. A. (1965), "Fuzzy Set", Information and Control, Vol. 8. pp. 338-353.
Zadeh, L. A. (1987), "Fuzzy Sets and Applications: Selected Papers", John Wiley, New
York.
Zhu, Q. H., Kuang, X. G. and Shen, Y. G. (2003), "Risk Matrix Method and Its Application
in the Field of Technical Project Risk Management", Engineering Sciences, Vol. 5, pp. 89-
94.
213
Appendices
Appendix A - Published Paper
Nwaoha, T. C., Yang, Z. and Wang, J. (2011), "Application of Genetic Algorithm
to Risk-Based Maintenance Operations of Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier Systems",
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part E: Journal of Process
Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 225, No.1, pp. 40-52.
Abstract: The concept of genetic algorithm (GA) is used to model the cost of
maintenance and repairs of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) containment system and its
transfer arm, after assessing the total risk of the systems using the probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) technique. Thefailure frequency data of the basic events of the fault
tree developed to model the LNG containment system and transfer arm, which is
implemented and evaluated to estimate thefailure frequencies of the systems, is derived
from a careful literature search. A total risk formula is developed, which is dependent
on hazard severity weight, failure frequencies, time and cost of maintenance and
repairs of the LNG carrier systems. Theformula serves as the objective function while
new total cost allocated for maintenance and repairs of the LNG carrier systems as a
whole is the constraint with boundaries of presenting initial/unit cost of maintenance
and repairs of each containment system and transfer arm. Optimization is carried out
on the objective function and its constraint for identification of new cost of maintaining
and repairing the containment system and transfer arm independently with the powerful
tool of GA using Matlab version 7. 7 software for improvement of the system's safety
level.
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Appendix 8 - An Appendix of Chapter 2
Appendix 81 - LNG Carriers AccidentslIncidents
Various accidents have happened in the LNG industry. Some of the accidents that
involved LNG carriers, which did not result to LNG spills are listed in Table B1.
Table 81: Incidents/Accidents of LNG Carriers (Ostvik, et al., 2005)
Date of Ship Name Description of Accident
Accident
1974 Methane Progress While in port, the vessel touched bottom. There
was no LNG spillage or injury/fatality recorded.
1979 El Paso Paul The vessel was stranded at sea. There was severe
Kayser damage to the bottom, ballast tanks, motors
water and bottom of containment system set up.
No casualty or LNG spillage was recorded.
1980 LNG Libra While at sea, the shaft moved against rudder.
Tailshaft fractured. There was no spillage of
LNG or injuries/fatalities.
1980 LNG Taurus The vessel was stranded at port and ballast tanks
all flooded thus leading to listing the vessel.
There was extensive bottom damage, but no
spillage of LNG or injury/fatality was
experienced.
1984 Melrose There was fire in engine room at sea and no
structural damage sustained. No LNG spill or
fatality/injury was recorded.
1985 Gadinia (Bebatik) Steering gear failure at the port. No LNG spill or
injury/fatality was experienced.
1985 Isabella There were cargo valve failure and the cargo
overflows during unloading of LNG. There were
also deck fractures, though no LNG spillage or
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injury/fatality was experienced.
1990 Bachir Chihani While at sea, the vessel sustained structural
cracks allegedly caused by stressing and fatigue
in the inner hull. There was no LNG spillage or
fatality/injury.
1995 Mourad Didouche Lifting cable broke while the turbine was lifted
out of engine room, causing turbine to fall from
great height at the shipyard.
1996 LNG Finima The vessel was boarded by pirates while
anchored. The pirates stole paint and broached a
lifeboat. There was no spillage or casualty.
1996 Mostefa Ben There was electrical fire in the main engine
Boulaid room, while at quay discharging. This caused
power lost and there was no spillage.
1996 LNG Portovenere Fire broke out in the engine room, when the
empty vessel was at sea, which killed 6 people.
There was no spillage of LNG.
1997 LNG Capricorn Sustained damage to shell plating on contact
with mooring dolphin, while in port. No spillage
or damage to cargo system.
1997 Northwest Swift Had a collision with fishing vessel. The port side
and bulkward were damaged. No water ingress
and LNG spillage.
1998 Mostefa Ben Had generator problems in port, though there
Boulaid was no spillage or casualty.
1998 LNG Bonny Had complete power failure while at sea. There
was no spillage or injuries/fatalities.
1999 Methane Polar Had engine breakdown and struck the Petrotrin
jetty at Point Fortin, while being brought in
empty for loading. There was no casualty or
damage experienced.
1999 Matthew Had tailshaft problem and overheated bearing
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while at sea. There was no casualty or spillage
experienced.
2000 Hanjin Pyeong
Taek
Had collision with bulk earner at sea and
damage occurred to shell plating. No spillage
reported.
2000 LNG Jamal Insulating materials & vinyl sheeting burnt out
during welding operations on No.3 tank cover at
wharf. There was no spillage or casualty
experienced.
2000 Hoegh Galleon
(Pollenger)
An outbreak of fire in the yard caused damage to
part of the tank insulation, which caused the
death of 1 ship builder.
2001 Ramdane Abane There was engine break down at sea and no
casualty or spillage was experienced.
2001 Methane Polar Had collision with bulk carrier at sea (in ballast),
which caused minor hull damage and sustained
holing to bow. There were three injuries and one
fatality of the bulk carrier crew, though no
spillage was recorded.
2002
2003 Methane Princess Had fire on board while under construction. Fire
burnt part of the cargo tanks, though the damage
Norman Lady The LNG vessel collided with a u.S. Navy
submarine, while at sea (in ballast condition).
The LNG vessel suffered a leakage of seawater
into the double bottom of the dry tank area.
Therewas no LNG spillage or injuries/fatalities.
2003
was minor. There was no injury/fatality.
Century Sustained main engine damage offshore. There
was no LNG spillage or injury/fatality of
personnel.
2003 Hoegh Galleon
(Pollenger)
Developed gearbox problems at sea. There was
no LNG spillage or casualty.
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2003 Hilli Had a boiler tube failure at anchorage. The
failure did not result to any spillage or casualty.
2003 Gimi Softly touched bottom when approaching pier. It
did not result in injuries or spillage.
2003 Fuwairit Grounded during passage of typhoon "Maemi"
while under construction. There was no casualty
experienced.
2003 Galicia Spirit Grounded after mooring ropes released during
typhoon "Maemi" while under construction. The
vessel sustained damage to bottom and starboard
shell plating, but there was no casualty.
2003 LNG Berge
Arzew
While under construction, mooring ropes broke
due to typhoon "Maemi" and drifted away from
berth, touching bottom. The bottom plating was
damaged, but there was no casualty.
2004 British Trader There was minor electrical fire onboard, which
damaged one transformer while the vessel was at
sea. No spillage or casualty reported.
2004 Methane Arctic The vessel had minor fire breakout after being
struck by lightning during discharge. There was
slight damage on the vessel, but no casualty or
LNG spillage.
2004 Tenage Lima Made contact with a submerged rock due to a
strong southerly current. The starboard side shell
plating in way of No. 1 membrane tank was
heavily damaged, though, no spillage or
casualties were experienced.
2005 Hispania Spirit The hull was damaged via contact during
berthing operations, which resulted in oil spill.
There was no LNG spill or casualty.
2005 Laieta Engine breakdown while in ballast. LNG spill or
casualty was not experienced.
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2005 Methane Kari Suffered damaged insulation and had nitrogen
Elin leak (Gasbridge, 2010). No LNG spillage or
casualty reported.
2006 Catalunya Spirit The vessel had damaged insulation (Gasbridge,
2010). No LNG spillage or casualty reported.
2008 Catalunya Spirit The vessel went adrift for hours off Cape Cod
because a computer glitch caused the vessel to
lose power (TimeLeyLaw, 2010). No spillage or
casualty was experienced.
2009 Matthew Grounded on coral reef habitat off the south
coast of Puerto Rico near Guayanilla (DARRP,
2010). No spillage or casualty reported.
2010 Umm Al Amad The vessel was boarded by six pirates while
sailing. The pirates stole cash from the ship and
crew members (ReCAAP, 2010). There was no
spillage or casualty.
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Appendix C - Appendices of Chapter 4
Appendix Cl.l- Example of how a Simple Genetic Algorithm Works
Example 1
Suppose the objective function of an LNG engineering product to be "minimise" is
symbolised as f(x, y) = xsin(5x) + 1.2ysin(3y), such that 0 ~ x s 12 and 0 ~ y ~ 12. Find
the following:
i.The steps of genetic algorithm before convergence.
ii. The first iteration by manual calculation.
Solution
The steps of finding the genetic algorithm are:
1. Randomly pick four numbers from the variable bounds as population size.
2. Convert the selected numbers to binary.
3. Assign fitness values to these numbers, using the objective function.
4. Rank the fitness values from lowest to highest.
5. Select the first half of the population for the next generation.
6. Select pairs of parents from half of the population chosen for next generation.
7. Apply crossover on the parents to produce individuals that will produce discarded
ones, maintaining the same population size.
8. Apply mutation to the formed individual (children) by flipping a 0 to 1 and vice
versa.
9. Arrange the parents and formed individual (children) as the new population with size
of four.
10. Check for convergence, and go back to step 2 if it has not been achieved.
ii. The objective function which is also called fitness function in GA, to be minimised is:
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f(x,y) = xsin(Sx) + 1.2ysin(3y)
Subject to:
o~x~ 12
O~y~ 12
The variables (x and y) values picked randomly for population size of four are:
1. 3.0 and 7.0
2. 9.0 and 2.0
3. 4.0 and 5.0
4. 6.0 and 8.0
Using binary based genetic algorithm called steady state or single objective genetic
algorithm, the real numbers of x and y variables, which are in base ten (denary number)
are converted to binary numbers, where bits of the binary represents the genes of the
chromosomes. The binary numbers and fitness values of population member 1 (3.0 and
7.0), population member 2 (9.0 and 2.0), population member 3 (4.0 and 5.0), and
population member 4 (6.0 and 8.0) will be represented respectively as follows:
1. 0011 and 0111 with fitness value of 3.7867
3
1 - 1
0- 1
Then 3 10 = 0011 2
221
73 - 1
1 - 1
0- 1
Then 7 10 = 0111 2
f(x,y) = xsin(5x) + 1.2ysin(3y)
f(3.0,7.0)=3.0sin(5 x3.0)+ 1.2x7.0xsin(3x7.0)
= 3.7867
Therefore fitness value = 3.7867
In a similar way, binary and fitness values of population member 2,3 and 4 are found.
2. 1001 and 0010 with fitness value of6.6148
3. 0100 and 0101 with fitness value of2.9210
4. 0110 and 1000with fitness value of6.9047
The fitness values, population member, binary numbers of the variables, and
chromosomes (individuals) are presented in Table C1.1 and C1.2 which are explained
as follows:
• Population member 1 with fitness value 3.7867 and chromosome 00110111 has x
and y values as 3 and 7 with string of 0011 and 0111.
• Population member 2 with fitness value 6.6148 and chromosome 10010010 has x
and y values as 9 and 2 with string of 1001 and 0010.
• Population member 3 with fitness value 2.9210 and chromosome 01000101 has x
and y values as 4 and 5 with string ofOl00 and 0101.
• Population member 4 with fitness value 6.9047 and chromosome 01101000 has x
and y values as 6 and 8 with string of OliO and 1000.
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Rank the fitness value in Table C 1.1 from lowest to highest in Table C 1.2 with their
corresponding population number, variables value and their string (binary)
representation, and individual/chromosomes. The first half of the population member
will be selected for next generation. From Table C 1.2, the population member 3 and 1
will be selected for next generation while the population member 2 and 4 will be
discarded. Population member 2 and 4 positions will be replaced after reproduction
(crossover and mutation).
Table CI.I: Unranked FirstlInitial Population Fitness Value
Population x y String x String y String x Ea String y = Fitness
member chromosome(individual) value
1 3 7 0011 0111 00110111 3.7867
2 9 2 1001 0010 10010010 6.6148
3 4 5 0100 0101 01000101 2.9210
4 6 8 0110 1000 01101000 6.9047
Table Cl.2: Ranked First/Initial Population Fitness Value
Population x y String x String y String x Ea String y = Fitness
member chromosome(individual) value
3 4 5 0100 0101 01000101 2.9210
1 3 7 0011 0111 00110111 3.7867
2 9 2 1001 0010 10010010 6.6148
4 6 8 0110 1000 01101000 6.9047
The chromosomes of population member 3 and 1 are selected as the chromosomes
(parents) in the population that will mate to reproduce new chromosomes/individuals
(offspring or children) by crossover and mutation of their bits (genes). The
chromosomes (parents) which will be part of the new population are:
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• 01000101
• 00110111
Applying single point crossover on the parents by exchange of the first four bits from
the right, two new chromosomes (offspring or children) will be reproduced. The
reproduced chromosomes are:
• 01000111
• 00110101
The next step is to mutate the reproduced chromosomes by randomly flipping the fifth
bit (0) of the first string from the right to that of second string and vice versa. Thus the
mutation operator is not necessary inventing new information but simply working as an
insurance policy against premature loss of genetic information (Colley, 1999). It allows
for various attributes of the candidate solutions to be occasionally altered (Charles and
Freeman, 1999). The reproduced chromosomes (offspring) will replace the
chromosomes of population member 2 and 4 in Table C 1.2, maintaining the same
population size. The new offspring (children) that is produced after mutation are:
• 01010111
• 00100101
The new population formed will be made up of population member 3 and 1 in Table
C 1.2 and the mutated chromosomes produced after crossover. The four new population
chromosomes are:
1. 01000101
2. 00110111
3. 01010111
4. 00100101
Convert the binary string of the chromosomes to their real values and corresponding
fitness values and check if the population have converged. The values are:
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l. 4 and 5 with fitness value of2.9210 as illustrated in Table Cl.1, Cl.2 and Cl.3.
01000101 = 0100 EB0101
0100=> 0 x23 + 1 X22 +0 X21+0 x2°
=0+4+0+0
=4
Then 0100 2 = 4 10
0101 => 0 x 23 + 1 X22 + 0 xi + 1 x 2°
=0+4+0+1
=5
Then 01012 = 5)0
f(x,y) = xsin(5x) + 1.2ysin(3y)
f(4.0, 5.0) = 4.0sin(5.0x4.0) + l.2x 5.0x sin(3.0x 5.0)
=2.92
Therefore, fitness value = 2.9210
Using the same method, the real and fitness values of population member 2,3 and 4
are identified.
2. 3 and 7 with fitness value of3.7867 as illustrated in Table Cl.l, C1.2 and C1.3.
3. 5 and 7 with fitness value of5.189 as illustrated in Table C1.3.
4. 2 and 5 with fitness value of l.9 as illustrated in Table C1.3.
Table Cl.3: Unranked Second Generation Fitness Value
Population x y String x String y String x E9String y = Fitness
member chromosome (individual) value
1 4 5 0100 0101 01000101 2.9210
2 3 7 0011 0111 00110111 3.7867
3 5 7 0101 0111 01010111 5.1890
4 2 5 0010 0101 00100101 1.9000
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Table C1.4: Ranked Second Generation Fitness Value
Population x y String x String y String x Ea String y = Fitness
member chromosome (individual) value
4 2 5 0010 0101 00100101 1.9000
1 4 5 0100 0101 01000101 2.9210
2 3 7 0011 0111 00110111 3.7867
3 5 7 0101 0111 01010111 5.1890
In a similar way to Table C 1.1 and C 1.2, Table C 1.3 and C lA are described as follows:
• Population member 1 with fitness value 2.9210 and chromosome 01000101 has x
and y values as 4 and 5 with string of DIDOand 0101.
• Population member 2 with fitness value 3.7867 and chromosome 00110111 has x
and y values as 3 and 7 with string of DOlI and 0111.
• Population member 3 with fitness value 5.1890 and chromosome 01010111 has x
and y values as 5 and 7 with string of0101 and 0111.
• Population member 4 with fitness value 1.9000 and chromosome 00100101 has x
and y values as 2 and 5 with string ofOOl0 and 0101.
From Table C1.3, fitness value of the population members is not the same. Therefore,
the new population formed did not converge at first iteration/generation. The population
will continue to be ranked as in Table CIA, selected, crossover and mutated using the
same procedures from generation to generation until the population start to converge at
fitness value of -25.279 as illustrated in Figure C1.2, x and y values of 10.99 and 12
using Matlab version 7.7 GA and direct search toolbox.
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Figure CI.t. Graph of Fitness against Generation of Example 1
Appendix et.2 -Boolean Algebra Rules
Representation of State of an Event
1 and 0 are used to represent two states of an event in Boolean algebra. There meanings
are as follows:
• 1 means occurrence, true or on .
o means non-occurrence, false or off .•
Applying these two states to events, for example, event A and B.
A = 0; means event A does not occur.
A = 1; means event A occur.
B = 0; means event B does not occur.
227
B = 1;means event B occur.
The signs are:
• "+" stands for "OR".
• "n" stands for "OR".
• "." stands for "AND".
• "u" stands for "AND".
• " A"," B", etc. stand for not "A", "B" etc.
Boolean Algebra Laws
1. Identity laws.
2. Idempotent laws.
3. Complementative laws.
4. Commutative laws.
5. Associative laws.
6. Distributive laws.
7. Absorption laws.
8. De Morgan's laws.
Identity Laws
Identity law states the following:
1. Addition of an event and zero is equal to that event. For examples,
A+O=A
B+O=B
2. Addition of an event and one is equal to one. For examples,
A+ 1 = 1
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8+1=1
3. Multiplication of an event and zero is equal to zero. For examples,
A.O=O
8.0=0
4. Multiplication of an event and one is equal to that event. For examples,
A.l =A
8.1 =8
Idempotent Laws
Idempotent laws state its laws as follows:
1. Addition of an event and the same event is equal to that event. For examples,
A+A=A
B+B=B
2. Multiplication of an event and the same event is equal that event. For examples,
A.A=A
B.B=B
Complementative Laws
Complementative laws states that:
1. Multiplication of an event and "not an event" is equal to zero. For example,
A. A=O
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B. B=O
2. Addition of an event and "not an event" is equal to one.
A+ A= 1
-
B+ B= 1
3. Not "not an event" is equal to an event. For example,
A=A
-
B=B
Commutative Laws
Commutative laws states that:
1. Addition of an event and another different event is the same. For example,
A+B=B+A
2. Multiplication of an event and another event is the same. For example,
A.B=B.A
Associate Laws
Associative laws state the following:
1. Addition of an event (A) and another event (B) in bracket, added to third event (C) is
equal to the first event (A) added to second and third event added in bracket. For
example,
(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)
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2. Multiplication of an event (A) and another event (B) in bracket, multiplied with third
event (C) is equal to the first event (A) multiplied to the second (B) and third (C)
event multiplied in bracket. For example,
(A • B) • C = A • (B • C)
Distributive Laws
Distributive laws state the following:
1. An event (A) multiplied with the second (B) and third (C) event added in bracket, is
equal to the event (A) multiplied by the second event (B) and added to event (A)
multiplied to the third event (C). For example,
A • (B + C) =A • B + A • C
2. An event (A) added to two different events (B and C) that is multiplied to each, other
in a bracket, is equal to an event (A) added to the first event (B) in bracket,
multiplied by an event (A) added to the second event (C) in bracket. For example,
A + (B • C) = (A + B) • (A + C)
Absorption Laws
Absorption laws states as follows:
1. An event (A) multiplied by another event (B), added to event (A) is equal to the
event (A). For example,
A+A.B=A
2. An event (A) multiplied by two events (A and B) added together in bracket is
equal to an event (A). For example,
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A. (A+ B)=A
De Morgan's Laws
De Morgan's laws states as follows:
1. Not "an event (A) multiplied by another event (B)" is equal to not an event (A)
added to not an event (B). For example,
A.B = A+ B
2. Not "an event (A) added to another event (B)" is equal to not an event (A) multiplied
by not an event (B). For example,
A+B = A. B
Minimal cut sets can be obtained using Boolean algebra laws and FT shown in Figure
C1.2 and C1.3. It helps to determine the occurrence probability of top event (hazardous
event) in the LNG industry.
In Figure C 1.2 if event A is independent of event B, the occurrence probability (P) of A
is P(A) and the occurrence probability of B is P(B), the probability of occurrence of the
top event K becomes:
P(K) = P(A • B) = P(A) x P(B)
In Figure Cl.3, if one event is independent of the other and the occurrence probability
of event A and Bare P(A) and P(B). The top event K becomes:
P(K) = P(A +B)
= P(A) + P(B) - P(A • B)
= P(A) + P(B) - P(A) x P(B)
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The application of theorem above and Boolean algebra are shown in example 2, below.
K
Figure C1.2: AND Gate Fault Tree
K
Figure Cl.3: OR Gate Fault Tree
Example2
A sprinkler system in an LNG ship accommodation region is being assessed. It is
considered that a hazardous situation arises if there is a fire (event Xl) and the sprinkler
system fails (event X2). A fire (event Xl) starts if there is a source of ignition (event
X3) and some combustible material is available (basic event A). Event X2 can occur
either due to electrical failure (basic event B) or due to pump failure (basic event D).
233
Event X3 can occur either because of event B above or due to another source of ignition
being present (basic event C). It is assumed that event A, B, C and D follow an
exponential distribution. The failure rate (llhour) of event A, B, C and D are 0.0001,
0.0002, 0.0003 and 0.0004, respectively.
1. Draw the fault tree for the above problem.
11. Find the minimum cut sets.
111. Discuss how the likelihood occurrence of top event can be reduced/eliminated.
IV. Calculate the occurrence likelihood of the top event at time t = 10,000 hours,
as summing events A, B, C and D are independent of each other.
Solution
1. The fault tree is illustrated in Figure C 1.4.
11. Xl. X2
= (A • X3 ) • (B +D)
= A • (B + C) • (B + D)
=(A.B+A.C). (B+D)
=A •B •(B+D)+A •C (B+D)
=A.B.B+A.B.D+A.C.B+A.C.D
=A •B (l +D)+A. C (B+D)
=A • B + A • C (B + D)
=A.B+A.B.C+A.C.D
=A • B (1 + C) +A • C • D
=A.B+A.C.D
iii. Ensure that A and B do not happen simultaneously or A, C and D do not happen
simultaneously.
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Figure Ct.4: Fault Tree Analysis of Sprinkler System
iv. At t = 10,000 hours
P(Event) = 1 - e-At
A= 0.0001
peA) = 1- e-o.oool x 10,000= 0.632
A= 0.0002
PCB)= 1- e-0.0002x 10,000= 0.865
A= 0.0003
P(C) = 1- e-0.0003x 10,000= 0.95
A= 0.0004
P(D) = 1- e-O.OOO4 x 10,000=0.982
P(Sprinkler system failure) = peA • B + A • C • D)
= peA. B) + P(A.C.D) - P(A.B.A.C.D)
= peA) x PCB)+ peA) x P(C) x P(D) - peA • B • C • D)
=~x~+~x~x~-~x~x~x~
= 0.632 x 0.865 + 0.632 x 0.95 x0.982 - 0.632 x 0.865 x 0.95 x 0.982
= 0.627
At t = 10,000 hours, 0.627 is the occurrence likelihood of top event (sprinkler failure).
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Appendix D - Appendices of Chapter 5
Appendix DI.I - The 125 Fuzzy Rules of the LNG Carrier System Maintenance
Cost
Rule #1: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is very cheap.
Rule #2: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #3: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #4: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #5: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is expensive.
Rule #6: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very low AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #7: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is cheap.
Rule #8: IF LTCC is low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #9: IF LTCC is low, LMD is long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is normal.
Rule #10: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #11: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is cheap.
Rule #12: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #13: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC
is normal.
Rule #14: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #15: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is very expensive.
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Rule #16: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #17: IF LTCC is high, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is normal,
Rule #18: IF LTCC is high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #19: IF LTCC is high, LMD is long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #20: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is very expensive.
Rule #21: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is normal,
Rule #22: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #23: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #24: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
very expensive.
Rule #25: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is very expensive.
Rule #26: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #27: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #28: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is long AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #29: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #30: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is normal,
Rule #31: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #32: IF LTCC is low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #33: IF LTCC is low, LMD is long AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is normal.
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Rule #34: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #35: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is normal,
Rule #36: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #37: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is medium AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #38: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is long AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #39: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #40: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is normal,
Rule #41: IF LTCC is high, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
normal,
Rule #42: IF LTCC is high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #43: IF LTCC is high, LMD is long AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #44: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
very expensrve.
Rule #45: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #46: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is normal.
Rule #47: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #48: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is long AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #49: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC
is very expensive.
Rule #50: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is expensive.
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Rule #51: IF LTee is very low, LMD is medium AND Lspe is very cheap, THEN
LMe is cheap.
Rule #52: IF LTee is very low, LMD is long AND Lspe is cheap, THEN LMe is
normal.
Rule #53: IF L'I'Cf' is very low, LMD is very long AND Lspe is average, THEN LMe
is normal.
Rule #54: IF LTee is very low, LMD is very short AND Lspe is costly, THEN LMe
is cheap.
Rule #55: IF LTee is very low, LMD is short AND Lspe is very costly, THEN LMe
is normal.
Rule #56: IF LTee is low, LMD is medium AND Lspe is very cheap, THEN LMe is
cheap.
Rule #57: IF LTee is low, LMD is long AND r.ssc is cheap, THEN LMe is normal.
Rule #58: IF LTee is low, LMD is very long AND isrc is average, THEN LMe is
expensive.
Rule #59: IF LTee is low, LMD is very short AND Lspe is costly, THEN LMe is
normal.
Rule #60: IF LTee is low, LMD is short AND Lspe is very costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #61: IF LTee is moderate, LMD is medium AND Lspe is very cheap, THEN
LMe is cheap.
Rule #62: IF LTee is moderate, LMD is high AND tsrc is cheap, THEN LMe is
normal.
Rule #63: IF LTee is moderate, LMD is very long AND Lspe is average, THEN LMe
is expensive.
Rule #64: IF LTee is moderate, LMD is very short AND LSpe is costly, THEN LMe
is normal.
Rule #65: IF LTee is moderate, LMD is short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #66: IF LTee is high, LMD is medium AND Lspe is very cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #67: IF LTce is high, LMD is high AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMe is
expensive.
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Rule #68: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #69: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #70: IF LTCC is high, LMD is short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #71: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is normal.
Rule #72: IF the LTCC is very high, LMD is long AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #73: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is average, THEN
LMC is very expensive.
Rule #74: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #75: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is short AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is very expensive.
Rule #76: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #77: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #78: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #79: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #80: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is normal.
Rule #81: IF LTCC is low, LMD is long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #82: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #83: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very low AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #84: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is normal.
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Rule #85: IF LTCC is low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC is
expensive,
Rule #86: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is normal.
Rule #87: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very long AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #88: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very short AND LSPC is average, THEN
LMC is normal.
Rule #89: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #90: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is medium AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is expensive.
Rule #91: IF LTCC is high, LMD is long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #92: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #93: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #94: IF LTCC is high, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensrve,
Rule #95: IF LTCC is high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #96: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #97: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC
is expensive
Rule #98: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is average, THEN
LMC is normal.
Rule #99: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is short AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #100: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is very costly, THEN
LMC is very expensive.
Rule #101: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is cheap.
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Rule #102: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #103: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #104: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #105: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #106: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is normal.
Rule #107: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #108: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #109: IF LTCC is low, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
normal.
Rule #110: IF LTCC is low, LMD is long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule # Ill: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is normal.
Rule #112: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #113: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
normal,
Rule #114: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #115: IF LTCC is moderate, LMD is long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #116: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #117: IF LTCC is high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
nonnal.
Rule #118: IF LTCC is high, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
normal,
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Rule #119: IF LTCC is high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #120: IF LTCC is high, LMD is long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC is
very expensive.
Rule # 121: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very long AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is expensive.
Rule #122: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC
is normal.
Rule #123: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is short AND LSPC is average, THEN LMC is
expensive.
Rule #124: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is medium AND LSPC is costly, THEN LMC
is expensive.
Rule #125: IF LTCC is very high, LMD is long AND LSPC is very costly, THEN LMC
is very expensive.
Appendix Dl.2 - The Results of Expert #2, #3, and #4 Fuzzy Conclusions for the
Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of the LNG Containment System
Result of Expert #2 Fuzzy Conclusion
Expert #2 estimates the values of LTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.29, 0.47 and 0.69 on
the scale of [0, 1] as illustrated in Figures D 1.1, D 1.2 and D 1.3 respectively. The sets of
the fired fuzzy rules are illustrated in Table D 1.1.
Expert #2 Fuzzy Conclusion
The fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a f.JIMC value ofO.55 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a f.JIMC value ofO.45 associated with "normal" linguistics term.
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Figure D1.1: Membership Function for LTCC of LNG Containment System (Expert #2)
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Figure D1.2: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Containment System (Expert #2)
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Figure D1.3: Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Containment System (Expert #2)
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Table D1.1: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of
LNG Containment System (Expert #2)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (,u) Linguistic term
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LTCC LMD LSPC LMC
#3 0.55 0.35 0.55 0.35 Very Low Medium Average Normal
#8 0.45 0.35 0.55 0.35 Low Medium Average Normal
#79 0.55 0.65 0.45 0.45 Very Low Short Costly Normal
#84 0.45 0.65 0.45 0.45 Low Short Costly Normal
#103 0.55 0.65 0.55 0.55 Very Low Short Average Cheap
#104 0.55 0.35 0.45 0.35 Very Low Medium Costly Normal
#108 0.45 0.65 0.55 0.45 Low Short Average Normal
#109 0.45 0.35 0.45 0.35 Low Medium Costly Normal
Result of Expert #3 Fuzzy Conclusion
Expert #3 estimates the values of LTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.28, 0.48 and 0.7 on
scale of[O, 1] as illustrated in Figures D1.4, D1.5, and D1.6 respectively. The sets of the
fired fuzzy rules are illustrated in Table Dl.2.
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Figure D1.4: Membership Function for LTCC of LNG Containment System (Expert #3)
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Figure 01.5: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Containment System (Expert #3)
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Figure 01.6: Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Containment System (Expert #3)
Table D1.2: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of
LNG Containment System (Expert #3)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (P) Linguistic term
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LTCC LMD LSPC LMC
#3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 Very Low Medium Average Normal
#8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 Low Medium Average Normal
#79 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 Very Low Short Costly Normal
#84 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 Low Short Costly Normal
#103 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 Very Low Short Average Cheap
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#104 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 Very Low Medium Costly Normal
#108 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 Low Short Average Normal
#109 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 Low Medium Costly Normal
Expert #3 Fuzzy Conclusion
The fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a J1lMC value ofO.5 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a J1lMC value ofO.5 associated with "normal" linguistics term.
Result of Expert #4 Fuzzy Conclusion
Expert #4 estimates the values of LTCC, LMO, and LSPC to be 0.25, 0.46, and 0.67 on
scale of[O, 1] as illustrated in Figures 01.7,01.8, and 01.9 respectively. The sets of the
fired fuzzy rules are illustrated in Table 01.3.
Very low Low Moderate High Very High
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Figure Dl.7: Membership Function for LICC of LNG Containment System (Expert #4)
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Figure D1.8: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Containment System (Expert #4)
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Figure Dl.9:Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Containment System (Expert #4)
Table Dl.3: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of LNG
Containment System (Expert #4)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value tu) Linguistic tenn
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LTCC LMD LSPC LMC
#3 0.75 0.3 0.65 0.3 Very Low Medium Average Nonnal
#8 0.25 0.3 0.65 0.25 Low Medium Average Nonnal
#79 0.75 0.7 0.35 0.35 Very Low Short Costly Nonnal
#84 0.25 0.7 0.35 0.25 Low Short Costly Nonnal
#103 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.65 Very Low Short Average Cheap
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#104 0.75 0.3 0.35 0.3 Very Low Medium Costly Normal
#108 0.25 0.7 0.65 0.25 Low Short Average NonnaI
#109 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.25 Low Medium Costly Normal
Expert #4 Fuzzy Conclusion
The fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a f..I.LMC value ofO.65 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a f..I.LMC value of0.35 associated with "normal" linguistics term.
Appendix Dl.3 - The Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 Uncertainty Treatments of the Unit
Cost of Maintenance of the LNG Transfer Arm
Expert #1 Opinion
Expert #1 estimates the values ofLTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.22, 0.25 and 0.24 on
scale of[O, 1] as illustrated in Figures D1.10, D1.11 and D1.12 respectively. The 8 fired
fuzzy rules are:
Rule #1: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN
LMC is very cheap.
Rule #2: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #6: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
Rule #7: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is cheap.
Rule #26: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #31: IF LTCC is low, LMD is short AND LSPC is very cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
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Rule #102: IF LTCC is very low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC
is cheap.
Rule #107: IF LTCC is low, LMD is very short AND LSPC is cheap, THEN LMC is
cheap.
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Figure Dl.lO: Membership Function for LTCC of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #1)
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Figure D1.11: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #1)
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Figure D1.12: Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert # 1)
A max-min method is applied on the membership function values of the LTCC, LMD,
and LSPC to produce the membership function value of the LMC of the LNG transfer
arm as illustrated in Table C lA.
Table D1.4: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of LNG
Transfer Arm (Expert # 1)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (,u) Linguistic term
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LTCC LMD LSPC LMC
#1 0.9 0.75 0.8 0.75 Very Low Very Short Very Cheap Very Cheap
#2 0.9 0.25 0.2 0.2 Very Low Short Cheap Cheap
#6 0.1 0.75 0.8 0.1 Low Very Short Very Cheap Cheap ,
#7 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.1 Low Short Cheap Cheap
#26 0.9 0.25 0.8 0.25 Very Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#31 0.1 0.25 0.8 0.1 Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#102 0.9 0.75 0.2 0.2 Very Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
#107 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.1 Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
The Fuzzy Conclusion
The Expert #1 fuzzy conclusion includes:
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• The LMC has a /-lIMe value ofO.75 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value ofO.25 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
In a similar way, the fuzzy conclusions of Expert #2, #3 and #4 are produced. The
Expert #2 fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value ofO.65 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value of 0.35 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
The Expert #3 fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value ofO.8 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value of 0.2 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
The Expert #4 fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value ofO.6 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a /-lIMe value ofOo4 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
The fuzzy conclusions of Expert #1, #2, #3 and #4 can be aggregated as follows:
For "very cheap" linguistic term, the A(,uIMe) value ofLMC for LNG transfer arm is:
(0.75 + 0.65 + 0.8 +,0.6)/4 = 0.7
For "cheap" linguistic term, the A{,uIMe) value ofLMC for LNG transfer arm is:
(0.25 + 0.35 + 0.2 + 004)/4 = 0.3
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Defuzzification of Fuzzy Conclusion
C· I WIXI +W2X2 0.7x125000+0.3x250000 $162nsp va ue = = = 500
WI + w2 0.7 + 0.3
Therefore, CSYSTEM{2U) = $162500
Appendix Dl.4 - The Results of Expert #2, #3, and #4 Fuzzy Conclusions for the
Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of LNG Transfer Arm
Result of Expert #2 Fuzzy Conclusion
Expert #2 estimates the values of LTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.24, 0.27 and 0.22 on
scale of[O, I] as illustrated in Figure Dl.13, Dl.14 and Dl.I5 respectively.
Very low Low Moderate High Very High
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Figure Dl.13: Membership Function for LTCC of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #2)
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Figure D1.14: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #2)
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Figure Dl.15: Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Transfer Ann (Expert #2)
Table Dl.5: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the unit Cost of Maintenance of the
LNG Transfer Ann (Expert #2)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (P) Linguistic tenn
LTee LMD LSPC LMe LTee LMD LSPC LMe
#1 0.8 0.65 0.9 0.65 Very Low Very Short Very Cheap VeryChcap
#2 0.8 0.35 0.1 0.1 Very Low Short Cheap Cheap
#6 0.2 0.65 0.9 0.2 Low Very Short Veryeheap eheap
#7 0.2 0.35 0.1 0.1 Low Short Cheap Cheap
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#26 0.8 0.35 0.9 0.35 Very Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#31 0.2 0.35 0.9 0.2 Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#102 0.8 0.65 0.1 0.1 Very Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
#107 0.2 0.35 0.1 0.1 Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
Expert #2 Fuzzy Conclusion
The fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a IJ.IMC value ofO.65 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a IJ.IMC value of 0.35 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
Result of Expert #3 Fuzzy Conclusion
Expert #3 estimates the values ofLTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.23, 0.24, and 0.21 on
scales of [0, 1] as illustrated in Figure D 1.16, D 1.17 and D 1.18 respectively.
Very low Low Moderate High Very High
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Figure D1.16: Membership Function for LTCC of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #3)
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Figure D1.17: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #3)
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Figure DI.IS: Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #3)
Table DI.S: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of
LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #3)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (JJ) Linguistic tenn
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LTCC LMD LSPC LMC
#1 0.85 0.8 0.95 0.8 Very Low Very Short Very Cheap Very Cheap
#2 0.85 0.2 0.05 0.05 Very Low Short Cheap Cheap
#6 0.15 0.8 0.95 0.15 Low Very Short Very Cheap Cheap
#7 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.15 Low Short Cheap Cheap
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#26 0.85 0.2 0.95 0.2 Very Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#31 0.15 0.2 0.95 0.15 Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#102 0.85 0.8 0.05 0.05 Very Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
#107 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.05 Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
Expert #3 Fuzzy Conclusion
The fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a IJ.IMC value of 0.8 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a IJ.IMC value ofO.2 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
Result of Expert #4 Fuzzy Conclusion
Expert #4 estimates the values of LTCC, LMD, and LSPC to be 0.25, 0.28, and 0.26 on
scale of [0, 1] as illustrated in Figures D1.19, D1.20 and D1.21 respectively.
Very low Low Moderate High Very High
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Figure D1.19: Membership Function for LTCC of LNG Transfer Ann (Expert #4)
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Figure D1.20: Membership Function for LMD of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #4)
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Figure Dl.21: Membership Function for LSPC of LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #4)
Table D1.6: Fired Fuzzy Rules for Determination of the Unit Cost of Maintenance of
LNG Transfer Arm (Expert #4)
Rules Fuzzy membership function value (u) Linguistic term
LTCC LMD LSPC LMC LrCC LMD LSPC LMC
#1 0.75 0.6 0.7 0.6 Very Low Very Short Very Cheap Very Cheap
#2 0.75 0.4 0.3 0.3 Very Low Short Cheap Cheap
#6 0.25 0.6 0.7 0.25 Low Very Short Very Cheap Cheap
#7 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.25 Low Short Cheap Cheap
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#26 0.75 0.4 0.7 0.4 Very Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#31 0.25 0.4 0.7 0.25 Low Short Very Cheap Cheap
#102 0.75 0.6 0.3 0.3 Very Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
#107 0.25 0.6 0.3 0.25 Low Very Short Cheap Cheap
Expert #4 Fuzzy Conclusion
The fuzzy conclusion includes:
• The LMC has a I1LMC value ofO.6 associated with "very cheap" linguistics term.
• The LMC has a I1LMC value ofO.4 associated with "cheap" linguistics term.
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Appendix E - Appendices of Chapter 6
Appendix E1.1 - An Example of Fuzzy Set Manipulation Used in Risk Assessment
of LNG Carrier Component
Example I
Suppose E = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.75, 1); L = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.75, 1) and C = (0, 0, 0, 0,
0.75, 1,0.75) ofan LNG carrier component. What is the level of the system safety?
Solution
S=CoExL
Ils = Ile oE «i. = (,u~,......111 ... )
° ° ° ° ° ° °
° ° ° ° ° ° °
° ° ° ° ° ° °
IlE xL ° ° ° ° ° ° °
° ° ° ° ° ° °° ° ° ° ° 0.75 0.75
° ° ° ° ° 0.75 1
Using max-min method
Il~ = max(min(0,01min(0,01min(O,01min(O,01min(O.75,01min(1,01min(O.5,O))
=max(O,O,O,O,O,O,O)
=0
Il~ = max(min (O,01min(O,01min(O,01min(O,01 min(O.75,01min(1,01 min(O.5,0))
=max(O,O,O,O,O,O,O)
=0
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f.1; = max(min(O,O 1 min(O,O),min(O,O 1 min(O, 01 min(0.75, 0),min(I,O), min(0.5,0))
=max(O,O,O,O,O,O,O)
=0
f.1.~ = max(min(0,01 min(O, 01min(0,01 min(0,0),min(0.75, 0),min(I,01min(0.5,0))
=max(O,O,O,O,O,O,O)
=0
f.1.~ = max(min(O, 0), min(O,O),min(O, 01 min(O,0),min(0.75,0 1min(I,01min(0.5,0))
=max(O,O,o,o,o,o,o)
=0
f.1~ = max(min(O,O 1 min(O,O), min(O,O1min(O,0), min(0.75,01 min(I,0.751 min(0.5, 0.75))
= max(0,0,0,0,0,0.75,0.5)
= 0.75
f.1~ = max(min(O,01 min(O,O),min(O,O 1min(0,0),min(0.75,01 min(I,0.751 min(0.5, I))
= max(0,0,0,0,0,0.75,0.5)
=0.75
=>s= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.75, 0.75)
f.1s =(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.75, 0.75)
The Best-Fit method is applied as follows:
dij{j = 1,2,3,4)
=0.25
d12(SI' average)=~(O-oy +(0-0)2 +(0-0)2 +(0-0.5)2 +(0-1)2 +(0.75-0.25)2 +(0.75-0)2
= 1.436
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= 1.561
= 1.639
aij(j = 1,2,3,4)
ail = Vn.251 = 1
/ v 10.25
ai2 = 0.2;{.436 = 0.174
ai4 = 0.2;{.639 = 0.153
Pil = 10+0.174 +0.160 +0.153) = 0.672
P - 0.1741 = 0.11712 - 11.487
P - 0.1601 = 0 108;3 - 11.487 .
P - 0.1531 = 0 10314 - 11.487 .
PII +Pil + PI3 +PI4 = 0.672 + 0.117 + 0.108 + 0.103 = 1
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Mapping PH' P;2 , P;3 and P;4 back to four safety expression implies:
s(s,)= {(0.672,"poor"1(0.117, "average"),(0.108, "good"),(0.103, "excellent")}
This means that the safety/risk level of the LNG carrier component belongs to "poor"
with a DoB of 67.2%, "average" with a DoB of 11.7%, "good" with a DoB of 10.8%
and "excellent" with DoB of 10.3%.
Appendix E1.2 - Failure Modes (Fire and Explosion 2, Fire and Explosion 3,
Structural Defect 1, Structural Defect 2, Structural Defect 3, Corrosion Effect 1,
Corrosion Effect 2, Corrosion Effect 3, Containment Pressure, Pressure Relief
System Failure and Installation Defect) Modelling of "LNG Containment System"
1. Fire and explosion 2
Suppose LI2 = {l/1.0,2/0.9,3/0.2,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
Cl2 = {ljO,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.l,6/0.8, 7/1}
EI2 = {IjO,2/0.1,3/0.75,4/0.1,5/0.75,6/0, 7/0}
SI2 =C12oEI2 XL12 = {Ij0.1,2/0.1,3/0.1,4/0,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
S(SI2) ={(0.2258,"poor"), (0.2459,"average"1(0.2726," good"1(0.2557, "excellent")}
where w12 = 0.137; QI2 = 0.624
2. Fire and explosion 3
Suppose LI3 = {lj1.0,2/0.9,3/0.2,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
CI3 = {IjO,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.l,6/0.8,7/1}
E)3 = {IjO,2/0.l,3/0.75,4/1.0,5/0.75,6/0,7/0}
S13 =C13 0 EI3 X L13 = {IjO.l,2/0.1,3/0.l,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
S(SI3) ={(O.2258,"poor"1 (0.2459,"average"1 (0.2726,"good"1(o.2557," excellent")}
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where W13 = 0.045; QI3 = 0.624
3. Structural defect 1
Suppose LI4 = {l/0.3,2j1.0,3jO.8,4jO.l,5jO,6jO,7jO}
CI4 = {l/0,2jO,3jO,4jO,5jO.l,6jO.8,7j1.0}
EI4 = {ljO,2jO,3jO.l,4jO.75,5jl.O,6j0.3, 7jO}
SI4 =C14 OEI4 XLI4 = {l/0.3,2j0.3,3j0.3,4jO.l,5jO,6jO,7jO}
S(SI4) ={(0.1695," poor"1(0.1806, "average"1(O.3778," good"1(0.2721," excel/ent")}
where WI4 = 0.137; QI4 = 0.674
4. Structural defect 2
Suppose LIs = {l/0.3,2j1.0,3jO.8,4jO.l,5jO,6jO,7jO}
CIS = {l/0,2jO,3jO,4jO,5jO.l,6jO.8,7j1.0}
EIS = {ljO,2jO,3jO.l,4jO.75,5jl.O,6jO.3,7jO}
SIS=CIS oEIS xLls = {l/0.3,2jO.3,3jO.3,4jO.l,5jO,6jO,7jO}
S(SIS) ={(0.1695," poor"1(0.1806," average"1(0.3778," good"1(0.2721, "excellent")}
where wlS = 0.137; QIS = 0.674
5. Structural defect 3
Suppose LI6 = {Ij0.3,2j1.0,3jO.8,4j0.1,5jO,6jO,7jO}
CI6 = {l/0,2jO,3jO,4/0,5/0.1,6/0.8,7/1.0}
EI6 = {l/0,2/0,3j0.1,4/0.75,5jl.O,6jO.3,7jO}
SI6 =C16 OEI6 XP.6 = {IjO.3,2j0.3,3jO.3,4j0.1,5jO,6jO,7jO}
S(SI6) ={(0.1695," poor"}(0.1806," average"} (0.3778, "good"}(0.2721, "excellent")}
where Wl6 = 0.045; Q16 = 0.674
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6. Corrosion effect 1
Suppose LI7 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.7S,S/1,6/0.4,7/0.1}
Cl7 = {l/1.0,2/0.7S,3/0.1,4/0,S/0,6/0,7/0}
E17 = {l/0.2S,2/1,3/0.7S,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
SI7 =C17 oE17 XL17 = {I/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.75,5/0.7S,6/0.4,7/0.1}
S(SI7) = {(0.1544, IIpoor"),(0.542S, IIaverage"~(0.1719, IIgood"~(0.1312,1 excellent")}
where W17 = 0.137, QI7 = 0.551
7. Corrosion effect 2
Suppose LI8 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.75,5/1,6/0.4,7/0.1}
CI8 = {l/1.0,2/0.7S,3/0.1,4/0,S/0,6/0,7/0}
EI8 = {I/0.2S, 2/1, 3/0. 7S, 4/0, S/O,6/0, 7/0}
SI8 =C18 OEI8 XLI8 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.7S,S/0.7S,6/0.4, 7/0.1}
S(SI8) ={(0.1544, IIpoor"~(0.542S, IIaveragell~(0.1719,IIgood"~(0.1312,1 excellent")}
where Wl8 = 0.067; QI8 =O.SSI
8. Corrosion effect 3
Suppose LI9 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.7S,S/I,6/0.4, 7/0.1}
CI9 = {l/1.0,2/0.7S,3/0.1,4/0,S/0,6/0,7/0}
EI9 = {l/0.2S,2/1,3/0.7S,4/0,S/O,6/0,7/0}
SI9 =C19 0 E19 XL19 = {ljO,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.7S,S/0.7S,6/0.4, 7/0.1}
S(SI9) = {(0.IS44, IIpoor"~(0.S42S, IIaverage"~(0.1719,1 good"~(O.1312,"exce/lent")}
where W19 = 0.04S; Q19 = 0.SS1
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9. Containment pressure
Suppose Lilo = {l/0,2/0.1,3/0.7,4/1.0,5/0.7,6/0.1,7/0}
Cm = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.1,6/0.8,7/1.0}
s.; = {l/0,2/0.1,3/0.7,4/1.0,5/0.7,6/0.1, 7/0}
SilO =CIlO 0 EHO X Lilo = {l/O,2/0.1,3/0.1, 4/0.1, 5/0.1,6/0.1, 7/0}
S(SIIO) ={(0.2271,"poor"1(0.2730," average"1(0.2729," good"1(0.2270, "excellent")}
where WHO = 0.034; QHO = 0.608
10. Pressure relief system failure
Suppose LIIl = {l/0.2,2/1.0,3/0.9,4/0.2,5/0,6/0,7/0}
CIlI = {l/0.1,2/0.4,3/1.0,4/0.8,5/0.1,6/0, 7/0}
EIIl = {l/0,2/0.1,3/0.6,4/1.0,5/0.6,6/0.1,7/0}
Sill =CIlI 0EllI XLIII = {l/0.2,2/0.8,3/0.8,4/0.2,5/0,6/0,7/0}
S(SIII) ={(0.1649,"poor"1(0.1793,"average"1(0.4103," good"1(0.2454,"excellent")}
where Wlli = 0.034; QIlI = 0.670
11. Installation defect
Suppose Lm = {l/0,2/0.1,3/0.1,4/0.8,5/1.0,6/0.3,7/0}
Cm = {l/1.0,2/0.75,3/0.2,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
Em = {l/0.25,2/1.0,3/0.75,4/0.1,5/0,6/0,7/0}
S112 =Cm 0 Em x L112 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.75,5/0.75,6/0.3,7/0}
S(S1I2) ={(0.1379,"poor"1(0.5685," average"1 (0.1673,"good"l (0.1263,"excellent")}
where wll2 = 0.045; Qll2 = 0.552
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Appendix E1.3 - Failure Modes (Manual Release Failure, Auto Release Failure,
Fire and Explosion 1, Fire and Explosion 2, Fire and Explosion 3, Application of
Ship Motion, Failure of Motion and Controls, Pipe Rupture, Overpressure
Material Defect 1, Material Defect 2 and Material Defect 3) Modelling of "LNG
Transfer Arm"
I. Manual release failure
Suppose L2l = {l/0.3,2/1.0,3/0.75,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
C2l = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.1,6/0.8,7/1}
E2l = {l/0,2/0.l,3/0.75,4/1.0,5/0.75,6/0,7/0}
821 =C2l 0 E2l X L2l = {l/0.1,2/0.1,3/0.l,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
8(S2l) ={(O.2258,"poor"~(0.2459, "average"~(O.2726,"good"~(O.2557, "excellent")}
where W2l = 0.047; Q2l = 0.6236
2. Auto release failure
Suppose L22 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.l,4/0.75,5/1,6/0.4,7/0.1}
C22 = {l/1.0,2/0.75,3/0.l,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
E22 = {l/0.25,2/1,3/0.75,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
822 =C22 0 E22 X L22 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.l,4/0.75,5/0.75,6/0.4,7/0.l}
8(822) ={(0.1544,"poor"~(0.5425," average"1(0.1719," good"1(0.1312, "excellent")}
3. Fire and explosion 1
Suppose L23 = {l/O.3,2/1.0,3/0.8,4/0.l,5/0,6/0,7/0}
C23 = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.l,6/0.8, 7/1}
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E23 = {I/0,2/0,3/0.1,4/0.2,S/0.7S,6/1.0,7/0.3}
S23 =C23 0 E23 XL23 = {I/0.3,2/0.8,3/0.8,4/0.1,S/0,6/0, 7/0}
S(S23) = {(0.l69S,"poor"1(0.l806," average"), (0.3778,"good"1(0.272l, "excellent")}
4. Fire and explosion 2
Suppose L24 = {I/0.3,2/1.0,3/0.8,4/0.l,S/0,6/0,7/0}
C24 = {I/O,2/0,3/0,4/0,S/O.l,6/0.8, 7/l}
E24 = {I/O,2/0,3/0.l,4/0.2,S/0.7S, 6/1.0,7/0.3}
S24 =C24 0 E24 X L24 = {I/0.3,2/0.8,3/0.8,4/0.l,S/0,6/0,7/0}
S(S24) = {(0.l69S,"poor"1(0.l806, "average"), (0.3778,"good"1(0.272l," excellent")}
where W24 = 0.047; Q24 = 0.6744
S. Fire and explosion 3
Suppose L2S = {I/0.3,2/1.0,3/0.8,4/0.l,S/0,6/0, 7/0}
C2S = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,S/O.l,6/0.8,7/l}
E2S = {l/0,2/0,3/0.l,4/0.2,S/0.7S,6/1.0,7/0.3}
S2S =C2S oE2S xL2S = {1/0.3,2/0.8~3/0.8,4/0.l,S/0,6/0, 7/0}
S(S2S) ={(0.169S,"poor"1(0.1806, "average"1(0.3778," good"1 (0.272l, "excellent")}
where w2S = 0.047; Q2S = 0.6744
6. Application of ship motion
Suppose L26 = {l/0,2/0.3,3/0.6,4/1.0,S/0.6,6/0.l,7/0}
C26 = {l/0,2/0.2S,3/1,4/0.7S,S/0,6/0,7/0}
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E26 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.l,4/0.8,5/1,6/0.4,7/0.l}
S26 =C26 0 E26 X L26 = {l/0,2/0.3,3/0.6,4/0.75,5/0.6,6/0.l, 7/0}
S(S26) = {(0.1605,IIpoor"~(0.3218, "average"~(0.3478, IIgood"~(0.1699, IIexcellent")}
where W26 = 0.047; Q26 = 0.6156
7. Failure of motion and controls
Suppose L27 = {l/0.1,2/0.3,3/1.0,4/0.8,5/0.1,6/0,7/0}
C27 = {lj0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.l,6/0.8,7/1.0}
E27 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.l,4/0.7,5/1.0,6/0.3,7/0}
S27 =C27 oE27 XL27 = {l/O.l,2/0.3,3/0.3,4/0.3,5/0.1,6/0,7/0}
S(S27) = {(0.1863,IIpoor"~(0.2414, "average"~(0.3411,IIgood"~(0.2312, IIexcellent ")}
where W27 = 0.047; Q27 = 0.6391
8. Pipe rupture
Suppose L28 = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0.l,5/0.9,6/1.0,7/0.3}
C28 = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.1,6/0.8,7/1.0}
E28 = {l/0,2/0,3/0.6,4/1.0,5/0.6,6/0,7/0}
S28 =C28 OE28 XL28 = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0.l,5/0.l,6/0.1,7/0.1}
S(S28) = {(0.2499,IIpoor"~(0.2729, IIaveragell~(0.2499, IIgood"~(0.2273, IIexcellent")}
9. Overpressure
Suppose L29 = {l/0.25,2/1,3/0.8,4/0.1,5/0,6/0,7/0}
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C29 = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.l,6/0.8, 7/l}
E29 = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0.l,5/0.8,6/1.0,7/0.3}
S29=C29 oE29 XL29 = {l/0.25,2/0.8,3/0.8,4/0.1,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
S(S29) = {(0.1699," poor"~(0.l81l," average"~(0.3859," good"~(0.263l," excellent")}
1o. Material defect 1
Suppose L210 = {l/0.3,2/I,3/0.75,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
C2lO= {ljO,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.2,6/0.9,7/I}
E2lO= {ljO,2/0.l,3/0.8,4/l,5/0.8,6/0.l,7/0}
S210=C2lO 0 E210 xL210 = {ljO.2,2/0.2,'3/0.2,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
S(S210)= {(0.2II2, IIpoor"~(0.2289, IIaverage"),(0.2837, IIgood"~(0.2762, IIexcellent")}
where w21O=0.143; Q2lO=0.64II
11. Material defect 2
Suppose L21I = {l/OJ,2/I,3/0.75,4/0,5/0,6/0,7jO}
C21I = {l/0,2jO,3jO,4jO,5jO.2,6/0.9, 7/I}
E211 = {ljO,2/0.1,3/0.8,4/l,5/0.8,6/0.1,7/0}
Sm =C21I 0 E21I X Lm = {l/0.2,2/0.2,3/0.2,4jO,5/0,6/0,7/0}
S(S211)={(0.2112, IIpoor"~(0.2289," averagell~(0.2837, IIgood"~(0.2762, IIexcellent")}
where Wm= = 0.143; Q211= 0.6411
12. Material defect 3
Suppose L212 = {l/0.3,2/l,3/0.75,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
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Cm = {l/0,2/0,3/0,4/0,5/0.2,6/0.9, 7/1}
Em = {l/0,2/0.1,3/0.8,4/1,5/0.8,6/0.1,7/0}
8212 =Cm 0 Em x Lm = {l/0.2,2/0.2,3/0.2,4/0,5/0,6/0,7/0}
8(8212) = {(0.2112,"poor"~(0.2289," average"),(0.2837, "good"~(0.2762," excellent")}
where wm = 0.071; Q212 = 0.6411
Appendix EtA - Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Containment System for
RC02A
When RC02A is used, the safety levels of the failure modes such as corrosion effect 1,
corrosion effect 2, corrosion effect 3, containment pressure and installation defect can
be improved to "excellent" with DoB of 100%. Their safety levels are synthesised with
the ones of other failure modes of the LNG containment system to obtain the safety
description as follows:
s(s 2A) = {(0.1198," poor "1(0.1298," average"1(0.2096," good"1 (0.5408," excellent ,,)}
The safety description is mapped onto the utility space as follows:
U{S2J = {(0.1198, "slightly preferred's, (0.l298, "moderately preferred's; (0.2096,
"preferred"), (0.5408, "greatly preferred')}
The four experts estimated the cost of RC02A to be "Moderately high" and vary about
"Moderately high". Their cost estimates are expressed as follows:
C~A = {I/O, 2/0.2, 3/1,4/0.6, 5/0.l, 6/0, 7/0}
CiA = {1I0, 2/0.1, 3/1.0, 4/0.6, 5/0.2, 6/0.l, 7/0}
CiA = {1I0, 2/0.3, 3/1.0,4/0.4,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
C1A = {I/O, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.4, 5/0'-6/0, 7/0}
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The Best-Fit method is applied on the estimated costs, followed by mapping the
outcome onto utility spaces to identify the utility descriptions for cost in a similar way
to the one of RC01A. Therefore, the four utility estimates for cost of RC02A can be
expressed as follows:
U(c~J = {(0.0676, "slightly preferred'), (0.0841, "moderately preferred'), (0.777,
"preferred"), (0.0713, "greatly preferred'yi
U(C;A) = {(0.1026, "slightly preferred'), (0.1348, "moderately preferred'), (0.6572,
"preferred's, (0.1054, "greatly preferred')}
U(C~J = {(0.0671, "slightly preferred'), (0.083, "moderately preferred'), (0.7772,
"preferred'), (0.0727, "greatly preferred')}
U(C;A) = {(0.0671, "slightly preferred'), (0.083, "moderately preferred'), (0.7772,
"preferred"), (0.0727, "greatly preferred')}
The above four judgements is synthesised and the cost estimate is obtained as follows:
U(C2A) = {(0.059, "slightly preferred'), (0.0754, "moderately preferred'), (0.803,
"preferred's, (0.0626, "greatly preferred')}
U(C2A) and U(S2J are synthesised with weights of 0.5 and 0.5 respectively, and the
outcome expressed as follows:
U(U 2A) = {(0.0838, "slightly preferred'), (0.0969, "moderately preferred'), (0.5322,
"preferred"), (0.2872, "greatly preferred')}
The preference degree for RC02A can be found in a similar way to the one of RCO1A
as:
P2A =0.217xO.0838 +0.478x 0.0969+ 0.739x 0.5322+ l x 0.2872
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P2A =0.745
Appendix EI.S - Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Containment System for
RC03A
Adopting RC03A. corrosion effect 1. corrosion effect 2. corrosion effect 3. containment
pressure. installation defect. fire and explosion 1. fire and explosion 2. and fire and
explosion 3 safety levels are improved to "excellent" with DoB of 100%. Their safety
levels are combined with the ones of other failure modes of the LNG containment
system to obtain the following safety estimate:
s(s 3A) = {(0.0458." poor "1 (0.049." average "1 (0.1062," good "1(0.799" excellent ")}
The safety description is mapped onto the utility space as follows:
U(S3J = {(0.0458, "slightly preferred's, (0.049, "moderately preferred's, (0.1062,
"preferred"), (0.799, "greatly prejerre(/')}
The cost of RC03A is considered to be "Very high" and varying about "Very high".
The four experts estimated the cost as follows:
C!A = {1I0,2/0, 3/0,4/0.4,5/1.0,6/0.3, 7/0}
CiA = {I/O, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.5, SILO, 6/0.2, 7/0}
CiA = {1I0, 2/0, 3/0,4/0.4,5/1.0,6/0.2, 7/0}
etA = {I/O, 2/0, 3/0,4/0.5,5/1.0,6/0.25, 7/0}
The Best-Fit method is applied to the estimated costs and the outcome is mapped onto
utility space in a similar way to the one of RCO 1A. The utility descriptions of cost for
RC03A are expressed as follows:
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U(C~J = {(0.OS98, "slightly preferred'), (0.8228, "moderately preferred'), (0.0626,
"preferred'), (0.0548, "greatly preferred')}
U(C;J = {(0.0286, "slightly preferred'), (0.9129, "moderately preferred'), (0.0315,
"preferred'), (0.027, "greatly preferred')}
U(C:A) = {(0.OS77, "slightly preferred'), (0.8263, "moderately preferred'), (0.0628,
"preferred'), (0.0532, "greatly preferred')}
U(C:A) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (1, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred'), (0,
"greatly preferred')}
The above four judgements are synthesised using the IDS to obtain the following:
U(C3J = {(0.0250, "slightly preferred'), (0.9249, "moderately preferred'), (0.0269,
"preferred'), (0.0232, "greatly preferred')}
U(C3A) and U(S3A) are synthesised with weights of 0.5 and 0.5 respectively, to obtain
utility estimates expressed below:
U(U3A) = {(0.0348, "slightly preferred'), (0.4929, "moderately preferred'), (0.0657,
"preferred'), (0.4066, "greatly preferred')}
The preference degree value for RC03A can be found in a similar way to the one of
RCOIA as:
P3A = 0.217 x 0.0348 + 0.478 x 0.4929 + 0.739 x 0.0657 + 1x 0.4066
P3A = 0.6983
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Appendix El.6 - Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Transfer Arm for RCOIB
The cost for 110 particular failure mode targeted for elimination using Re01B is
considered to be "Very low". This implies that Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 estimated the
cost as follows:
CllB = {1I1, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, SID, 6/0, 7/0}
Cl2B = {lll, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, SID, 6/0, 7/0}
C{B = {Ill, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, SID, 6/0, 7/0}
c: = {lll, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0}
The Best-Fit method is applied to C:B, Cl2B, C{B and Cl~' and the outcomes are
mapped onto utility spaces as follows:
U(C:B) = {(O, "slightly preferred"), (0, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred's, (1,
"greatly preferred') }
U(CI2B) = {CO, "slightly preferred'), (0, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred's, (1,
"greatly preferred') }
U(C13B) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (0, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred's, (1,
"greatly preferred') }
U(CI~) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (0, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred's, (1,
"greatly preferred's;
The above four judgements are synthesised using IDS to obtain the cost estimate as
follows:
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U(C1B) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (0, "moderately preferred'), (0, "preferred'), (1,
"greatly preferred')}
Suppose U(C1B) and U(SIB) are synthesised with safety and cost weights of 0.5 and 0.5
respectively. The following utility description can be obtained:
U(U1B) = {(0.0858, "slightly preferred'), (0.1057, "moderately preferred'), (0.1404,
"preferred'), (0.6681, "greatly preferred')}
The preference degree value for RCO 1B can be known using the expression below:
~B =0.217 x 0.0858 + 0.478 x 0.l057 +0.739x 0.1404 + 1x 0.6681
~B = 0.8410
Appendix EI.7 - Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Transfer Arm for RC028
Fire and explosion 1, fire and explosion 2, and fire and explosion 3 are eliminated using
RC02B. The IDS is used to synthesise their new safety/risk levels with the ones of
manual release failure, auto release failure, application of ship motion, failure of motion
and controls, pipe rupture, overpressure, material defect 1, material defect 2 and
material defect 3 to obtain the safety estimates as follows:
s(s 28) = {(0.1488," poor "1(0.1884, IIaverage"1(0.2107, IIgood "1(0.4521, II excellent")}
The safety description is mapped onto the utility' space as follows:
U(S 28) = {(0.1488, "slightly preferred'), (0.1884, "moderately preferred's, (0.2107,
"preferred"), (0.4521, "greatly preferrecl')}
The cost for elimination of fire and explosion 1, fire and explosion 2, and fire and
explosion 3 are considered to be "Moderately high" and varying about "Moderately
high". The Experts # 1, #2, #3 and #4 estimated the cost as follows:
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C~B = {l/l, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
CiB = {I/O, 2/0.1, 3/1,4/0.6,5/0.2,6/0.1, 7/0}
C~B = {I/O, 2/0.3,3/1,4/0.4,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
C~B = {I/O, 2/0.3, 3/1,4/0.4,5/0,6/0, 7/0}
The Best-Fit method is applied to C~B' CiB' ciB and C~B' followed by mapping the
outcomes onto the utility spaces. The utility descriptions of cost by Experts #1, #2, #3
and #4 are expressed as follows:
U(C~B)= {(0.0676, "slightly preferred's, (0.0841, "moderately preferred"), (0.777,
"preferred's, (0.0712, "greatly preferred')}
U(C;B) = {(0.1026, "slightly preferred'), (0.1348, "moderately preferred's, (0.6572,
"preferred'), (0.1053, "greatly preferre(/')}
U(C~B)= {(0.0671, "slightly preferred'), (0.083, "moderately preferred's, (0.7772,
"preferred'), (0.0727, "greatly preferred')}
U(C:B) = {(0.0671, "slightly preferred'), (0.083, "moderately preferred's, (0.7772,
"preferred's, (0.0727, "greatly preferred')}
The above four judgements are synthesised to obtain the following:
U(C2B) = {(0.0590, "slightly preferred's, (0.0754, "moderately preferred'), (0.8030,
"preferred's, (0.0626, "greatly preferred')}
U(C2B) and U(S2B) are synthesised with weights of 0.5 and 0.5 respectively, to obtain
the following utility estimates:
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U(U28) = {(0.0976, "slightly preferred'), (0.1252, "moderately preferred'), (0.5327,
"preferred'), (0.2445, "greatly preferred')}
The preference degree value for RC02B can be obtained as follows:
P28 =0.217 x 0.0976 +0.478 x 0.1252 +0.739 x 0.5327 +1x 0.2445
P28 =0.7192
Appendix El.8 - Cost Benefit Assessment of the LNG Transfer Arm for RC038
Fire and explosion 1, fire and explosion 2, fire and explosion 3, material defect 1,
material defect 2 and material defect 3 are eliminated using RC03B. The IDS is used to
synthesise their new safety/risk levels with the ones of manual release failure, auto
release failure, application of ship motion, failure of motion and controls, pipe rupture
and overpressure to obtain the safety estimate as follows:
S(S38) = {(O.0652," poor "1(0.0921," average"1(0.093," good "1(0.7497, "excellent ,,)}
The safety description is mapped onto the utility space as follows:
U(S38) = {(0.0652, "slightly preferred'), (0.0921, "moderately preferred'), (0.093,
"preferred'), (0.7497, "greatly preferred')}
The cost for RC03B is considered to be "Very high" and vary about "Very high". The
four Experts estimated the cost as follows:
C~B = {I/O, 2/0, 3/1, 4/0.4, 5/1, 6/0.3, 7/0}
C;B = {1I0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.5,5/1,6/0.2, 7/0}
CiB = {1I0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.4, 5/1, 6/0.2, 7/0}
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C;H = {1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.5, 5/1, 6/0.25, 7/0}
The Best-Fit method is applied to C~B' CiB' C:B, and CiB' followed by mapping the
outcomes onto the utility spaces. The utility descriptions of cost are expressed as
follows:
U(C~H)= {(0.0598, "slightly preferred's, (0.8228, "moderately preferred's, (0.0626,
"preferred's, (0.0548, "greatly preferrecf')}
U(C;H) = {(0.0286, "slightly preferred's, (0.9129, "moderately preferred's, (0.0315,
"preferred"), (0.027, "greatly preferrecf')}
U(C:n) = {(0.0577, "slightly preferred"), (0.8263, "moderately preferred"), (0.0628,
"preferred"), (0.0532, "greatly preferrecf')}
U(C:
H
) = {(O, "slightly preferred'), (1, "moderately preferred's, (0, "preferred's, (0,
"greatly preferred") }
The above four judgements are synthesised to obtain the following:
U(C3B) = {(0.0250, "slightly preferred's, (0.9249, "moderately preferred's, (0.0269,
"preferred's, (0.0232, "greatly preferred')}
U(C3B) and U(S3B) are synthesised with weights of 0.5 and 0.5 respectively, to obtain
the following utility description:
U(U3B) = {(0.0436, "slightly preferred's, (0.5232, "moderately preferred's, (0.0581,
"preferredry; (0.3751, "greatly preferred')}
The preference degree value for RC03B can be obtained as follows:
P3B =0.217x 0.0436 +0.478 x 0.5232 +0.739x 0.0581+ l x 0.3751
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P.lH = 0.6776
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